APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Albert James Saavedra, was ultimately convicted of voluntary manslaughter and attempted second degree murder and, thereafter, received an effective fourteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s (1) allegedly providing the prosecution with information about the location of the Petitioner’s vehicle and (2) failing to adequately address issues surrounding the video recording of the Petitioner’s statement to authorities. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Kacy Dewayne Cannon, of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted a TBI report detailing the DNA on substances found on the victim’s pantyhose; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the case after the victim died; (3) the trial court erred when it denied his request for a forensic scientist to testify about the procedure for handling evidence and the possibility of evidence contamination; (4) the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody for the victim’s pantyhose; (5) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce testimony about the emergency room’s protocol; (6) a State witness, Nurse Ardyce Ridolpho, was not qualified to testify as an expert; (7) the trial court erred when it determined that the State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; (8) the trial court erred when it allowed a doctor to testify about the victim’s medical records; and (9) he is entitled to relief based upon cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pro Se Petitioner, Herman Shurn, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner was originally indicted for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. A jury convicted the Petitioner of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated robbery for which the Petitioner received an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his indictment for aggravated robbery, as amended, is void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Joseph Scott Turk, was indicted for simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; failure to obey a traffic control device, a Class C misdemeanor; failure to operate a motor vehicle within a single lane of traffic, a Class C misdemeanor; failure to use a turn signal, a Class C misdemeanor; driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the implied consent law, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage while operating a motor vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-418, -17-425, 55-8-109, -8-123, -8-143, 55-10-401, -10-406, -10-416. The Defendant filed a suppression motion alleging that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop his car. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. The Defendant subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the State. The Defendant pled guilty to DUI, first offense, and received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days with forty-eight hours to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on unsupervised probation. As part of the plea agreement, the remaining charges were dismissed and the Defendant reserved a certified question of law for appellate review pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence against him. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, William K. Paulson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of postconviction relief from his convictions of reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest, driving without a license, and violating the state registration law. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in determining that he received effective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Michael L. Webster, for one count of first degree premeditated murder. A jury found Appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty-five years at 100% as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The State argues that the trial court erred in determining that Appellant was a Range I, standard offender and should have sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender based upon prior convictions out of Georgia. On appeal, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction because the jury rejected his claim of self-defense and Appellant was unable to raise reasonable doubt. We also determine that the trial court correctly determined that Appellant qualified as a Range I, standard offender because his Georgia conviction for burglary was equivalent to a Tennessee conviction for burglary and, therefore, Appellant did not have the requisite amount of the correct classification of prior felonies for him to qualify as a Range II, multiple offender. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Petitioner, Antonio Bobo, entered a guilty plea to assault and received probation on the sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to enter a guilty plea that was not knowing and voluntary. He now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellee, Jose Luis Gonzalez, was indicted by the Blount County Grand Jury for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of a firearm with intent to go armed in the commission of a felony. Prior to trial, Appellee filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on an illegal traffic stop. The trial court determined that the evidence seized during a traffic stop should be suppressed, granting the motion filed by Appellee. The State sought an interlocutory appeal on the matter, asking this Court to reverse the grant of the motion to suppress. After a review of the record, we determine police had probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for improper brake light operation, or at minimum a reasonable and articulable suspicion the lights violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-402. As a result, we conclude based on the facts herein that the officer effectuated a lawful traffic stop of Appellee. Consequently, the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Rhonda Brown-Montague aka Rhonda Brown, pleaded guilty to theft of property over $60,000.00, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Appellant challenges her sentence as excessive and argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher Terrell Robinson, was found guilty by a Bedford County jury of violating the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender (“HMVO”) Act, evading arrest, and violating the light law. In a separate case, Petitioner pled guilty to felony failure to appear. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an effective sentence of twelve years, to be served as a Career Offender at 60 percent. Petitioner’s convictions and sentence were upheld on direct appeal. See State v. Christopher Terrell Robinson, No. M2010-01183-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1671809, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 29, 2011), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jul. 13, 2011). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition was dismissed after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief because Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
 

