APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to “Set
Aside, Amend and/or Correct Improper and Unlawful Judgments.” The Defendant argues
(1) that her judgments are void due to noncompliance with the statutes and rules governing
the entry of judgment forms and (2) that she is entitled to relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule
of Criminal Procedure 36. Following our review, we have determined that we lack
jurisdiction to hear the Defendant’s voidness arguments and that the Defendant has waived
review of her Rule 36 claim. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, William Patrick Robinson, appeals pro se from the Circuit Court of
Carroll County’s dismissal of his third request for post-conviction relief. Following
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Joseph Marquis Jeffries, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts each of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment, and one count each of domestic assault, interference with emergency communications, trafficking for a commercial sex act, promotion of prostitution, and evading arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately explore racial bias during voir dire and (2) failing to seek additional time for the Petitioner to consider the State’s plea agreement. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Nicholas Kentrell Dickerson, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s
orders revoking his probation and imposing his original sentences for various drug
convictions and a felony evading arrest. The Appellant contends the trial court abused its
discretion in revoking his probation because (1) the alleged violations were based on new
charges that were subsequently dismissed, and (2) the remaining violations were technical
in nature and not a valid basis for full revocation under Tennessee Code Annotated section
40-35-311(e)(1)(A) (2022). Upon our review, we affirm.

The Appellant, Eleanor Grace Hoffman, filed a motion to suppress challenging the search of her purse during a traffic stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant was convicted as charged by a Warren County jury of simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Appellant’s application for judicial diversion was granted, and she was sentenced to two concurrent terms of eleven months and twentynine days suspended to supervised probation after service of ten days’ imprisonment. A probation violation order was entered, and the Appellant conceded to violating the terms of probation before the trial court. The trial court revoked her probationary judicial diversion sentence, entered judgments of conviction for simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, and ordered the Appellant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment, with the possibility of furlough to an inpatient drug treatment facility after service of ninety days’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. Alternatively, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred in revoking her diversionary probation and ordering service of her original sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress and revocation of the Appellant’s probation but remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Appellant, Jason Lee Schutt, of alternative counts of possession of hydrocodone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-408(b)(1)(F), -417(a), -417(c)(2)(A). The trial court properly merged the above counts, and following a sentencing hearing, the Appellant was ordered to serve nine years and six months in confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the alleged controlled substance was not verified by chemical analysis as hydrocodone, and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Stacy M. Miller, was convicted by a Meigs County Criminal Court jury of
three counts of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, especially
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft of property valued at less than $1000.
See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree felony
murder), 39-13-212 (2018) (criminally negligent homicide), 39-13-305 (2018) (especially
aggravated kidnapping), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft).
The trial court merged the three first degree felony murder convictions and imposed an
effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is
insufficient to support her first degree felony murder convictions and (2) the trial court
erred in failing to merge the criminally negligent homicide conviction with the first degree
felony murder conviction and to merge the theft conviction with the aggravated robbery
conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected
judgments reflecting the requested mergers of convictions and for correction of the
judgment form in Count 6 to reflect the correct conviction offense, aggravated robbery.

A Hamblen County jury convicted Defendant, Raymond D. Arwood, of one count of sexual
exploitation of a minor involving more than fifty images. The trial court imposed a
sentence of ten years as a Range II, multiple offender to be served in confinement. On
appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
suppress certain photographs and that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction. After reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, and considering the
applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Dan E. Durrell, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Archie Lee Meeks, of aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon, assault by offensive touching, and aggravated criminal trespass, and
the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we
affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Jeffrey Wayne Seidel, challenges the denial of his pre-sentencing motion to
withdraw his guilty plea to second offense driving under the influence (“DUI”). Defendant
contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the factors set out by our
supreme court in State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 447 (Tenn. 2010), and that he established
a “fair and just reason” to permit the withdrawal of his guilty plea. After a thorough review
of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Douglas R. Roach, was convicted of ten counts of especially aggravated
kidnapping and received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed especially
aggravated kidnapping because the evidence did not show that he accomplished the
kidnappings through use or display of a deadly weapon or that he used the victims as
hostages or human shields. The State responds that the evidence was sufficient to support
his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robert Lee Adams, Jr., was convicted in the Tipton County Circuit Court
of attempted second degree murder and received a sentence of thirty years in confinement.
On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tyler Hemmingway, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court
jury of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard
offender to eight years at 100 percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On
appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce a photograph of the
Defendant’s bedroom that showed a pornographic poster on the wall. Based on our review,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, David Eugene Dunlap, Alias, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury
convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, possession of a firearm after having been convicted
of a crime of violence, possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the
commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence,
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent to
sell or deliver, and that the trial court erred by declining to sentence him under the amended
Drug-Free Zone statute. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Charles Jonathan Murphy, was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of two counts of rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for each conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years at 100 % in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing him by misapplying an enhancement factor and ordering consecutive sentences. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pro se Petitioner, Bruce Parks, Jr., appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Because the Petitioner’s claim that the State failed to give notice
of enhancement factors or its intent to seek consecutive sentencing is not cognizable in a
Rule 36.1 motion, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of the motion to correct
an illegal sentence.

