APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Vincent Sims, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, in which he claimed he is intellectually disabled and, therefore, ineligible for the death penalty. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis and his stand-alone claim under the intellectual disability provisions in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Jerome Wall, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and robbery. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed because appellant’s sentences had expired. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion because an illegal sentence may be challenged at any time pursuant to Rule 36.1 and that on remand, his case should be assigned to a different trial judge because the trial judge was not impartial as to the Rule 36.1 motion. The State concedes to appellant’s Rule 36.1 argument and states in its brief that this case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Jason Lee Fisher, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of felony escape, a Class E felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-16-605(a) (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years’ confinement at 60% service to be served consecutively to a previous sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Demarcus Keyon Cole, was convicted by a Madison County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of life and twenty years, to be served consecutively to a six-year sentence for a previous conviction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Octavious Taylor, filed pro se in 2013 a timely petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2012 Shelby County, guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery for which he received an effective 21-year sentence to be served at 100 percent in the Department of Correction. The petitioner asserted that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Following the appointment of counsel, the filing of an amendment to the petition, and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this timely appeal, the petitioner advances his claim of an infirm guilty plea. Because the record supports the decision of the post-conviction court, we affirm its judgment.

The petitioner, Joseph Howard Green, Jr., was originally charged with second degree murder, and he ultimately pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony.  He received a six-year sentence to be served consecutively to another sentence.  In this appeal, the petitioner contends that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made because he was mentally ill and unmedicated at the time of his plea and because he was not made aware of the consequences of the guilty plea; and (2) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment denying relief of the post-conviction court. 

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Craig Patrick Hebert, of assault, and the trial court sentenced him to six months, which was suspended and ordered to be served on probation.  On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury in accordance with Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction – Criminal No. 42.23 (Duty to Preserve Evidence); and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following the denial of the motion for new trial, the defendant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was heard and denied.  This court consolidated the appeal of the denial of his petition with the original appeal as of right in this cause.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Oblin Sabier Euceda, was charged in an eight-count indictment returned by the Davidson County Grand Jury with aggravated robbery of A.H. (the victims will be identified by initials) in Count 1, aggravated robbery of J.H. in Count 2, aggravated robbery of Z.H. (a child less than thirteen years of age) in Count 3, especially aggravated kidnapping of A.H. in Count 4, especially aggravated kidnapping of J.H. in Count 5, especially aggravated kidnapping of Z.H. (by use of a deadly weapon) in Count 6, especially aggravated kidnapping of Z.H. (a victim under thirteen years of age) in Count 7, and rape of a child, Z.H. in Count 8.  All charges were committed during a home invasion, and there was a co-defendant who is not before the court in this appeal.  The case proceeded to a jury trial where Defendant pled guilty to the first two aggravated robbery charges and the jury found him guilty as charged of the remaining offenses.  At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions in Count 6 and Count 7 for one conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping of Z.H.  After determining the length of sentence for each of the seven convictions, the trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of seventy-five years.  In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing.  After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Kenneth Paul Colvett, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the jury erred by rejecting the defense of insanity; (2) that the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to take home prior written statements made by a witness and by not admitting extrinsic evidence of the statements of two witnesses during trial; (3) that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to provide the Defendant with a transcript of a prior hearing in this case; (5) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during the cross-examination of the Defendant’s expert witness; (6) that the trial court erred by questioning the Defendant about his decision not to testify at trial; (7) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument by commenting on the Defendant’s decision not to testify; and (8) that the Defendant is entitled to a new trial based upon cumulative error.¹ Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1999, Appellant, David A. Brimmer, pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping in relation to the October 1989 disappearance and death of the  victim, for which he had been previously found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death. His death sentence was remanded by this Court. See Brimmer v. State, 29 S.W.3d 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). At resentencing, Appellant agreed to plead to aggravated kidnapping as a Class A felony with a sentence of 60 years to be served at 100%, consecutively to a life sentence for first degree murder, in exchange for the State not seeking the death penalty. Appellant subsequently filed a petition to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that his sentence for aggravated kidnapping is in contravention of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition for failing to state a colorable claim. Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Rafael Antonio Bush, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence.  State v. Rafael Antonio Bush, No. M2002-02390-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 794755 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, April 14, 2004), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed.  Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  The trial court denied the petition after a hearing, and this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment denying relief.  Rafael Antonio Bush v. State, No. M2005-02967-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 2682825 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 7, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 27, 2006).  On April 24, 2014, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief.  The post-conviction court denied the motion to reopen, and the Petitioner appeals that decision.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Clifton Swift, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of rape of a child, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting impeachment of the defendant by his prior conviction for attempting to violate the sexual offender registry act and by admitting into evidence the victim’s rape kit. In addition, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of rape of a child. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Secdrick L. Booker, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence.  The Petitioner contends that his convictions are void because he was sentenced in direct violation of Tennessee statutory law.  Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court properly denied the motion.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Gabriel Kimball, pleaded guilty to rape of a child in Bradley County Criminal Court, and the trial court sentenced him to serve fifteen years.  The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief.  Gabriel Kimball v. State, No. E2006-01562-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 2757634, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 4, 2008).  The Petitioner then sought state habeas corpus relief alleging that the judgment of conviction entered was void and that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance.  The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition finding that the Petitioner had failed to raise a cognizable habeas corpus claim.  The Petitioner appeals this dismissal, maintaining that the judgment is void and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

