APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Travis Jay Woods (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the indictment underlying his conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder contains a fatal variance entitling him to habeas corpus relief. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s claim for relief. The Petitioner has appealed. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s ruling.

Ricky Lee Burris (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended to supervised probation. After his second probation violation, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Gary R. Bunton, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he is being illegally restrained because his probation and community corrections sentences expired before revocation warrants were filed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition.

The Petitioner, Ophelia L. Lomax, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from her convictions for aggravated child abuse by causing serious bodily injury and aggravated child abuse by neglect or endangering a child. On appeal, she contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (1) meet with her or discuss with her the nature of the charges and her potential defenses, (2) call an expert witness at the trial to contest the issue of serious bodily injury, and (3) raise an issue of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James Patrick Stout, was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. At the sentencing hearing for the felony murder conviction, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3) the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any robbery or kidnapping. T.C.A. § 39-13-204(1)(2), (6) (Supp. 1995). The jury also found that the evidence of these aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed a sentence of death for the Petitioner’s felony murder conviction. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to forty years for each of his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, to be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to the death sentence. On direct appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. See State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689 (Tenn. 2001). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was later amended by appointed counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court entered an order in which it denied the Petitioner post-conviction relief from each of his three convictions and his sentences for the convictions of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The post-conviction court’s order granted the Petitioner post-conviction relief from his sentence of death, ordering that the Petitioner have a new sentencing hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s order denying relief regarding the guilt phase of trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

Appellant, James Edward Church, Jr., pled guilty to eleven counts of theft of property valued at less than $500, three counts of burglary, one count of resisting arrest, four counts of auto burglary, and one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 in Bedford County. The trial court was to determine the manner and length of the sentences at a sentencing hearing. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of approximately twelve years and six months. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a review of the record and the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, William A. Stafford, pled guilty to facilitation of aggravated kidnapping and was sentenced to nineteen years in incarceration. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief that was dismissed by the habeas corpus court. After a thorough review of the record and briefs on appeal, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that his sentence was void or that his confinement was illegal. Therefore, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition.

Defendants, Marvin Christopher Long, Desmond Shelton Spann, and Dontillus Williams, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and for conspiracy of the same offense, both Class A felonies. Following a jury trial, all three defendants were convicted as charged. Defendant Long was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to 60 years’ incarceration for each conviction with his sentences to be served concurrently; Defendant Spann was sentenced as a multiple offender to 25 years’ incarceration for each conviction with his sentences to be served concurrently; and Defendant Williams was sentenced as a persistent offender to 40 years’ incarceration with his sentences to be served concurrently. Defendants appeal and assert the following: 1) Defendant Long challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s classification of him as a career offender; 2) Defendant Spann challenges the trial court’s jury verdict form regarding the schedule of the controlled substance, challenges the trial court’s instructions as to lesser-included offenses, and argues the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury regarding the weight of the controlled substance; and 3) Defendant Williams challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. After a careful review of the record before us, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Anthony Graham, entered a guilty plea in the Hawkins County Criminal Court to the charged offense of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and requested that the trial court grant him judicial diversion or an alternative sentence. At that time, the State informed the court that the parties agreed Graham would be sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a sentence of three years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the court, in the event that the court denied judicial diversion. Graham was subsequently sentenced to three years’ incarceration. On appeal, Graham contends that the trial court erred in denying: (1) judicial diversion and (2) an alternative sentence. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying a sentence of split confinement. Although the trial court properly denied judicial diversion, full probation, and a community corrections sentence, we reverse the judgment and remand the case with instructions to the trial court to enter an order sentencing Graham to serve 90 days’ confinement in the Hawkins County Jail before serving the remainder of his three-year sentence on supervised probation.

The Defendant, Nathaniel Kelly, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence and placing his original sentence into effect, instead of ordering a period of shock incarceration followed by release to community corrections, and (2) that the trial court did not issue a statement setting forth the evidence or factors it relied upon in making its determination to revoke his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s community corrections sentence.