The Putnam County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Gary Randall Moser, for two counts of aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated assault resulting from an altercation with his girlfriend. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two lesser included offenses of false imprisonment. These offenses were merged into one count, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to 319 days in the county jail. Appellant appeals his conviction based upon his arguments that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony alleging it violated Appellant’s right under the Confrontation Clauses of both the Tennessee and United States Constitutions. Appellant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We have determined the statement in question was nontestimonial and properly admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule and, therefore, there is no error in its admission. We have also determined that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Joseph Brennan, pled guilty to two counts of incest and two counts of attempted rape of a child in Sumner County. As a result, he was sentenced to ten years for each attempted rape conviction and three years for each incest conviction. The trial court ordered the attempted rape convictions to run consecutively with one another but concurrently to the incest convictions, for a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. State v. Joseph Brennan, No. M2009-00895-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1425540, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 9, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 23, 2010). On direct appeal, Petitioner challenged the denial of an alternative sentence. Id. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s sentence. Id. Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition in which he alleged that the sentencing judge was impartial. Petitioner also requested a new sentencing hearing and recusal of the trial court. The trial court denied the request for recusal. An amended petition was filed by Petitioner along with a second motion for recusal of the trial court. The trial court denied the motion for recusal and the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the post-conviction judge properly denied recusal and where the record indicates that Petitioner was sentenced by an impartial tribunal, properly denied post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Randy Maray Cheairs, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of second-degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and possession of a handgun in the commission of a felony for which he received an effective forty-year sentence. In this appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Kimberly Holliday, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for coram nobis relief. In 2000, the Petitioner entered a “best interest” guilty plea to theft of services and issuing a false financial statement and received an effective four-year-suspended sentence. Over ten years later, in 2011, she filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that failure to report earnings to a public housing authority does not constitute “theft of services” based on State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558 (Tenn. 2010). In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because (1) “a person cannot be guilty of something that is not a crime;” (2) “due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations;” (3) “this case is timely filed as a petition for postconviction relief;” and (4) “a best interest plea rather than a voluntary admission of guilt preserves the appellant’s right to bring a petition for writ of error coram nobis.” Upon review, we affirm dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Amanda Kay Profitt, pled guilty to four counts of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud and to one count of willful abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an adult. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years incarceration as a Range I, standard offender, at thirty percent, for the controlled substance offenses and to two years incarceration as a Range I, standard offender, at thirty percent, for the willful abuse of an adult offense. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of three years at thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered the Defendant to serve her sentence in confinement, specifically when it: (1) denied judicial diversion; and (2) denied alternative sentencing or probation. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The pro se Petitioner, Manuel Haynes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. Because the petition was untimely and the Petitioner has not shown that due process concerns tolled the one-year statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Victor Armando Martinez ("the Defendant") appeals his jury convictions for possession with intent to sell twenty-six or more grams of cocaine, simple possession of Alprazolam, possession with intent to sell one-half (1/2) ounce or more but less than ten pounds of marijuana, possession of a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, simple possession of diazepam, simple possession of 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine ("MDMA"), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his residence. He also alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Finally, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in applying no mitigating factors in its sentencing of the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

Appellant, Tyrone Douglas, was placed on community corrections after his plea of guilty to the sale of less than .5 gram of cocaine in Davidson County. After the trial court found a violation of community corrections in 2011, Appellant was reinstated to community corrections on the condition that he complete a drug and mental health assessment and comply with any recommendations made in the assessment. Subsequently, another affidavit was filed alleging Appellant had violated the terms of his community corrections sentence by failing to attend required meetings with his case worker and pleading guilty to new charges. The trial court revoked Appellant’s community corrections sentence, reinstating Appellant’s sentence of thirteen years, to be served as a Persistent Offender at forty-five percent incarceration. Appellant appeals that revocation. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse it’s discretion. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Susan Michelle Barnett (“the Defendant”) was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated assault, two counts of misdemeanor assault, and unauthorized use of an automobile in Gibson County Circuit Court case no. 17702. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of six years. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her six-year sentence consecutively to a previous sentence. On the date of the sentencing hearing in case no. 17702, the Defendant also pleaded guilty to failure to appear in Gibson County Circuit Court case no. 18191 and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year, to be served consecutively to her six-year sentence. Thereafter, the Defendant attempted to appeal both cases. Having determined that we lack jurisdiction in case no. 17702, we dismiss that appeal. We also dismiss the appeal in case no. 18191 because the notice of appeal was untimely filed, and the Defendant is not entitled to appeal her guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b).

A Hamilton County jury convicted petitioner, Jamila Nunn, of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, for which the trial court ordered a twenty-year sentence. Following the direct appeal, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied post-conviction relief, and petitioner now appeals. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Jerry Ray Norton, challenges his conviction for driving under the influence, fourth offense. As grounds, he claims that the State’s evidence did not prove that he operated a motor vehicle on a public roadway and that the officer’s failure to file an accident report should have resulted in dismissal of the indictment. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgments on count four, driving on a revoked license, third offense, and count five, driving under the influence, fourth offense, reflecting a disposition of count one, driving under the influence, and count two, driving on a revoked license. The corrected judgments should reflect merger of count one into count five and count two into count four. The trial court should also enter a judgment disposing of the third count of the indictment, violation of the implied consent statute.

A Shelby County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Kearn Weston, for robbery, a Class C felony. A jury convicted him as indicted, and the trial court sentenced him as a persistent offender to fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on appeal. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, following a jury trial and sentenced as a Range III offender to fourteen years and six months incarceration. In this delayed appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by permitting him to be impeached with a hearsay statement contained in a police report. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial,the Defendant, Maurice O.Byrd,was convicted of aggravated robbery, felony first degree murder, and premeditated first degree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202,-402. The trial court merged the premeditated first degree murder conviction into the felony first degree murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. The trial court also sentenced the Defendant to eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction and ordered the sentence to be served concurrently with the life sentence for the felony first degree murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Derron S. Guy, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein he challenged his 2010 Shelby County Criminal Court convictions of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony. Discerning no error, we affirm.