APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Joseph Anthony Gonzales, appeals from the trial court’s partial revocation of his probation and order that he serve one of his two eight-year sentences, imposed pursuant to his guilty pleas to dual counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, in the Department of Correction (DOC). He contends that the evidence relied upon by the trial court was insufficient to support the revocation and requests that this court reinstate his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The case is remanded to reflect the proper award of jail credits on the judgment form.

The Defendant, Willie Howard Mull, pled guilty to aggravated assault, felony reckless endangerment, and unlawfully carrying a weapon. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of four years, to be served on probation. A warrant was issued alleging the Defendant had violated his probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Jose Juan Frierson, entered a "best interest" plea, on January 7, 1999, to criminal attempt to commit aggravated rape and was ordered to serve an eight-year split-confinement sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on December 30, 2009, alleging that he was entitled to the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations period for post-conviction petitions due to his mental incompetence. The Petitioner further alleged that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court failed to ensure that he was aware that the sentence included a requirement of lifetime supervision. After hearings on the petition, the post-conviction court entered an order denying post-conviction relief. The Petitioner filed, at the same time, both an appeal to this Court and a motion for new trial. Thereafter, the post-conviction court issued a subsequent order granting post-conviction relief. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the subsequent order granting post-conviction relief is void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the second order. As to the first order denying post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgement of the post-conviction court.

A Lauderdale County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Greg Patterson, of felony reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen months to be served in community corrections. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree that the evidence is insufficient. Therefore, the conviction is reversed, and the original charge is dismissed.

The Defendant, Malcolm H. Jones, appeals from his dual jury convictions for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court’s subsequent sentence, after merging the two convictions, to serve nine years in the Department of Correction (DOC). He contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, and that the trial court’s sentence of nine years was excessive because the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor, and the remaining two enhancement factors are not sufficient to support a one-year enhancement beyond the minimum in the range. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael W. Smith, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Gregory Lance, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, and arson. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Gregory Lance, No. M2001-02507-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 1960270, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 28, 2003), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2003). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief. The denial of his petition was affirmed by this Court on appeal. Gregory Paul Lance v. State, No. M2005-01765-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 2380619 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 16, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 18, 2006). In March of 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis. It was dismissed as untimely. After a review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the untimely petition for coram nobis relief as Petitioner made no allegations that would toll the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the coram nobis court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Kyrie T. Adams, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statement to the police prior to the Petitioner entering a guilty plea. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Carolyn Nadine Killian, appeals her conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, and her sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with ten days to be served in confinement and the remainder of the sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, she argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by failing to consider the purposes and principles of the sentencing act. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, but we remand the case for entry of a percentage of service for the DUI conviction.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Jackie Ewing, of theft of property valued over $1,000.00. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Kimyata Izevbizuaiyamu, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order denying her application to write bail bonds as the owner of Number One Bonding Company. On appeal, petitioner argues that the evidence did not support the court’s denial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Noura Jackson, was convicted of second degree murder for the death of her mother, Jennifer Jackson, and sentenced to twenty years and nine months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in the following rulings: (1) concluding that her conversation at the scene with a family friend, who is an attorney, was not subject to the attorney-client privilege; (2) concluding that the searches of the residence she shared with the victim and of a vehicle parked in the driveway were lawful; (3) allowing testimony of lay witnesses as to her use of “drugs”; (4) allowing testimony of her having sexual relations at a time after the murder, as to her eviction from an apartment after the murder, and as to her hospitalization at Lakeside Hospital after the murder; (5) allowing the victim’s brother and sisters to testify as to arguments between the defendant and the victim prior to the murder; and (6) allowing certain photographs of the crime scene and the victim’s body. Additionally, the defendant argues that she is entitled to a new trial because of (7) prosecutorial conduct consisting of references to the post-arrest silence of the defendant; suppression of the third statement of a State’s witness; loudly beginning its opening statement by saying, “Give me the f*cking money”; using a misleading PowerPoint presentation during its closing argument; commenting on her right to remain silent; references to the Deity during closing arguments; commenting in closing argument on the length of the trial; treating as established facts which were not proven at trial; making personal attacks during closing statements upon her; and making additional improper statements during closing argument. Further, the defendant argues on appeal that (8) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for second degree murder and that (9) the court erred in imposing more than a minimum sentence. We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the arguments of the defendant are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in the lead opinion by Judge Glenn. Indeed, I join in the lead opinion on all but one issue. I write separately to address the issue of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. As the lead opinion points out, the opening sentence of the State’s rebuttal argument was as follows: “Just tell us where you were. That’s all we’re asking, Noura.” The defense contends that the remark constitutes an improper comment on the defendant’s choice not to testify at trial. The State claims that the remark was merely a reference to the testimony during trial given by Cindy Eidson, the defendant’s aunt.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Steven D. Pippin, of aggravated sexual battery and incest. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction and a consecutive ten-year sentence for the incest conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court’s sentence was excessive. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions and that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Andrianne Kiser, of two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of reckless endangerment. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective sentence of sixteen years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred by allowing a State witness to testify about telephone calls she received before trial, and (3) his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s reckless endangerment conviction. Therefore, that conviction is reversed. The appellant’s remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed. However, the case is remanded to the trial court for correction of the judgment for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.