Defendant-Appellant, Demariceo Chalmers, appeals as of right his convictions for attempt to commit aggravated robbery and first degree murder committed during the perpetration of an attempted aggravated robbery. He received a sentence of five years for the attempt to commit aggravated robbery to be served concurrently with a sentence of life imprisonment for the felony murder. In this appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction of felony murder. Specifically, Chalmers contends that the State failed to prove felony murder because he abandoned his intent to commit the underlying felony prior to shooting and killing the victim. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, the Defendant-Appellant, Jerell Reed, entered guilty pleas to tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and purported to reserve a certified question of law regarding whether his attempt to dispose of less than onehalf ounce of marijuana constituted the felony offense of tampering with evidence. Because Reed failed to properly reserve the certified question, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Jonathan Radford, pled guilty to two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range I offender, to two concurrent five-year sentences and ordered him to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement, with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation report, the second such report filed against the Defendant. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation for a second time and ordered that he serve the balance of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it revoked his probation. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Derrann William Estill,appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping and resulting seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, that he is entitled to relief based upon cumulative error, and that the post-conviction court failed to address adequately his claims of due process violations. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Donald Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated burglary and was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and thirty years, respectively. On appeal, Jones argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy Dewayne Williams, appeals as of right from the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from the attorneys representing him at trial because they failed to call an eyewitness to the crime. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Cumberland County jury convicted the Defendant, Cody Cofer, of two counts of felony murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed consecutive life sentences for the felony murder convictions, ordering those sentences to run concurrently with the twelve-year sentence it imposed for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the jury to determine whether a witness was an accomplice; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to give a missing witness instruction to the jury; (4) the State’s closing argument was improper; and (5) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive life sentences. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Davidson County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Melissa Grayson, for aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Following jury verdicts of guilty on all five counts, the trial court sentenced appellant to an effective seventeen-year sentence. Appellant claims the following errors at trial: 1) the trial court erred in declaring a witness unavailable and allowing the State to introduce his preliminary hearing testimony; 2) the trial court erred in permitting the State to elicit improper character evidence from a witness; and 3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. The State contends that appellant has waived the first two issues because her motion for new trial was untimely. We have concluded that the State is correct with respect to its waiver argument and further, that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdicts. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this consolidated appeal, Petitioner Tony Cox appeals the trial court’s order denying his application to qualify as a bondsman’s agent to write cash bonds in the Criminal Courts of the Thirtieth Judicial District, and Petitioner Samuel R. Brisco appeals the trial court’s revocation of his authorization to write bonds in the Criminal Courts of the Thirtieth Judicial District. In both of these cases, the trial court determined that the Petitioners’ restoration of citizenship rights following their felony convictions did not remove the civil disability preventing them from serving as a bondsman or bondsman’s agent. On appeal, the Petitioners argue that they are entitled to serve as bond agents pursuant to Attorney General Opinion 04-143. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Sidney Cleve Metcalf, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, the Petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief because of alleged defects in the indictment. The crux of his argument is that his indictment is invalid because it did not allege all of the elements of the offense of aggravated rape, i.e., that the penetration of the victim was accomplished while being armed with a weapon. He also contends that he is entitled to relief because the grand jury foreman did not sign the indictment. We conclude that there is no error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court and affirm.

The Petitioner, Albert Evans, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-four years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On January 31, 2011, Appellant, Johnny Marvin Highsmith, II, entered guilty pleas to one count each of theft of property over $1,000, identity theft, and theft of property over $500 with an effective sentence of eight years. He was placed on community corrections with all but 165 days of his sentence suspended. The trial court issued a violation of community corrections warrant on May 2, 2011, and amended that warrant on June 3, 2011. The trial court held a hearing and revoked Appellant’s community corrections sentence and ordered that he serve his original sentence in incarceration. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve his sentence in incarceration. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse it discretion. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Appellant, Odell Wisdom, pled guilty in Sullivan County to the charge of felony failure to appear in exchange for a five-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender. The trial court held a sentencing hearing specifically for the purpose of addressing Appellant’s request for probation or alternative sentencing. The trial court denied Appellant’s request and ordered Appellant to serve the sentence in confinement. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. However, after a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly denied probation or alternative sentencing. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following his jury conviction of aggravated rape, the petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his conviction resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel and that due process considerations should toll the statute of limitations. The post-conviction court ruled that the petitioner failed to establish a basis for due process tolling and summarily dismissed the petition. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, James Randall Roskam, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the State impermissibly elicited testimony from its witnesses about his prior bad acts in violation of Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.