APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Bobby Joe Strader, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the habeas corpus court erred by not appointing counsel and not allowing him to amend his petition with the assistance of counsel prior to its dismissal and (2) that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Petitioner, Jason R. Williams, appeals from the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he complained that the McMinn County trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose concurrent sentences. After the timely filing of a notice of appeal, Petitioner argues in this Court that the habeas petition was improperly dismissed and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101, which limits the grounds for habeas corpus relief, is unconstitutional. After a review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has not provided an adequate record demonstrating his sentences were illegal. Thus, we chose not to address the constitutionality of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Mel Lindsay Atwell, pled guilty to driving under the influence fourth offense, a Class E felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years for the aggravated assault conviction and two years for the felony driving under the influence conviction and ordered that the sentences run consecutively, for an effective sentence of seven years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences because the State had not met its burden of proof to support that decision. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

In a bench trial, petitioner, Mario Pendergrass, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder,especially aggravated kidnapping,and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life in prison plus forty-four years. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief raising the following issues:(1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to develop mental health evidence; (2) whether trial counsel denied petitioner his right to testify at trial; and (3) whether petitioner voluntarily waived his right to a trial by jury. The post-conviction court denied relief following a full evidentiary hearing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Jermaine Bradford, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Circuit Court of Davidson County. He sought habeas corpus relief from his conviction in the Criminal Court of Davidson County for especially aggravated kidnapping. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without a hearing. Petitioner appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, Edward Wooten Titus, pled guilty to vehicular assault pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to receive the minimum sentence of two years. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined by the trial court. A charge of driving without a license was dismissed pursuant to the agreement. The trial court ordered alternative sentencing, with Defendant to serve the sentence in the community corrections program. Included was fifty days of incarceration with periodic confinement so that Defendant’s receipt of social security disability payments would not be jeopardized. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant him full probation. From the record we glean that no pre-sentence report was prepared. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

Petitioner, David Ferrell, was convicted in Warren County of failure to display a license, violation of the seatbelt law, and two violations of the vehicle registration law. Petitioner represented himself at trial. Petitioner was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifty days. Petitioner appealed the convictions pro se, arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case and “that he is not subject to the enforcement of traffic laws by local law enforcement authorities.” State v. David A. Ferrell, No. M2007-01306-CCAR3-CD, 2009 WL 2425963, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 7, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 8, 2010). This Court upheld the convictions. Id. at *3. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was dismissed as untimely. On appeal, the State conceded that the petition was improperly dismissed as untimely. This Court agreed and reversed the dismissal of the petition. See David A. Ferrell v. State, No. M2010-00696-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5625882, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 28, 2010). On remand, Petitioner sought recusal of the post-conviction judge. The judge denied the motion and the matter proceeded to a hearing. After the hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief because Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Jessica Evette Ward, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault and attempt to commit second degree murder. After a jury trial,Appellant was convicted of the lesser included offenses of reckless aggravated assault and misdemeanor reckless endangerment. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Appellant to serve three years in the county workhouse. Appellant did not file a motion for new trial.Appellant seeks review of the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. After reviewing the record before this Court, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to state on the record its reasons for denying judicial diversion; thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The Knox County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Tonya Thomas, for one count of aggravated assault. The trial court found Appellant guilty of a lesser included offense of simple assault. Appellant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for her conviction for simple assault. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and have concluded that the evidence presented is sufficient to support the conviction. For these reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted Bobby L. Looper (“the Defendant”) of one count of second degree murder, and the trial court subsequently sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the length of his sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and the length of his sentence. This matter is remanded to the trial court for the entry of a corrected judgment order.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Stanley Blue, of facilitation of first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty years. The Petitioner did not appeal his sentence, but this Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. State v. Stanley Blue, No. W2007-00292-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 723845 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 19, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2009). The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the sentence imposed by the trial court was illegal. The post-conviction court granted the Petitioner’s petition, in part, finding that his sentences were not constitutional. The State appealed, contending that the post-conviction court erred when it granted the Petitioner a new sentencing hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Teresa Deion Smith Harris, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s dismissal of her pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Andrew D. Harville, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and felony evading arrest. Petitioner was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment for his murder conviction and two years for evading arrest, and his sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. A summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions can be found in this Court’s opinion in State v. Andrew Deon Harville, No. W2008-02375-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 571786 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Feb. 19, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 16, 2010). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s request for relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Krystal Bowman, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion for her conviction of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Craig O. Majors, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary in Montgomery County. See Craig O. Majors v. State,No.M2009-00483-R3-CD,2010 WL 2483512 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Nashville, Jun. 21, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2010). Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on appeal. Id. at *1. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on various grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief as Petitioner has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed

