APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Martin Dean Gibbs, of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and eight counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for each rape of a child conviction and ten years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing a social worker to testify about the victim’s allegations pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(4), the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify about the victim’s allegations as prior consistent statements; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions in counts 7 and 11; and (4) his convictions in counts 1 and 9, 2 and 10, and 3 and 11 violate protections against double jeopardy. The State concedes that the evidence is insufficient as to count 11. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s rape of a child conviction in count 11. Therefore, that conviction is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. The appellant’s remaining convictions are affirmed.

In two separate trials, a Shelby County jury found the Petitioner, Kevin McDougle, guilty of three counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated assault and one count of unlawful possession of a handgun. For all the convictions, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed separate appeals for his cases, and this Court affirmed the judgments in both cases. State v. Kevin McDougle, No. W2009-01648-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2490752, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 11, 2010) no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed; State v. Kevin McDougle, No. W2007-01877-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2219591, at *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 24, 2010) no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming the two attorneys who represented him on each respective case were ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition, maintaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in both cases. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Humberto Lopez, appeals the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine and resulting effective sentence of eight years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was not advised by trial counsel or the trial court about the immigration consequences of his pleas. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Russell Caldwell, pled guilty to facilitation of first degree felony murder and was sentenced to serve fifty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court entered an order denying post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Antywon Montrace Beasley, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for probation. The defendant pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of ten years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the court determined that the sentence was best served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that this determination was error. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentence as imposed.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Louis Dancy, charging him with the second degree murder of Charles Williams. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense and received a sentence of eighteen years and six months as a Range I, violent offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in giving the jury a sequential instruction, which charged the jury that it must first acquit Defendant of the greater offense before considering any lesser offense. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Roy Dale Harrell, pled guilty in the Franklin County Circuit Court to one count of statutory rape, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to two years split confinement, to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail and the remainder on probation. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of split confinement that required service of eleven months and twenty-nine days. After review, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of a split confinement sentence. However, we modify the judgment of the trial court to the extent it imposed an eleven-month-andtwenty-nine-day period of incarceration and remand for entry of an amended judgment showing the defendant's period of incarceration at 7.2 months.

The Defendant-Appellant, Andre Jon Simmons, II, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Madison County to possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and simple possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. He received an effective sentence of ten years, suspended to probation. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A), Simmons attempted to reserve the following certified question of law: “Whether the cocaine and oxycodone should have been suppressed by the Circuit Court for an illegal stop and search of Andre Jon Simmons.” Because the certified question fails to identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider it. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed.

The petitioner, BarrySmelley, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court should be reversed for failing to make findings on his specific claims and that counsel’s uniateral decision to release a witness from a subpoena violated his rights to compulsory process and to present a defense. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The appellant, Larry E. Rathbone, was convicted of two counts of rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of attempted rape of a child. He received a total effective sentence of fifty-six years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Derek Coleman, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of voluntary manslaughter, employing a firearm during the commission of a felony, and aggravated assault, all Class C felonies. He was subsequently sentenced to six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, six years for the firearm conviction, and five years for the aggravated assault. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following review of the record, we conclude the evidence is sufficient and affirm the convictions.

A Shelby County jury convicted petitioner, Charlton Garner, of second degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced him to an effective twenty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After an unsuccessful direct appeal to this court, he petitioned the Shelby County Criminal Court for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present a witness suggested by petitioner and failure to impeach a State’s witness with prior convictions. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error in the proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Joseph Wells (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. After a hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered the Defendant to serve thirty days of periodic confinement followed by two years of probation. The Defendant has appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion, erred in denying full probation, and erred in relying on hearsay statements in imposing sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of second-offense driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving with an expired license, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended after seven months’ incarceration, on the second-offense DUI, and to a concurrent six months on the charge of driving on an expired license, for a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant claims that: the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to enter evidence pertaining to his tumultuous relationship with a woman; the trial court erred by denying his motion to recuse; the trial court erred by denying his motion to investigate juror dissatisfaction with the verdict; and the sentences imposed were excessive. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 1994, a Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Stephen L. Beasley, of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction on appeal. State v. Stephen Lujan Beasley, No. 03C01-9509-CR-00268, 1996 WL 591203, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 10, 1996), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 27, 1998). After a somewhat lengthy procedural history, the Petitioner filed a second petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to “instruct trial jury and argue murder in perpetration of felony reckless.” The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he has been subjected to multiple punishments for the same crime, arguing that the jury violated his constitutional rights when it applied the felonymurder aggravating circumstance to his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. He does not contest his sentence for life in prison but contests the jury’s decision that he not have the possibility of parole. The Petitioner states that because he was convicted of premeditated murder, the jury improperly applied the felony murder aggravator as a basis for imposing his “without parole” sentence. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The Defendant, James Young, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 0-401. The trial court suspended the Defendant’s driver’s license for one year and sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration with all but thirty days to be served on probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, first offense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Joshua Beadle, and Co-Defendant, Lezuntra Knox, charging them with burglary of a building. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the offense and received a sentence of four years in the county workhouse. Defendant Knox was tried separately. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lawrence County jury found appellant, JimmyEsters, guilty of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range I, standard offender, to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument inappropriately shifted the burden of proof to appellant; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Van Buren County jury convicted Defendant, Ricky Dean Harvey, of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on a related charge of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and the trial court declared a mistrial as to that count. A fourth count of the indictment was resolved in a bench trial wherein the trial court found Defendant violated the implied consent law. The DUI charge was ultimately dismissed. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve eleven years for the cocaine conviction, concurrent with the sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the drug paraphernalia conviction. In his appeal, Defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver; (2) the stop and search of Defendant’s vehicle and the resulting arrest of Defendant violated Defendant’s constitutional rights and the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (3) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive; and (4) Defendant “[l]acked the [m]ental [c]apacity for the [a]rrest and [t]rial [h]eld in this [m]atter.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jake L. Monroe, alias, appeals as of right from a jury conviction for possession with intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance within a drug-free school zone, a class B felony. The Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for correction of the judgment.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Daniel Ross McClellan, of rape of a child and incest. On remand for resentencing for the rape of a child following his first direct appeal, State v. Daniel Ross McClellan, No. E2009-00698-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2695657 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, July 8, 2010), the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. McClellan appeals the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial by relying on enhancement factors that were improperly submitted to the jury. The State concedes error but maintains that McClellan’s sentence is appropriate. Although we discern no reversible error, we remand to the trial court for correction of the judgment formsto reflect the date of the offense as shown in the indictment. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Nathan Cordell Burkeen,appeals the denialofhis petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Humphreys County jury convicted the Defendant, Tina M. Dixon, of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone and of possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress because the attachment order upon which she was arrested was unlawfully issued; (2) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to set aside her verdict because she was not properly charged with the crimes for which she was convicted; (3) she was denied due process of law because the presiding trial judge had previouslyprosecuted her for burglary and felony theft charges; (4) she was denied due process of law because the Assistant District Attorney General who prosecuted her case had previouslybeen her public defender when she was convicted of burglaryand felonytheft charges; and (5) the trial court erred when it enhanced her sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Pro se petitioner, Efrain Huerata Orduna, appeals the Circuit Court for Franklin County’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 31, 2007, petitioner pled guilty to first degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnapping. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On April 4, 2011, almost four years after the judgments were entered, petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief, contending that he did not understand the guilty plea proceedings and that other constitutional rights were violated. He failed to state any factual basis in the petition to explain its untimely filing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

Rivera Peoples (“the Defendant”) appeals his jury conviction for first degree felony murder. In his appeal, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.