APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Jason Burdick, of one count of aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated rape with bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to a cumulative sentence of thirty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape with bodily injury, (2) the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial motions to suppress evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Upon review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and the length of his sentences but remand the case to the Criminal Court of Davidson County for additional findings regarding consecutive sentencing.
 

Between the years of 1988 and 1996, the Petitioner, Lawrence David Ralph, Jr., pled guilty to the offenses of public drunkenness, resisting arrest, interfering with the duties of a police officer, disturbing the peace, two counts of assault, driving under the influence, and harassment. On May 17, 2011, the Petitioner filed five separate pro se petitions for post-conviction relief. In five separate orders, the post-conviction court summarily denied relief, concluding that the petitions were not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it summarily dismissed his petitions. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.
 

The Defendant, Tiffany Davis, was indicted on eighteen felony drug counts following a series of controlled drug purchases conducted by law enforcement officers. The jury convicted the Defendant of one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; three counts of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, all Class B felonies; three counts of the delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, all Class C felonies; three counts of the delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, all Class B felonies; two counts of conspiracy to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, both Class C felonies; and one count of the lesser included offense of facilitation of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class C felony. She was found not guilty on the remaining five counts. At her sentencing hearing, the trial court found the Defendant to be a career offender based upon her seven prior Class B felony convictions, for which she previously had received a sixteen-year sentence. After merging alternative counts in this action, the trial court sentenced her to the mandatory sentence of fifteen years for each Class C felony and thirty years for each Class B felony. The trial court then ordered each of these sentences to run concurrently. After finding that the Defendant had an extensive prior record of criminal activity and that the present offenses were committed while she was on probation, the trial court ordered its effective thirty-year sentence in this case to run consecutively to the Defendant’s prior sixteen-year sentence. On appeal,the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each conviction. She also challenges her effective sentence, arguing that it is excessive. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Appellant, Kendrick Miles, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to four years. The trial court held a sentencing hearing specifically for the purpose of addressing Appellant’s request for alternative sentencing. The trial court denied Appellant’s request and ordered Appellant to serve the sentence in incarceration. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court considered the pertinent sentencing guidelines and principles and properly denied Appellant’s requestfor alternative sentencing. Therefore, we affirm the judgmentof the trial court.
 

Defendant-Appellant, Matthew C. Welker, appeals from the Stewart County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation. Welker pled guilty to residing with a minor as a sex offender, and he received a suspended sentence of two years following 90 days of confinement. On appeal, Welker claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and in ordering him to serve the sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Defendant, Andrew Kelly King, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for robbery, vandalism, and attempted escape and ordering his fouryear sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence. We reverse the judgment of the trial court because the court improperly relied upon potential parole in making its determination. The case is remanded to the trial court for a new hearing.

The defendant, Michael Clark, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and sentenced to fifteen years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to another sentence. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the trial court erred in allowing certain photographs into evidence, and the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Cornelius Phillips, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County in two separate cases to two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of theft of property over $1000, and one count of attempted aggravated burglary, for which he received an effective sentence of sixteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider applicable mitigating factors and the principles of sentencing in setting the lengths of the sentences and by inappropriately ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, William Robinson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced by the trial court to five years, suspended to nine months in the county workhouse with the remainder of the time on supervised probation. His sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Francisco R. Liriano, of conspiring to deliver more than 300 grams of cocaine, a Class A felony. He received a community corrections placement of fifteen years following one year of confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence sufficiently established that Liriano was a knowing participant in the conspiracy. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

In this consolidated appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his requests for pretrial diversion in both Maury County and Rhea County, the denial of his motions for writ of certiorari by the Maury County and Rhea County trial courts, and the denial of his motion for interlocutory appeal by the Rhea County trial court. He also argues that the pretrial diversion statute does not prohibit diversion for more than one offense. After review, we affirm the denials of pretrial diversion and motions for writ of certiorari. We also conclude that the Rhea County trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion for interlocutory appeal but such error is of no effect in light of this court’s grant of an extraordinary appeal. We further conclude that the pretrial diversion statute does not prohibit diversion for more than one offense charged in the same indictment.

The State of Tennessee, through the Office of the Attorney General, has filed an application for an extraordinary appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P. 10, seeking review of the trial court's order granting the Defendants new trials on grounds that: ( I ) former Judge Richard Baumgartner, who presided over each of the Defendants' trials, committed "numerous egregious actions" in violation of both the criminal law and the Code of Judicial Conduct while presiding over the cases resulting in structural error that denied these Defendants their rights to fair trials; and (2) former Judge Baumgartner did not discharge his duty as the thirteenth juror in these cases before leaving the bench and the successor judge on these cases "is unable to serve as thirteenth juror" given "the numerous issues concerning the credibility of both certain testifying witnesses and the trial judge."