The Defendant, Francisco Javier Ancona, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder, attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and employing a handgun during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A.§§ 39-13-202,39-13-403,39-14-403, 39-13-102, 39-17-1324(b) (2010). He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree felony murder conviction, fifteen years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction to be served concurrently with the first degree murder conviction, nine years for the aggravated burglary conviction to be served consecutively to the first degree murder conviction but concurrently with the aggravated assault conviction, nine years for the aggravated assault conviction to be served consecutively to the first degree murder conviction but concurrently with the aggravated burglary conviction, and nine years for employing a handgun during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction to be served consecutively to the aggravated burglary conviction, resulting in an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus eighteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted especially aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements of the Defendant’s co-defendants into evidence at the trial; (3) the trial court erred by failing to redact a statement made by a co-defendant to the police from a telephone recording played at the trial; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the State to amend the indictment to include a greater offense than originally charged; (5) the trial court erred by allowing separate convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary; and (6) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his conviction of aggravated assault and accompanying 10-year sentence of incarceration, the defendant, Yoni Sales Barahona, appeals, alleging some 21 assignments of error. Some of the issues have been waived, and others are redundant. The defendant’s reviewable challenges are these: (1) the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress, (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of the victim, (3) the trial court erred by admitting the identification of the defendant by both the victim and a witness, (4) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a knife recovered from the scene, (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (6) the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error in either the conviction or the sentence, we affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Ericka Barfield, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probation and order that she serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Gregory D. Valentine, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal, without an evidentiary hearing, of  Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on Defendant’s motion.

The defendant, Walter Lavar Wright, pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and one count of possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and received a Range I sentence of nine years’ incarceration. Following the successful completion of “boot camp,” the defendant was placed on probation. On January 20, 2011, a probation violation warrant issued alleging that the defendant violated the terms of his release by garnering a new arrest, failing to report to his probation officer, failing to maintain employment, and failing to pay fines and costs. At the hearing, the defendant admitted to many of the allegations. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. In this timely appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering him into confinement. Because the record supports the trial court’s order, we affirm.

The defendant, John Wesley Shutt, pled guilty to first offense DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days. As part of his plea agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law: “whether the officer had probable cause to make the arrest.” After careful review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the officer involved had probable cause to arrest the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Isiah Buckley, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the petitioner pled guilty, as a Range I offender, to facilitation of second-degree murder, a Class B felony, and received an out-of-range sentence of fifteen years, with the manner of service to be determined. After a hearing, the petitioner was ordered to serve the sentence. In the instant appeal, the petitioner contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically,he contends trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to inform the trial court of withheld exculpatory evidence; and (2) failing to investigate and to interview witnesses. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Michael Scott Farner, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his 1988 guilty-pleaded convictions of second degree murder, assault with intent to commit first degree murder, and seconddegree burglary are void because his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered and because his sentences are illegal. Because we perceive no error in the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Petitioner, Brenda Holliman, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. She received concurrent sentences of life without parole and fifteen years. The victim was Petitioner’s husband. Her convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Brenda Holliman, No. W2003-01736-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 819735 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2005) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005). She timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended. Following an evidentiary hearing the petition was dismissed. Petitioner has timely appealed. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant, Monica Rankin, pled guilty to two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, aggravated statutory rape, exploitation of a minor by electronic means, solicitation to commit aggravated statutory rape,and solicitation to commit sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to an effective sentence of five years and ordered her to serve six months in confinement, followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it:
(1) applied enhancement factors and failed to apply mitigating factors; (2) denied her full probation; and (3) denied her request for a variance from the probation rule prohibiting internet access for sex offenders. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.