APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, James D. Ledford, II, appeals the Seqautchie County Circuit Court’s denial of his request for alternative sentencing. The defendant pled guilty to one count of vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of nine years, as a Range II offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the same time, the defendant also pled guilty to a violation of probation in a separate case with a sentence of two years, which the trial court revoked and ordered to be served concurrently with the homicide sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentence as imposed.

The defendant, Donald E. Fentress, appeals the sentencing decision of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. The defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and aggravated rape, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that his sentence for rape is excessive under the facts and circumstances of his case. Specifically, he faults the trial court for failing to apply mitigating factor (8), that the defendant was suffering from a mental condition which significantly reduced his culpability for the offense. See T.C.A. § 40-35-113(8) (2010). Following review of the record before us, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, Motorius G. Herron, appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing. In his post-conviction proceeding, Petitioner challenged his conviction following a jury trial for identity theft. The sole issue for appeal is whether Petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to make a written request for the inclusion of the crime of fraudulent use of a credit or debit card as a lesser included offense of identity theft. Since the crime of fraudulent use of a credit or debit card is not a lesser included offense of identity theft, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction trial court.

Petitioner, Willie Thomas, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel “scared” him into pleading guilty; and (2) he was not fully informed regarding the plea. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Patrick Lynn Crippen, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (DUI), violating the implied consent law, failing to provide proper evidence of financial responsibility, and violation of state registration law. Defendant waived his right to the appointment of counsel and subsequently filed motions to dismiss for want of prosecution and to suppress evidence of his performance on field sobriety tests, which were both denied by the trial court. Following a jury trial, at which Defendant represented himself, Defendant was convicted of DUI and found in violation of the implied consent law. The remaining charges were dismissed prior to trial. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court to 11 months and 29 days to be served at 75 percent. Defendant appeals his conviction pro se and asserts that: 1) he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial; 2) the trial court erred by allowing the officer to testify about Defendant’s field sobriety tests; 3) the trial court improperly excluded evidence that the Knoxville Police Department unlawfully “stacked” charges against him; 4) that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 5) that the jury should have been instructed as to the availability of audio/visual equipment in the jury room; and 6) that Defendant was not properly informed of a hearing on his motion for new trial. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for one count of resisting arrest, for one count of vandalism over $1,000, and for one count of theft over $10,000. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of one count of resisting arrest, one count of vandalism over $1,000, and the lesser included offense of theft over $1,000 but less than $10,000. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of vandalism over $1,000 and resisting arrest. In addition, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to declare a mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was ample evidence to support his convictions and that the trial court did not err in denying his motion to declare a mistrial.

Appellant, Marcus Pope, was indicted by a Shelby County grand jury for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court granted appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and a jury convicted him of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of ten years for aggravated robbery and six years for aggravated burglary. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the length of his sentences. Discerning no reversible error in the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Bennie Osby, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted second degree murder, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant Ward pled guilty to one count of initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and Defendant Want pled guilty to one count of initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant Ward was sentenced to eight years, and Defendant Want was sentenced to eight years for the initiation conviction and to a concurrent eleven months and twenty-nine days for the possession conviction, for a total effective sentence of eight years. Both defendants reserved a certified question of law concerning the legality of a search conducted by police. On appeal, both defendants claim that the trial court erred by failing to suppress items seized pursuant to the warrantless search of Defendant Ward’s premises. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the certified question as phrased is not dispositive of the case, and we dismiss the appeals accordingly.

