APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Carmel Borum, also known as Carnel Borum, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of two felonies – theft and evading arrest. He received an effective sentence of 18 years as a persistent offender. On appeal, he claims that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony about the value of the property in question and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon our review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Patrick Leighton Ryan, Jr., was convicted of misdemeanor theft under $500 and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days of supervised probation, with credit for time served. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred both by not requiring the State to make an election of offenses or giving a special jury instruction as to unanimity, in excluding a police property inventory from 2005, and in not taking judicial notice of the Grand Junction Police Manual and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kenneth Eugene Black, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to two counts of sale of a schedule I controlled substance within a school zone, Class B felonies. As part of the agreement, he received concurrent eight-year Range I sentences to be served at 100%, which is the drug-free school zone release eligibility. The petitioner now contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to provide the petitioner with all discovery materials prior to his accepting the plea. Following review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
 

The Petitioner, Gregory D. Valentine, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief as waived or previously determined.  The State responds that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the Petitioner’s claims without a hearing.   Upon review, we reverse and remand for further proceedings with regard to the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Petitioner, Monroe Dodson, Jr., pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.  After a sentencing hearing, Petitioner received an effective sentence of eighty-two years.  He now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s finding that Petitioner has failed to prove his ineffectiveness claim.

A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Andrew Joseph Aborizk, charging him with theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000.  Following a jury trial , Defendant was convicted of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000.  The trial court imposed a sentence of two years as a Range One standard offender  to be served on supervised probation.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his theft conviction because the State failed to prove identity of the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s conviction for theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000.

The defendant, Alexa Williams, also known as Elizabeth Williams El, timely appeals pro se her Carroll County Circuit Court jury convictions of one count each of driving a motor vehicle while the privilege to drive was suspended, driving an unregistered automobile, and operating a motor vehicle without evidence of financial responsibility. The defendant claims on appeal (1) that “the trial court erred by issuing an in personam judgment without personal jurisdiction over the blood and flesh woman” and (2) that “the trial court erred in procuring a trial without evidence of a motor vehicle or traffic on the highway.” Upon our review of the record and the briefs in this case, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Ryan T. Brandon, was convicted of public intoxication and evading arrest. He received sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days of supervised probation for evading arrest and thirty days of supervised probation for public intoxication. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the evading arrest charge, limitation of his crossexamination of the arresting officer, and failure to instruct the jury as to the defense of necessity. We hold that Defendant waived any claim of error with regard to the motion for judgment of acquittal by continuing to participate in the trial after the close of the State’s proof by calling his own witness. However, we review the issue for sufficiency of the evidence. Based upon our review of the record, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to support the charge of evading arrest. The trial court’s judgment as to that conviction is hereby reversed and dismissed. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for public intoxication. We also hold that the trial court’s exclusion of impeachment evidence, though in error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we hold that Defendant’s claim as to the jury instructions has been waived for failure to include the jury instructions in the record. The trial court’s judgment as to the public intoxication conviction is hereby affirmed.

