APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Douglas Emory Carlton (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury conviction for burglary. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement made to police officers. He also alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

The petitioner, Mike Dwayne Rahming, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summarily dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The petitioner pled guilty to Class D felony burglary and received a two-year probated sentence in 2007. In 2011, he filed the instant petition for relief asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal,hecontends that the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal resulted in a violation of his due process rights. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that the petition was timely filed or that a recognized exception to the statute of limitation applies, we find no error in the post-conviction court’s dismissal.

The petitioner, Leon Flannel, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of murder in the perpetration of a theft and one count of premeditated murder; the convictions were merged, and the petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for life. After the denial of his direct appeal, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner urges that, because he expressed his dissatisfaction with his trial counsel prior to trial, his trial counsel should have withdrawn. The trial court found no deficiency in the petitioner’s trial counsel’s performance and no resulting prejudice. After a thorough review of the petitioner’s claim, we affirm.

In 2005, the Petitioner, Tony Chandler, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of theft under $500, two counts of aggravated robbery, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and burglary. For these convictions, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of sixteen years. In 2011, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and for a writ of error coram nobis. The State filed a motion to dismiss because the petition was untimely filed. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the petition was untimely filed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition without a hearing. Following our review of the record and the law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Gerraldo White, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition without appointing an attorney to represent him, without holding an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised, and without allowing him an opportunity to respond to the State’s brief opposing his petition. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner has asserted no colorable claim to relief, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and sentenced to serve twenty-five years in prison. He appeals his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction and contending that the victim’s identification of him to the sexual assault nurse should have been excluded as hearsay. Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the identification was properly admitted into evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Joseph May (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder. The Petitioner contends that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. This appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jason Peter Meeks, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), violating the implied consent law, and leaving the scene of an accident, all misdemeanor offenses. The Defendant appeals pursuant to Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, contending that he should be granted a new trial because the State failed to record his trial. We disagree with the Defendant’s claim and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Glenda Nash Clemmons, pled guilty in the Marion County Circuit Court to failure to appear in case numbers 8109 and 8721. In case number 8109, the trial court sentenced her to two years to be served as sixty days in jail and one year, ten months in community corrections. In case number 8271, the trial court sentenced her to three years to be served in community corrections and consecutively to the two-year sentence in case number 8109. Subsequently, the trial court revoked her community corrections sentences and ordered her to serve her effective five-year sentence in confinement. The appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her community corrections sentences and ordering her to serve her original sentences in confinement. She also contends that she did not receive all the jail credits to which she was entitled. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Robert Jason Burgess, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of rape and two counts of possession with intent to sell a controlled substance, for which he is serving an effective twenty-six-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. He also contends that the trial court erred in treating his letters as a petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Hamilton County Criminal Court grand jury charged the defendant, Derrick Keith Walker, with one count of attempt to commit the premeditated first degree murder of the victim, Charles Vandergriff, and one count of the aggravated assault of the victim. The defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement calling for dismissal of the attempted murder count and a plea of guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, with a six-year Range I sentence to be served as 11 months and 29 days in confinement followed by supervised probation. The agreement provided for the defendant to pay $13,000 in restitution at the rate of $175 per month beginning on March 15, 2010. On December 17, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment that implemented the terms of the plea agreement. In August 2011, the State obtained a probation violation warrant claiming that the defendant garnered new arrests and had failed to pay restitution. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him into confinement to serve the balance of his sentence. In this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by revoking the probation and by ordering him to fully serve his original sentence. Because the record supports the order of the trial court, we affirm the order.

