APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Chris Cummins, was indicted for first degree murder. The State’s proof included the testimony of an inmate who had been housed with the defendant in prison and who claimed the defendant confessed to the crime. The defendant moved for a continuance based on the fact that he was only made aware of this witness on the morning the trial began, and the trial court denied his motion. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the defendant was sentenced to life in prison. The defendant asserts on appeal that he is entitled to a new trial because the court erred in denying his request for a continuance. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Juryconvicted the appellant, Timothy Eugene Kelly, Jr., of one count of especially aggravated robbery and two counts of fraudulent use of a credit card. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles Hall, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Robert Jesus Porrata, pled guilty to attempted second degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and employing a weapon during a felony in Case No. 09-00597 involving victim Cliff Belue. In Case No. 09-00598, he pled guilty to aggravated robbery involving victim Reginald Bean, and he pled guilty to attempted aggravated robbery in Case No. 09-00599 involving victim Ray Heath. In Case No. 09-00597, Defendant was sentenced to ten years for attempted second degree murder, four years for attempted aggravated robbery, to run concurrently, and six years for use of a firearm in a felony, to run consecutively for an effective sixteen-year sentence. In Case No. 09-00598, the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence, and the trial court imposed a four-year sentence in Case No. 09-00599. The sentences in 09-00597, 09-00598, and 09-00599 were ordered to run consecutively for an effective thirty-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him. After a thorough review, we affirm judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Jerry D. Carney, appeals the dismissal of his third petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that due process should toll the statute of limitations and that he is entitled to coram nobis relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence of the criminal activities and official misconduct of the medical examiner who testified at his trial. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Constance Elaine Archer, was convicted of theft of property valued at $500 orless,a Class A misdemeanor,and criminaltrespass,a Class C misdemeanor,and sentenced to an effective term of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on probation. On appeal, she argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Mell Thomas Bruton, aka Mel T. Bruton, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the sentence based on the defendant’s unauthorized trip out of state when the trip was necessitated by a family emergency. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Nicholas Fletcher, appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel: (1) failed to investigate concerning certain witnesses at his trial; (2) failed to present Petitioner’s testimony at the pre-trial hearing on the motion to suppress Petitioner’s inculpatory statement to police; and (3) failed to adequately explain to Petitioner the State’s negotiated plea agreement offer. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction trial court.

The petitioner, Tarik Robertson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of observation without consent, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation following service of four months in the county workhouse. On appeal, the petitioner contends that it was error to deny him post-conviction relief because: (1) the conviction was based upon evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest; (2) there is newly discovered evidence in the case; (3) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (4) there were cumulative constitutional errors in the trial process. Following review of the record and arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the postconviction court.

The petitioner, Patrick Thurmond, appeals the denial of his sixth petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his conviction of aggravated rape is void. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Rodney Dewayne Hymes, alias Rodney Dewayne Hynes, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentences in the Department of Correction for his 2007 and 2008 convictions for violation of the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender (“HMVO”) Act. The defendant also challenges the trial court’s sentencing determinations in five new cases, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give sufficient weight to his potential and amenability for rehabilitation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Marques Sanchez Johnson, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for four counts of burglary of a motor vehicle, six counts of theft of property, and one count of evading arrest in two separate cases. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of burglary of a motor vehicle and one count of theft in each case in exchange for a total effective sentence of six years in the first case and twelve years in the second case as a Range IV, career offender, with the trial court to determine after a sentencing hearing whether the sentences would run concurrently or consecutively. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of eighteen years as a Range IV, career offender. Appellant insists that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. After a review of the record, the briefs, and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s determination that consecutive sentences were warranted because Appellant had an extensive criminal record and was a professional criminal. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Jamie Scott Moore, pled guilty in Rutherford County to two counts of attempted sale of methamphetamine on October 6, 2006. As a result, he was sentenced to six years at thirty percent as a Range I, standard offender on each offense, to be served concurrently with each other. Petitioner was to serve 270 days prior to release on probation. As part of the plea agreement, Petitioner agreed that on his first violation of probation he would waive any application for a suspended sentence and serve the sentence in its entirety. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus in which he argued that he was “prematurely and illegally released” before serving all 270 days of the agreed sentence. After a hearing on the petition, the trial court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to support his argument with authority, failed to present the court with an adequate record for review, and sought an appeal to this court from the denial of a writ of mandamus, a right not prescribed in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b). Consequently, the appeal is dismissed, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, George L. Morgan, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court should have held an evidentiary hearing to consider his claim that his dual convictions and consecutive sentences for second degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery are illegal and void because they violate double jeopardy principles. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Jerry McGaha, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to accept his guilty pleas to nine counts of child rape because his plea agreements did not include the mandatory requirement of community supervision for life. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

Appellant, Keith Sales, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of pssession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, two counts of possession of Alprazolam with intent to sell, and one count of possession of a handgun as a convicted felon. Appellant’s arrest was as the result of the execution of a search warrant based upon information provided by a confidential informant. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Appellant pled guilty reserving a certified question for appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Appellant pled guilty in a negotiated plea agreement to one count each of possession of 5 grams or more of cocaine, one count of possession of Alprazolam, and one count of possession of a handgun as a convicted felon. He received an effective nine-year sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the information set out in the affidavit does not meet the two prong test set out in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed.2d 637 (1969) and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed.2d 723 (1964), (“Aguilar-Spinelli”), as adopted in State v. Jacumin, concerning the proof of the reliability of a confidential informant. We have reviewed the record on appeal, and conclude that the information supplied in the affidavit meets the Aguilar-Spinelli/Jacumin test. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Brian Keith Medley, appeals the Cumberland County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation for DUI, fifth offense. He argues that the record did not contain substantial evidence in support of the court’s finding that he violated his probation and that the court erred by not allowing him to assert the defense of necessity. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robert W. Hawkins (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one count of aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The trial court merged the two convictions into the conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to a term of five years, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and arguing that the trial court improperly commented on the motivation of the Defendant during his testimony. He also alleges that the trial court should have sentenced him to full probation. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James L. Johnson, pro se, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2006 convictions for rape and attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and his resulting ten-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him habeas corpus relief. He argues that his convictions and sentences are void because the indictment for rape was defective and his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On appeal, the petitioner, Alberto Eddie Deleon, contests the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he was incarcerated for an excessive time span prior to instigation of extradition proceedings. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, arson, a Class C felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. Prior to trial, the defendant pled guilty to an additional count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. She was sentenced to four years for the arson and three years on each count of tampering with evidence, with each sentence to run concurrently but consecutive to a twenty-one year sentence for the second degree murder, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for second degree murder and that the trial court erred by sentencing her to partial consecutive sentences. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Tosha Taylor, appeals the denial of her motion to reopen her post-conviction petition. Because she failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner, Gerry Hoover, was convicted by a Coffee County jury of three counts of rape of a child. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of forty-eight years. Petitioner’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Gerry Hoover, No. M200701595-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 768928, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 25, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2008). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping and three counts of aggravated rape, all Class A felonies. He received four twenty-year sentences, all to run concurrently. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by using criminal convictions he received for crimes committed after those committed in the instant case to enhance his present sentences from fifteen to twenty years. After review we conclude that the trial court did not err by enhancing the defendant’s sentences. We affirm.

A Sumner County grand jury indicted appellant, Bobby A. Raymer, for one count of especially aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated robbery, and a jury found him guilty of both counts. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years to be served at 100% release eligibility. On appeal, appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court should have merged the two convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to use a demonstrative exhibit. Upon review of the record and the applicable case law, we conclude that the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. The conviction for aggravated robbery is affirmed.