APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Paul David Childs, convicted of sexual battery, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition on the basis that the Petitioner failed to provide any factual grounds in support of his claims for relief. The State concedes that the post-conviction court acted in error. Following our review, we reverse the order of summary dismissal and remand this case to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In its appeal, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed a misdemeanor vandalism charge against the defendant, Carl E. Presley, and also in ruling that it could not charge the jury on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor vandalism on the two remaining felony vandalism charges, because the statute had run as to the misdemeanor.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the dismissal of the vandalism charge and, as to the issue regarding the lesser included offense of misdemeanor vandalism, deny the State’s Rule 10 appeal as improvidently granted.

Lawrence Key (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery. In his appeal, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Ronaldo Regala Puno, Jr., of attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant to seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted first degree murder. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction, but we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of the convictions.

The defendant, David Earl Scott, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that his kidnapping convictions run afoul of the precedent set in State v. Anthony and its progeny, and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. Because the evidence of serious bodily injury was insufficient, the defendant’s conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping is reversed and modified to a conviction of aggravated kidnapping, and the sentence is modified from 25 years to 12 years. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

A Davidson County jury found appellant, Dwaniko Martez Sudberry, guilty of three counts of reckless aggravated assault, one count of attempted aggravated child neglect, and one count of reckless homicide stemming from the death of his infant daughter. The trial court merged the convictions of reckless aggravated assault with the conviction for reckless homicide and sentenced appellant to four years. The trial court sentenced appellant to twelve years for attempted aggravated child neglect and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sixteen-year sentence. Appellant contests his convictions and sentences on the following grounds: (1) the convicting evidence was insufficient; (2) the combination of his convictions offends the principles of double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erred in failing to order the State to make an election on the offense of aggravated child neglect; (4) the trial court erred in admitting certain expert testimony; and (5) the trial court committed multiple errors in sentencing him. Following our careful review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority that the evidence of serious bodily injury to the victim was insufficient to support the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. After considering the evidence of serious bodily injury in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it is my view that a rational trier of fact could have found that the victim suffered serious bodily injury at the hands of the Defendant, and therefore I would affirm the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction.

Terrell Loverson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, misdemeanor assault, and obstructing arrest. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s admission of a photograph of the victim; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we have determined that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Theodore Locklin, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering his six-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to revoke his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lindsey Butler, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and two counts of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and ordering the remainder of his effective eight-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in revoking his probation and (2) failed to exercise “separate discretion” in determining his punishment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Celso V. Melendez, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of facilitation to deliver over 300 grams of cocaine and resulting effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his guilty pleas were based upon trial counsel’s assurance that he would be eligible for the boot camp program. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, the judgments of conviction are vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner was convicted in 1998 of one count of first degree murder in Wilson County. He was sentenced to life in prison. Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal. State v. Henry Dequan Rhodes, No. M1999-959-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 264327, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 10, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 30, 2000). On March 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in its dismissal of his petition. We conclude that the post-conviction court did not err because the decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), did not create a new constitutional right that was required to be retroactively applied; Petitioner did not provide adequate support for his argument that the statute of limitations had been tolled based upon the violation of a due process right; and Petitioner did not meet the requirements set out to present a writ of error coram nobis to the court. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Salvatore Pisano, Jr., was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to serve eight years in prison for each count, all counts to be served concurrently. The petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, which was dismissed by the post-conviction court without a hearing or the appointment of counsel. The petitioner then filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition; the motion was denied. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal. Because the petitioner has not complied with the statutory requirements surrounding appeal of an application to reopen a petition for post-conviction relief, we are without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Curtis Dewayne Staggs, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions and imposed a life sentence, and imposed a consecutive twelve-year sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial based upon a State witness recanting his testimony; (3) the trial court erred when it issued a material witness attachment; (4) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; and (5) the trial court erred when it did not grant his motion for a new trial based upon the prior knowledge of the case by a juror. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions and that the trial court committed no error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Laderius Stephens (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and attempted second degree murder. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Petitioner received an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In his petition for relief, he argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea was constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals, raising the same two issues. As his bases for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Petitioner contends that his counsel at trial: (1) failed to file the appropriate discovery motions; (2) failed to prepare adequately for trial; and (3) failed to hire an investigator in a timely manner. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Christopher L. Williams, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claims that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as time-barred. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Colby Terrell Black, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by making insufficient findings at the revocation hearing, and the State agrees. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an appropriate written order that summarizes the evidence and clearly sets forth the reasons for the revocation of probation.

Jason Everett Nickell (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to three counts of misdemeanor stalking, with no agreement as to his sentences. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent on each count, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive because the trial court did not consider two mitigating factors. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Kristopher Colbert, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury in April of 2011 for driving under the influence, driving under the influence per se, reckless endangerment, vehicular assault,and aggravated assault. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of vehicular assault in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four years for each offense, to be served consecutively as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to reduce sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 and/or Tennessee code Annotated section 40-35-212(d). After a hearing, the trial court denied the motions. Appellant initiated this appeal to determine whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to reduce the sentence. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Jody Lee Lindsey, pled guilty to one count of violating the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender (“HMVO”) law, one count of third offense driving on a revoked license, and one count of felony failure to appear. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court found the Defendant to be a Range III offender and merged the driving on a revoked license conviction with the HMVO conviction. It then sentenced the Defendant to five years for both the HMVO conviction and the felony failure to appear conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively based upon the Defendant’s extensive criminal history, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; (2) his convictions were based upon an unlawfully induced guilty plea; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the counsel representing him at the guilty plea hearing and sentencing hearing was ineffective. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Eric D. Wallace (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that (1) his indictment for attempted first degree murder is defective because it was amended improperly to include a factual basis for aggravated assault; (2) the judgment and sentence imposed for felony murder and attempted first degree murder are void; and (3) the felony murder conviction must be dismissed. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Petitioner, Odell Shelton, seeks relief via a writ of error coram nobis from his plea agreement that resulted in a conviction of aggravated assault and a sentence of ten years. He claims that the trial court improperly sentenced him as a multiple (Range II) offender and erroneously relied upon a presentence report in denying his request for a suspended sentence. Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s reliance on the presentence report is “newly discovered evidence.” The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition. Discerning no basis for coram nobis relief, we affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Eugene Rutherford, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and ordering his fiveyear sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to revoke his probation, (2) there is new evidence related to testimony relied upon by the trial court in revoking his probation, (3) the trial court erred by allowing the victim of the Defendant’s new theft charge to testify at the revocation hearing, and (4) the court erred by insufficiently weighing his good behavior. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William J. Ferris, Sr. (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Richard Tipton, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; driving on a revoked license, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the seatbelt law, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10- 401(a)(2), 55-50-504, 55-9-603(a)(1), and 55-12-139. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve one year and six months in the county jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) that the trial court failed to consider the eight-year span of time in which the Defendant committed no crimes when determining his sentence, showing a lack of consideration of other sentencing factors. Following our review, we remand this case to the trial court for correction of the judgments because the Defendant was sentenced to the county jail instead of the Department of Corrections (DOC), as required by statute. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.