Petitioner, Teresa Deion Smith Harris, appeals the denial of her petition for writ of error coram nobis. In the circuit court, petitioner raised a claim of newly discovered evidence relating to the timing of the victim’s death and the degree of torture that he endured. The coram nobis court summarily denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Roger Wayne Henry, Jr., was found guilty by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-504 (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years and six months at 100% service.  On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by restricting his cross-examination, (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to elicit inadmissible hearsay testimony, (4) the trial court erred by failing to order the State to play all of the Defendant’s recorded statements to the police, (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant trial counsel’s motion to withdraw, (6) the trial court erred by denying his requests to continue the trial and for funds for an expert, and (7) the trial court erred by failing to compel the State to produce the police file relative to the victim’s acting as a confidential informant.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jermaine Gwin, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him because (1) his indictment failed to track the language of the second degree murder statute and (2) the indictment failed to include an essential element of the offense. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we find the issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Jeffrey Horskins, charging him with attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at more than one-thousand dollars. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of reckless endangerment, aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000. The trial court merged the two convictions for aggravated burglary and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for reckless endangerment, nine years for aggravated assault, nine years for aggravated burglary, and three years for theft of property. The trial court further found Defendant to be an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive and ordered Defendant’s sentences for aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and theft to be served consecutively for an effective twenty-one-year sentence as a Range Two offender. The misdemeanor sentence for reckless endangerment was ordered to be served concurrently to the other sentences. On appeal, Defendant argues that the length of his sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kayln Marie Polochak, was convicted by an Overton County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and theft, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-103, 39-13-403, 39-14-103 (2014). The trial court merged the first degree and felony murder convictions and imposed a life sentence. The court also imposed concurrent sentences of fifteen years at 30% service for conspiracy to commit first degree murder, fifteen years at 100% service for especially aggravated robbery, and two years at 30% service for theft. On appeal, she contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying her motion for a judgment of acquittal, (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress her pretrial statements, (4) the trial court erred by refusing to exclude the video recording of the crime scene depicting the victim’s body at the scene and a photograph taken during the victim’s autopsy, (5) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s fear of the codefendant, (6) the trial court erred by excluding witness testimony related to the Defendant’s mother’s consenting to police questioning of the Defendant, (7) the trial court erred by failing to provide an intoxication jury instruction, (8) the trial court erred by failing to provide a duress jury instruction, (9) the mandatory life imprisonment sentence violates the federal and Tennessee constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, and (10) the juvenile court erred by transferring her case to the criminal court. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Leniel Middlebrooks, was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102, -13-103, -17-1307. Prior to trial, the State dismissed one of the counts of aggravated assault. Following a bifurcated jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of aggravated assault and facilitation of reckless endangerment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403. The Defendant then pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm while the jury was deliberating during the second phase of the trial. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for facilitation of aggravated assault and facilitation of reckless endangerment; and (2) that the trial court erred by ruling that the Defendant’s prior conviction for attempted aggravated burglary could be used to impeach the Defendant if he chose to testify at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Frazier Perry, appeals as of right from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Lorenzo Malone, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which was summarily denied by the trial court.  Because Appellant has failed to state a colorable claim that his life sentence for first degree felony murder is illegal, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tina M. Dixon, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that her trial counsel were ineffective for failing to request a ruling on a motion for additional findings of fact related to a motion to suppress; failing to raise the issue of the trial judge and the prosecutor’s potential conflicts of interest prior to trial; and failing to advise her of a proposed plea agreement.  The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, James Richardson Reece, appeals the judgment of acquittal of aggravated assault and the trial judge’s findings of contempt of court.  The appeal of the judgment of acquittal is hereby dismissed and the findings of contempt are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Jefferson Lawton Freeman, appeals as of right from the Henry County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for having been untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, James Clark, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for procedural defects and for failing to state a cognizable claim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se appellant, Jarrett Dunn, appeals as of right from the McMinn County Criminal Court’s order denying his motion to correct illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Devonta Amar Cunningham, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony.  After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective life sentence. Subsequently, he filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.  On the same day, he filed a motion for new trial and for judgment of acquittal.  The petition and the motion were denied by the trial court.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction and that the trial court erred by refusing to compel a witness to testify after the witness asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; by refusing to admit a co-defendant’s prior statement as substantive evidence; by limiting his cross-examination of a State’s witness; by allowing evidence to be admitted in violation of the rules of discovery; and by denying his petition for a writ of error coram nobis.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, David Dewayne Smith, was indicted along with three other individuals for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Before trial, the State entered a nolle prosqeui as to the charges against one co-defendant and entered into a plea agreement with another. The trial proceeded against the Petitioner and the remaining codefendant. On the third day of trial, the State announced that it had entered into a plea agreement with the remaining co-defendant, and the co-defendant would testify against the Petitioner. Trial counsel made oral motions for a mistrial and a continuance, both of which were denied by the trial court. The Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and this Court affirmed his conviction on appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the petition was denied. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the denial of post-conviction relief on 12 grounds. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, Terrence Lamont McDonald (“the Defendant”) was convicted of four counts of aggravated rape and one count of reckless endangerment, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated rape in counts two and four into his aggravated rape convictions in counts one and three, respectively. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 25 years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises claims that: 1) the State violated Batson by striking African-American potential jurors from the venire; 2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument; 3) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); 4) his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape violate principles of double jeopardy; 5) count five of the indictment fails to state an offense; 6) the Defendant’s conviction for reckless endangerment in count five violated his right to an unanimous verdict; and 7) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing  Following a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.