APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Christopher Hubbard (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping. He appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lisa Faye Allison, pled guilty, pro se, to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine and one count of possessing less than 0.5 ounces of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of three years to be served on probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that she had violated the terms of her probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her request to apply for the community corrections program, improperly basing the denial on her decision to exercise her right to a hearing on the issue of whether she violated her probation. She further  contends that the trial court erred because it denied her community corrections request without holding a hearing on her eligibility. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Derrick Brandon Bush (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty to two counts of attempt to commit rape in December 2000. On April 25,  2011,the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief,alleging that his guilty plea was unconstitutional in light of Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), and that the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations should be tolled. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief. The State appealed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we hold that the rule announced in Ward does not apply retroactively. Therefore, the Petitioner is not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(b)(1). We also hold that the Petitioner is not entitled to tolling on due process grounds. Thus, the Petitioner’s claim for relief is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Darry Lee Mitchell (“the Petitioner”) pled guilty in 1991 to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated robbery, receiving an effective sentence of fifty-fiveyears in theTennesseeDepartmentof Correction. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief in 1996 and again in 2004; both petitions were denied. Acting pro se, the Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition in July 2011, which the post-conviction court denied without a hearing. The Petitioner appealed. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Bryant Carter, entered into a negotiated plea agreement and pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), and properly reserved the following certified question of law for appeal: “Whether further prosecution of this case is barred by double jeopardy under the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions when the Defendant was detained under a pro forma policy of the General Sessions Criminal Court while properly out on a misdemeanor citation in lieu of arrest.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kevin Anthony Dickson, Jr., was found guilty by the Sevier County Circuit Court of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2010), 39-14-404 (2010), 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010, 2011), 39-13-402 (2010), 39-12-101 (2010). The trial court merged one count of aggravated assault into an attempted first degree murder conviction. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for each attempted first degree murder conviction, twelve years for especially aggravated burglary, and six years each for the aggravated assault and attempted aggravated robbery convictions. The trial court ordered the attempted first degree murder convictions to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted first degree murder convictions, (2) his conviction for especially aggravated burglary is barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d), and (3) the trial court erred by applying improper sentencing enhancement factors and ordering partially consecutive sentences. We  ffirm the judgments for the attempted first degree murder of Christopher Lyons, aggravated assault, and attempted aggravated robbery. We reverse the judgments for the attempted first degree murder of Rodney Hardin and especially aggravated burglary and remand the case for sentencing and entry of judgments of conviction for attempted second degree murder and aggravated burglary.

After careful review of the record and relevant law, I am unable to agree with my colleagues’ determination that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for the attempted first degree murder of Rodney Hardin. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent on this issue. I concur with the majority’s conclusions otherwise.

The Petitioner, John Todd, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of one count of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2006) (amended 2007), 39-13-210 (2010). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for first degree murder and twenty years’ confinement for second degree murder. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by (1) finding him competent to stand trial; (2) denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement; (3) denying his motion for a mistrial trial on the ground that an outburst during the trial prejudiced the jury against him and prevented a fair trial; (4) admitting gruesome photographs of the victims at the trial; (5) allowing a medical examiner who did not perform the autopsies to testify at the trial; and (6) denying his request for a mistrial on the ground that the State failed to provide his oral statement reduced to writing before the trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Ramone Gholston, of facilitation of first degree felony murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered him to serve an effective sentence of nineteen years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that his sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied enhancement factors. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, William Henry Wiggins, was convicted in the Davidson CountyCircuit Court of felony possession of a controlled substance, namely oxycodone, and a violation of the sex offender registry. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve an effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support the convictions and that his sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Denise Dianne Brannigan, was convicted by a Carter County jury of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000 and three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value equal to or less than $500. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed terms of 5 years for the theft conviction and 11 months and 29 days for each fraudulent use of a credit card conviction. The trial court ordered consecutive service of the 5-year sentence and two of the 11-month and 29-day sentences. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of prior uncharged conduct under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and (2) that her sentence was excessive. After our review, we affirm.

Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court to concurrent sentences of 20 years for each conviction. Defendant appeals his convictions and asserts that: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and 2) the trial court erred by limiting Defendant’s cross-examination of a State’s witness and by denying Defendant the opportunity to make an offer of proof of his excluded cross-examination. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Courtney Rashad Farrell, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. As part of the Defendant’s guilty plea, he agreed to a sentence of between ten and twelve years as a Range I standard offender. The plea agreement provided that the trial court would determine the length of sentence within the agreed upon range as well as whether the sentence would run consecutively or concurrently with the Defendant’s prior twelve-year sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven years consecutively to his prior sentence. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Derrick Le’mon Goode, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court committed error in finding that neither his general sessions court counsel nor his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance as a matter of law. He cites six factual grounds supporting his claim and alleges that the cumulative effect of counsels’ errors deprived him of his right to counsel and a fair trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to show that either counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, of aggravated rape and especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to prove venue; (2) law enforcement officers’ seizure of him violated his constitutional protections; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Pro se petitioner, Joby Lee Teal, seeks a declaratory judgment concerning the legality of his five 1988 convictions for drug offenses and the resulting concurrent five-year sentences he received as a result of a negotiated plea agreement. As grounds, petitioner argues that the sentences are void because he committed the offenses while on bail and should have received consecutive sentences. The Criminal Court for Shelby County found that declaratory judgment relief is not available to petitioner because his five concurrent sentences had expired. Upon review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that due process considerations could toll the statute of limitations in this case. While there are instances when due process could toll the statute of limitations, this is not one of them. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Christopher Kennedy, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery in exchange for a sentence of nine years to be served at 100%, followed by community supervision for life. After his release for that conviction, the Defendant was indicted for violating a condition of his community supervision. The Defendant filed a motion to declare Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 unconstitutional “and/or” seek habeas corpus relief. After hearing the motion, the trial court granted relief, finding that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 violate double jeopardy protections. The State filed a timely notice of appealed. The Defendant cross appeals, asserting: (1) the community supervision for life statute is unconstitutional; and (2) the conditions for lifetime supervision established by the Board of Probation and Parole are void as the conditions are not enacted pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Upon a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court improperly declared Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-524 through 526 unconstitutional and that the trial court properly dismissed the remaining issues. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court in part and affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, Troy Fuller, was convicted by a Madison County jury of rape, aggravated criminal trespass, and violation of an order of protection. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Appellant complains that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the length of his sentence was excessive, that the jury was not instructed on the offense of assault and that his wife’s car was illegally searched. On appeal, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; he has waived any issue regrading his sentence because he failed to include a copy of the presentence report in the record; Appellant has waived any issue regarding an assault instruction because he failed to request one; and his constitutional rights were not violated by the search of the car because the knife, which was recovered from the search, was not
presented as evidence at trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Stoney R.Anderson,II,pled guilty in the Hickman County Circuit Court to possession of more than half an ounce of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ probation. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Anderson reserved the following certified question of law: “[w]hether the warrantless search of the Defendant’s bag is supported by exigent circumstances.” Upon review, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case.

Raymond Thomas (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years of incarceration. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence consecutively to a previous sentence. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the consecutive service of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Richard Carlton Pickard, Jr. (“the Defendant”) pled nolo contendere to one count of DUI, second offense, and one count of simple possession of Schedule IV contraband. He reserved five certified questions regarding the legality of his stop. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the Defendant is entitled to no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, David Easton Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because due process considerations may toll the statute of limitations in this case and the post-conviction court did not make such determination, we reverse the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant-Appellant, Channon Lee Williams, appeals from the Benton County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. He was originally convicted for the initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class B felony. He received a sentence of eight years, which was to be served on community corrections after one year’s imprisonment. On appeal, Williams argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Harriet Robertson Forrest, was indicted on nine counts of identity theft, a Class D felony. The Defendant pleaded guilty to all nine counts. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant received a four-year sentence for each conviction as a Range II multiple offender with the sentences to run concurrently. The plea agreement provided that the manner of service would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve her effective four-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying her request for an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.