Following his convictions for felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially
aggravated kidnapping, the Petitioner, Mario Donte Keene, filed a petition for postconviction
relief. The Petitioner alleged that his confession was unconstitutionally
admitted into evidence during his trial. He also asserted that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to cross-examine a witness and failed to
present an expert to testify that he did not have the physical ability to commit the crimes.
After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, we respectfully
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Darius Patterson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that
the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of
counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Knox County jury found the Defendant, Geoffrey Ian Paschel, guilty of aggravated
kidnapping, domestic assault, and interference with emergency communications. He was
sentenced to eighteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. He also argues that
(1) the trial court abused its discretion by twice denying a mistrial following improperly
admitted evidence; (2) the trial court misapplied enhancement factors and placed too much
weight on the testimony of his ex-wife in sentencing; and (3) the cumulative impact of the
errors warrants a new trial. Upon review, we respectfully affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Desmond Anderson, was convicted of three offenses in 2013, and the trial
court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty years consisting of
concurrent sentences of varying lengths. The trial court awarded pretrial jail credit on
Count 1 but did not do so in Counts 2 or 3. The Defendant later filed a motion pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 seeking to have appropriate pretrial jail credit
awarded on all concurrent sentences. The trial court summarily denied the motion,
concluding that the request was an administrative matter for the Tennessee Department of
Correction. The Defendant appealed, and the State concedes error. We agree. We
respectfully vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for entry of corrected
judgments in Counts 2 and 3 to award appropriate pretrial jail credit on all concurrent
sentences.

The Defendant, William Paul Watson, pled guilty to possessing more than one-half gram
of cocaine with intent to sell within a drug-free zone and received a fifteen-year sentence
to be served at one hundred percent. More than ten years later, he filed a motion to be
resentenced pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h). The trial court
held a hearing, granted the Defendant’s motion, and resentenced him to fifteen years with
eight years to be served at one hundred percent and the remainder to be served at a thirtyfive
percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court
imposed an illegal sentence. The State argues that we should dismiss the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) and that, in any event,
the Defendant’s sentence is not illegal. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the
parties’ briefs, we agree with the Defendant, reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial
court, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Raffell M. Griffin, Jr., was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess
with the intent to sell or deliver more than twenty-six grams of cocaine in a drug-free
zone, a Class B felony, and first degree premeditated murder. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-
417(c) (2018) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled substance), 39-12-103
(2018) (conspiracy), 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree
murder). The jury found that the Defendant committed a criminal gang offense,
enhancing by one level the felony classification of the convictions. See id. § 40-35-121
(2019) (subsequently amended) (gang enhancement). The trial court imposed a twentyfive
year sentence for the conspiracy conviction, to be served consecutively with a life
sentence for the murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the
evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for first degree murder; (2)
the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing
Investigator Philip Jinks to testify as an expert in gang investigations; (4) the trial court
failed to conduct an adequate investigation of alleged juror misconduct; and (5) the trial
court failed to apply mitigating factors in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

The Defendant, Roger Scott Herbison, entered a guilty plea to one count of attempted
sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of attempted aggravated sexual exploitation
of a minor in exchange for an effective four-year sentence, suspended to probation, and the
Defendant’s placement on the sex offender registry. As a part of his plea, the Defendant
sought to reserve a certified question of law, concerning whether probable cause existed
for issuance of a search warrant, which was the subject of an unsuccessful suppression
motion. Because the Defendant did not properly reserve a certified issue for review, we
are without jurisdiction to review the merits of the Defendant’s claim, and we dismiss his
appeal.

The petitioner, Rodney Earl Jones, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.