In February 2004, the Petitioner, Trish Wooley, pleaded guilty to three counts of theft of property valued under $500 and two counts of vandalism under $500, and further proceedings were deferred pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. In September 2004, the trial court revoked judicial diversion, sentenced the Petitioner to concurrent terms of 11 months and 29 days on each conviction, and placed the Petitioner on supervised probation. In 2013, the Petitioner sought the expunction of her criminal convictions. The trial court granted the expunction. The State appealed. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court because the Petitioner was convicted of more than one offense in a multi-count indictment and therefore was not an “eligible petitioner” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(g)(1).

The Defendant, Oren Ray Johnson, pleaded guilty to simple assault, and the trial court ordered a probationary sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days.  Thereafter, the Defendant was arrested for aggravated domestic assault, an offense to which he pleaded guilty.  The trial court issued a probation violation warrant and, after a hearing, revoked the Defendant’s probation sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement for violating the terms of his probation.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Tamir Clark, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping, arson, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Corrections.  The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.  The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we  affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Tarrence Parham, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted second degree murder and reckless aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Terrance Wooden, also known as Terrence Wooten, was convicted of the rape of the victim, who was confined to a wheelchair, and sentenced to confinement for twelve years at 100%. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Sean William Lee, pled guilty in 2004 to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to three years, which then was suspended to six years probation. In 2013, after a probation violation warrant was filed against him, he filed a pleading styled “Motion to Revoke Probation and Impose a Sentence in Absentia.” He followed this pleading by filing a petition for writ of error coram nobis, based upon what he saw as newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition without a hearing, concluding that the statute of limitations for such a pleading had expired eight years earlier and no issues were raised which could be the basis for coram nobis relief. Following our review, we affirm the order of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The appellant, Carlos Eaton, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 1995 guilty plea to first degree murder and his life sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Charles Anderson Clark, Jr., was convicted by a Henderson County jury as charged of rape, see T.C.A. § 39-13-503, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to a term of twenty-five years’ imprisonment. In this direct appeal, the Defendant-Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Leon Flannel, was convicted of murder in the perpetration of a theft and premeditated murder. In this appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, the Petitioner argues that the individual tests performed by the defense’s expert witness, along with their results, should have been introduced at trial to bolster the Petitioner’s diminished capacity defense. Upon review, we find that the petition for writ of error coram nobis is barred by the statute of limitations. Additionally, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied relief on the merits.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, William Lance Walker, of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine.  The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court.  State v. William Lance Walker, No. M2012-01319-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1799988, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, April 29, 2013), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed.  The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective on multiple grounds.  The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Williamson County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Karl P. Cooper, of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense; speeding; and violating the open container law.  The appellant received a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days and was ordered to spend sixty days of the sentence in jail before being released on probation.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to violate the rule of witness sequestration, that the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s objection to the appellant’s request to have the arresting officer demonstrate a field sobriety test, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his DUI conviction.  The State concedes that the trial court erred by allowing the violation of the rule of sequestration but contends the error was harmless.  Upon review, we conclude that the violation of the rule of sequestration was reversible error; accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.