APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Adrian R. Brown, was convicted in 1995 of three counts of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and one count of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. The appellant was given concurrent sentences of eight years’ imprisonment for the Class B felony and six years’ imprisonment for each Class C felony. The appellant entered the community corrections program, and he was recommended for a transfer to probation one year later. In October 2003, shortly before his eight-year sentence was set to expire, a violation of probation affidavit was completed. However, the petition for revocation of the appellant’s probation was dismissed in 2005. The appellant now challenges his sentences as illegal, asserting that he did not receive the pretrial jail credits to which he was entitled. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the issue is moot, and accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the appellant’s motion to correct his sentence.

The Defendant, Robert A. Bass, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-101(a)(2) (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days on probation.   On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding self-defense.  We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

Defendant, Jamayl Stoudemire, was charged by indictment with three counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder (Counts One through Three), three counts of aggravated assault (Counts Four through Six), and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Count Seven). Defendant entered a best interest plea of guilty to three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, as charged in Counts Four, Five, and Six. The remaining counts of the indictment were dismissed. The parties agreed that the three counts would run concurrently with the trial court to determine length and manner of service. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to five years for each conviction of aggravated assault to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction as a Range I offender. The trial court also denied Defendant’s request to be placed on judicial diversion. Defendant raises two issues on appeal. He argues that his five-year sentence is excessive and that the trial court should have ordered judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Nelson V. Plana, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged the petitioner’s 2004 Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convictions of two counts of first degree murder.  In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to post-conviction relief based upon the allegedly ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Michael J. Shipp, stands convicted of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated robbery and is serving an effective life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  In his post-conviction petition, petitioner claimed that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at trial because his attorney failed to seek suppression of his statement to the police.  The post-conviction court denied relief.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Cocke County Jury convicted Defendant, Randy Ray Ramsey, of second-degree murder. He received a sentence of twenty-five years to be served concurrently with a federal sentence for drug-related convictions. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder and that the trial court improperly sentenced him. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury found Appellant Dannaer Beard guilty of criminal attempt: second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of twelve years' imprisonment. Appellant now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for criminal attempt: second degree murder. Appellant also argues that the trial judge erred in not merging the two aggravated assault convictions. Because a jury could find that Appellant’s stabbing of the victim was a substantial step in a knowing attempt to kill Mr. Moore, we affirm the criminal attempt conviction. Additionally, we find that the two aggravated assault charges arose from a single incident, and we remand the case for entry of a single judgment noting merger of the two offenses in counts 2 and 3.

The Petitioner, Dana Keith Woods, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court merged the convictions for first degree premeditated murder and felony murder and also merged the convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. For his convictions, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus fifty years. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The petitioner, John J. Kratochvil, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction of second degree murder.  The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Corey M. Willis, was charged with various driving under the influence (DUI) offenses.  He filed a motion to suppress, alleging that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to perform the traffic stop.  The trial court granted the motion, and the State appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

The Defendant, Lee Ann Lynch, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking her community corrections sentence for her conviction for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and ordering her four-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Bo Heath, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for second degree murder and three counts of tampering with or fabricating evidence and his effective twenty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Racris Thomas, of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of seventy years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred by refusing to declare a mistrial after the jury instructions revealed that the felony underlying the charge for being a felon in possession of a handgun was a prior aggravated robbery. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Caleb Lawrence Mullins, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, theft of property, and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court misapplied one enhancement factor and two consecutive sentencing factors. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Appellant, Omar Robinson, pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and two counts of simple possession of marijuana. Appellant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed, holding that appellant’s sentence had expired. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion because an illegal sentence may be challenged at any time pursuant to Rule 36.1. The State concedes that this case should be remanded to the trial court. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Ibrahim Talafhah, was convicted after a bench trial in the Wilson County Criminal Court of harassment, a Class A misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. § 39-17-308(a)(2) (2014).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve ten days in jail with the balance of his eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence to be served on probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him his constitutional right to a jury trial.  We conclude that the Defendant was denied his right to a jury trial, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Cynthia Gail Harvey, appeals from her Humphreys County jury conviction for felony theft, (1) challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial and (2) contending that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon considering the relevant authorities and the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Delquan Bolton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to terms of twenty-five years and ten years, respectively, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting character evidence and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, John Brent, was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, for which he was sentenced, respectively, to thirty years at 100% and fifteen years at 45%, the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the court erred in allowing into evidence a photograph of a pair of scissors which were similar to those in the victim’s home; that the evidence was insufficient to support either of his convictions; and that his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant’s claims are without merit and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, O’Neal Johnson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Antonio Lamont Freeman, was convicted of one count of possession of contraband in a penal facility, a Class C felony. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in removing the defendant from the courtroom during his trial; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by introducing evidence into the record during the motion for new trial; (3) the trial judge’s alleged continued acts of prejudice warrant a new trial; (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct when it assumed facts not in evidence; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence; and (6) numerous grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Brian Oneal Elliott, challenges the length of the twenty-five-year maximum sentence the trial court imposed for his conviction of second degree murder.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cary Arnaz Harbin, III, was charged with violating the sexual offender registration act by establishing his primary residence within one thousand feet of a licensed day care facility.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(a).  The trial court dismissed the charge, finding that the Defendant, convicted in Michigan in 2008 of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree, did not meet the statutory definition of “sexual offender.”  The State appeals the order of dismissal, arguing that the record was insufficient for the trial court to make this determination.  Following our review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the Defendant, an out-of-state sexual offender required to register in Michigan, is subject to the requirements of Tennessee sexual offender registration act upon sufficient contact with this State.  Therefore, we reverse the order of the trial court dismissing the indicted charge and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The record in this matter is very sparse.  Much of our understanding of its history comes from the decision of this court in the defendant’s direct appeal, State v. John Robert Q. Jackson, No. M2012-00511-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 791621 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 4, 2013).  As best we can understand, the defendant, John Robert Quinton Jackson, pled guilty in February 2009 to five counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of automobile burglary, one count of theft over $10,000, and one count of theft over $1000, receiving an effective sentence of six years in community corrections.  In September 2009, he was served with a violation warrant and subsequently pled guilty to an additional count of aggravated burglary, receiving a four-year sentence in community corrections, to be served concurrently with the six-year community corrections sentence reinstated by the court.  Later, he was served with another violation warrant, based upon his participation in a home invasion and aggravated robbery.  Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure  36.1, he filed a motion for correction of an illegal sentence, which the trial court dismissed.  He appeals that dismissal.  Based upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of his motion.

This is an appeal by A-Action Bonding Company of Columbia (“A-Action”) of an order of the Maury County Circuit Court, sitting en banc, which suspended the bonding authority of the company, its principal, and one of its agents based on its finding that the agent solicited an inmate at the county jail, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-126(6).  The appellant argues that the court improperly considered as evidence a cell phone recording of a videotaped conversation between the agent and the inmate when the original jail videotape had been destroyed and the cell phone recording was made by a competitor and contained an altered version of the original.  We agree.  We also agree that, without the improperly admitted recording, there was insufficient evidence that the agent solicited business in violation of the statute.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the motion to suspend the bonding authority of A-Action, its principal, and its agent.