The Defendant, Anthony Dewight Washington, appeals from his conviction by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of possession with intent to sell or deliver more than one-half gram of cocaine in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(4), (c)(1) (2010) (amended 2012) (possession of cocaine), 39-17-432 (2010) (increased penalty for a drug offense committed in a drug-free zone). The Defendant was sentenced to serve thirty years as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Alveraz Ramirez Rigoberto, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of simple possession of marijuana; misdemeanor evading arrest; and driving on a revoked license, sixth offense, and resulting sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served concurrently on supervised probation. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because trial counsel failed to advise him about the consequences of his guilty pleas, which resulted in his entering his pleas unknowingly and involuntarily. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The appellants, Deshaun Emmanuel Brown and Jerome Cardell Holt, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to ten counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced Appellant Brown to a total effective sentence of 60 years and Appellant Holt to a total effective sentence of 72 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellants challenge the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, we must remand for entry of corrected judgments for the aggravated rape convictions to reflect that each appellant is a multiple rapist rather than a violent offender as indicated on the judgments.

Following a traffic stop and search of his vehicle that uncovered over five kilograms of cocaine, the defendant, Mario Ochoa, was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury with possession of over 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony. He subsequently pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, in exchange for a Range I sentence of twelve years in the Department of Correction, reserving the following certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A): (1) whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; (2) whether the officer exceeded the scope of the stop once he discovered that the defendant’s temporary license tag was valid; (3) whether the evidence should be suppressed because the defendant’s consent to search the vehicle was not sufficiently attenuated from the prior seizure; and (4) whether the search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of what a reasonable person would have understood to have been meant by the defendant’s consent. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Juan Alberto Blanco Garcia, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The defendant, David Lee Leggs, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-five years for each conviction, with one of the sentences ordered to be served consecutively to the other two concurrent sentences. Because the defendant had prior convictions for aggravated robbery, the sentences were also ordered to be served at 100 percent, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(k)(2), for a total effective sentence of fifty years at 100 percent in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

The defendant, Calvin Taylor, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jacob Stephen Love, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery and effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily made because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Ricky Trumaine Salters, Sr., entered guilty pleas without recommended sentences to drug offenses stemming from four separate indictments, for which the trial court imposed an effective thirteen-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by ordering partially consecutive sentences and by refusing alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Fusco, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, which were merged, and one count of each of the following offenses: conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -12-103, -13-202, -13-304, -13-305, -13-402, -13-403, & -14-403. The trial court determined that the Defendant was a Range II, multiple offender for sentencing purposes and imposed an effective 65-year sentence. We first decided this appeal several months ago in February 2012. See State v. Robert Fusco, No. M2010-01724-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 368224 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2012). Our decision was vacated by the Tennessee Supreme Court, and the case was remanded to this court for reconsideration in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties addressing any White issues. When this case was previously before this court, the Defendant raised the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the lesser-included offense of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) whether the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (3) whether the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping; (4) whether his dual convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery violate due process concerns because the restraint of the victim was not beyond that necessary to complete the robbery; (5) whether the trial court erred by not merging his two conspiracy convictions because the offenses were the object of the same agreement; (6) whether the trial court erred by using certain out-of-state convictions to enhance his sentencing range; and (7) whether his sentence was excessive. We reissue our previous opinion as follows with a new section dealing with the White issues. Upon further consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case with those in White, we again affirm the Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery. The case is remanded to the Montgomery County Circuit Court for the entry of corrected judgments to reflect merger of the Defendant’s conspiracy convictions. In all other respects, we conclude that there is no reversible error in the judgments of the trial court and affirm.