Jasper Pugh (“the Defendant”) was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of theft of property of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to twelve years on each count. The trial court ordered each count to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. The Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for both counts and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph Thomas Blakely, was charged with two counts of rape of a child. A jury found him guilty of the first count but was unable to reach a unanimous decision on the second count. The defendant was sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment with a release eligibility of one hundred percent. The defendant appeals, challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Robert Lee Yates, appeals the Warren County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery and sentenced to thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, LaQuenton Monger, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and of aggravated child abuse. On direct appeal, the conviction for first degree murder was ultimately reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court failed to charge lesser included offenses. The petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder. The petitioner brought a pro se post-conviction petition asserting various errors, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition based on the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Lewis County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Michael E. Fischer, of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, see T.C.A. § 39-13-103; driving under the influence (“DUI”), fifth offense, see id. § 55-10-401; driving while his license was revoked (“DWLR”), fifth offense, see id. § 55-10-504; and violation of the open container law, see id. § 55-10-416. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years’ incarceration by the agreement of the parties. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of DUI, the defendant also argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Lynn Garry Fryer, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Much aggrieved by his convictions of aggravated assault and felony reckless endangerment, the petitioner, Abron Spraggins, sought post-conviction relief in the Shelby County Criminal Court, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner contends that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to introduce alibi evidence at trial and by failing to object to a police officer’s testimony concerning his knowledge of the petitioner and that these omissions inured to his detriment. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

After a trial by jury, the petitioner was found guilty of first degree (premeditated) murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. His conviction was affirmed by this court on direct appeal. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred by: (1) ruling that the State did not violate the petitioner’s due process right to favorable evidence by failing to provide information related to the testimony of a State witness; (2) ruling that the petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at this trial, and (3) denying his request for post-conviction DNA analysis. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s finding that the State in fact provided the petitioner with access to the favorable evidence in question and that the trial court did not err in its conclusion that the petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial. We further conclude that the post-conviction court was within its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for additional DNA analysis. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment, the defendant, Anthony Williams, appeals to this court, challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Discerning no paucity in the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Bedford County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Joseph Darryl Taylor, of two counts of rape, see T.C.A. § 39-13-503(a)(1), (2); one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, see id. § 37-1-156; and one count of simple possession of marijuana, see id. § 39-17-418(a). At sentencing, the trial court merged the rape convictions into a single judgment of conviction and imposed an effective sentence of 20 years plus 11 months and 29 days’ incarceration for the offenses. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, the trial court’s allowing his impeachment by prior convictions of aggravated assault and statutory rape, and the trial court’s sentencing determination. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Danny Ray Hensley, pleaded guilty to robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-401 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years’ confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Because the trial court did not consider a presentence report, we reverse its judgment and remand for resentencing.

Appellant, Deonte Matthews, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of especially aggravated robbery and the trial court sentenced Appellant to seventeen years at 100%. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated this appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the proof supports the conviction for especially aggravated robbery.

The petitioner, who stood convicted following a guilty plea to numerous crimes including aggravated kidnapping, brought a petition for habeas corpus claiming that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a pretrial order amending one count of his indictment from a charge of especially aggravated kidnapping to a charge of aggravated kidnapping. Consequently, he urged that his conviction for aggravated kidnapping was void. The habeas corpus court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the petitioner’s claims, if sustained, would merely render his judgment voidable, not void. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due process right to fair and impartial review by failing to accurately grasp the merits of his claims and including nongermane material in its order. After review, we conclude that the habeas corpus court’s order did fairly address his claims and did not violate his due process rights. Consequently, the judgment below is affirmed.

A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant- Appellant, Billy J. Blankenship, of robbery, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. He received a sentence of four years for robbery and three years for theft, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Blankenship argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to prove the particular allegations of the indictments. Upon review, we reverse and vacate the judgment for robbery, and remand for a new trial as to the robbery offense. The judgment for theft, however, is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Jerry D. Carney, II, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he contended that his life sentence for his first degree premeditated murder conviction was illegal and void. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the summary dismissal of the petition. His primary claim is that his life sentence is illegal because the statute governing his release eligibility does not allow for the possibility of parole. Following our review, we affirm.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ronnie Ingram, of aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-14-403; theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, see id. § 39-14-103, 105(2); criminal exposure to human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), see id. § 39-13-109; evading arrest, see id. § 39-16-603; and resisting arrest, see id. § 39-16-602. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 32 years plus 11 months and 29 days’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of criminal exposure to HIV. Because we determine that the State failed to establish an element of the offense, we reverse the defendant’s conviction of criminal exposure to HIV and dismiss that charge. In lieu thereof, we impose a conviction of attempt to expose one to HIV and remand for sentencing on this modified conviction. Because the defendant raises no challenge to his remaining convictions, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.