The Defendant, Victor Byndum, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for two violations of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act and ordering him to serve his six-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Putnam County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Matthew Kinnard, charging him with one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. He received a sentence of three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or some other form of alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant filed a motion to correct a judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 in the Shelby County Criminal Court. The trial court subsequently entered an order denying the Appellant’s motion. In this appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion. Because there is no appeal as of right from the denial of a Rule 36 motion to correct a judgment, the appeal is dismissed.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of four counts of rape, Class B felonies, and three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, Class C felonies. The defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that the prosecution committed misconduct during closing argument, and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence on a single rape count consecutive to his remaining concurrent sentences. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A grand jury indicted appellant for possession of a substance containing .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417 (a)(4), a Class A felony. Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence, appellant entered a guilty plea to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to eight years and 270 days and placed him on probation. As a condition of the plea agreement, appellant reserved the right to certify several questions of law challenging the validity of the search that yielded the evidence against him. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Bert Durand Hatmaker, of one count of reckless endangerment, one count of assault, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of two years for the reckless endangerment conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction, and thirty days for the leaving the scene of an accident conviction, with sixty days to be served in jail and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless endangerment. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Joseph A. Hale, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2007 conviction for second degree murder and resulting seventeen-year sentence. He contends that his sentence is void because the trial court improperly sentenced him pursuant to the 2005 Sentencing Amendments when the offense date was 2004. The State has moved this court to affirm the trial court’s denial of relief by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion for a memorandum opinion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Keisha M. Howard, was indicted for theft of property valued at $60,000 or more and for violating the Tennessee Computer Act, both Class B felonies. She entered guilty pleas to the offenses as charged in the Bradley County Criminal Court, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of her sentence as well as the amount of restitution, if any. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105(5), -602(a)(1) (2006). The trial court sentenced Howard as a Range I, standard offender and imposed concurrent sentences of eight years. Under the special conditions in the theft judgment, the court ordered that Howard “may apply to Community Corrections” and that she “owes $215,000 [and] cannot pay that amount but must pay no less than $200 a month.” Howard filed a motion to clarify the total amount of restitution owed, and the trial court, in determining that its previous judgment regarding restitution violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(c), ordered Howard to pay $1,000 per month for eight years, for a total of $96,000 in restitution. On appeal, Howard argues that the trial court’s order requiring her to pay $96,000 in restitution was unreasonable, given her financial resources and ability to pay. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order that Howard pay $1,000 per month for eight years for a total of $96,000 in restitution, and we amend the judgments to show that the victim’s loss in this case is $156,951.30 and that the restitution, based on the proof established of Howard’s present ability to pay, is reduced to $48,000, which shall be paid at the rate of $500 per month for eight years. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

Defendant, Sherri A. Bogle, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking Defendant’s probation and requiring her to serve the sentence in incarceration. Defendant argues on appeal that her sentence had expired before the State initiated revocation proceedings. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Carter County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Wendi Nicole Garrison, of the second degree murder of the victim, Joshua Perry. The trial court imposed a sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction, that the trial court erred in denying her request to charge assisted suicide as a lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and that the trial court erred in denying her request for a jury instruction regarding assisted suicide as a defense to second degree murder. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Putnam County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Matthew Kinnard, charging him with one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. He received a sentence of three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or some other form of alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin Womack, of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm with intent to employ in the commission of a dangerous felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, theft of property over $500, and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments, with the exception of the theft of property conviction, which we modify from a Class E felony theft to a Class A misdemeanor theft.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, L. B. Rittenberry, Jr., of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress his statements; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to refer to the deceased as “the victim”; and (4) his sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Shelly Minor, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for several offenses after the death of his estranged girlfriend. At the conclusion of a lengthy jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder, leaving the scene of an accident involving injury or death, driving while a habitual motor vehicle offender, driving under the influence (“DUI”), reckless driving, vehicular homicide by intoxication, and vehicular homicide by reckless conduct. At sentencing, the trial court merged the vehicular homicide convictions with the second degree murder conviction and merged the reckless driving conviction with the conviction for driving under the influence. As a result of the convictions, Appellant was ordered to serve an effective sentence of twenty-eight years, eleven months, and twenty-eight days. A motion for new trial was denied and this appeal followed. On appeal, Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying a continuance; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of prior bad acts of Appellant and hearsay statements made by the victim; (4) the State committed discovery violations with regard to recorded telephone calls made by Appellant while incarcerated; (5) cumulative errors necessitate a reversal of Appellant’s convictions; and (6) the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to an excessive sentence with consecutive sentencing. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine: (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) Appellant failed to show what the testimony of the missing witness would have been at trial and, therefore, cannot show prejudice from the trial court’s failure to grant a continuance to secure the witness’s attendance at trial; (3) the trial court properly allowed the State to introduce evidence of prior bad acts of Appellant under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and 804(b)(6); (4) Appellant failed to show how he was prejudiced by the State’s alleged discovery violations; (5) cumulative errors do not necessitate a reversal of Appellant’s convictions; and (6) the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.