The General Sessions Court of Shelby County found the petitioner, Michelle Lambert, in contempt for failing to comply with the orders of the court and sentenced her to five days in jail. Rather than filing a direct appeal, the petitioner responded by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Shelby County Criminal Court, alleging that the judgment was void for two reasons: first, because Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-103, which lists the punishments under the general contempt statute cited by the general sessions court in its order, limits the power to impose jail time to circuit, chancery, and appellate courts and; second, because the general sessions court failed to afford her notice or a hearing prior to finding her in indirect contempt. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court granted the writ by vacating the judgment and remanding to the general sessions court for “further proceedings not inconsistent” with its order, including the initiation by the general sessions court of the proper notice and hearing required for a finding of indirect contempt. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the habeas court lacked the authority to remand the case to the general sessions court upon granting the writ of habeas corpus. We conclude, however, that the petitioner failed to show that her judgment was void, rather than merely voidable. Thus, she should have sought relief through a direct appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the habeas court granting the writ of habeas corpus.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, William A. Osborne, of three counts of facilitation of aggravated burglary, one count of facilitation of theft of property between $500 and $1000, one count of theft of property between $500 and $1000, and one count of theft of property between $1000 and $10,000. The trial court sentenced him as a career offender to an effective sentence of thirty-six years, to be served at 60%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed the jury to find the Defendant guilty on Count 1 after the jury had previously announced it could not unanimously agree as to Count 1; (3) the trial court erred when it failed to declare a mistrial following prejudicial statements made by the State’s witnesses; (4) the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (5) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court, and we affirm those judgments.
 

Brian Dewayne Brewington (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of aggravated child neglect, two counts of child neglect, and the resulting sentence of twenty-five years. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and at sentencing. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

Jerry Phillips (“the Defendant”) appeals jury convictions for four counts of aggravated sexual battery, resulting in an effective sentence of fifty-four years. Specifically, he contends that the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony render the evidence insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Chancy Jones, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-four years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s exclusion of certain orders of protection, which had been sought and entered against the victim by persons unrelated to this case, and which the Defendant sought to admit in an effort to prove that the victim was the first aggressor. The trial court held that the orders of protection themselves were not relevant, but offered the Defendant the opportunity to introduce the testimony of the persons who obtained the protective orders against the victim. For his second issue, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Brandon L. Smith, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and agreed to be sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to thirteen years and six months to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) relied upon hearsay statements contained in the presentence report at sentencing; and (2) denied him an alternative sentence. Following review of the record, we conclude that the defendant’s first claim has been waived and his second claim is moot. We affirm accordingly.

The defendant, Princeton Moody, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant as a Range II offender to twenty years at 100 percent for the second degree murder conviction, eight years at thirty-five percent for the aggravated assault conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment conviction, with the murder and aggravated assault sentences to be served consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his second degree murder conviction and argues that the trial court erred by admitting a hearsay statement as an excited utterance, in ruling that the State could impeach his testimony with his prior convictions for reckless endangerment, in admitting the victim’s medical records, and in allowing the medical examiner to testify with respect to an autopsy report that she did not create. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tray Turner, appeals as of right from a jury conviction for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in the Criminal Court for Knox County. Following a sentencing hearing, the court imposed a sentence of 14 years incarceration at 100 percent service. The Defendant contends (1) that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery and (2) that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve 100 percent of his sentence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Asata D. Lowe, was convicted by a Blount County jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery, two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of a theft, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of theft. Lowe subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Blount County Circuit Court, which was dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, Lowe argues that the judgments are void because numerous constitutional errors deprived the trial court of authority to try and sentence him. He asserts that his right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s failure to disclose evidence and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury properly, that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the seizure and admission at trial of evidence, that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated by his counsel’s performance at trial, and that his right against double jeopardy and due process rights were violated by multiplicitous indictments. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

A Rutherford County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Elgene Kentea Porter, for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and misdemeanor evading arrest. Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape, robbery, and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years at 100% for aggravated rape, six years at 30% for robbery, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for evading arrest, to be served as an effective thirty-one-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the rape kit into evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his robbery conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

A Hamblen County Criminal Court jury found the appellant, Joel Scott Stephens, guilty of driving on a revoked license and violating the financial responsibility law. He was found not guilty of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total sentence of six months in the Hamblen County Jail, with ninety days to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of ninety days of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Anthony Brown, of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The conviction for simple possession of cocaine was merged with the Class B felony, and Brown received an effective twenty-year sentence as a Range II offender. On appeal, Brown argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of possession with intent to deliver, (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct at trial, and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Carol Ann Tully, pled nolo contendere to DUI, first offense, and properly reserved a certified question of law to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), after her motion to suppress evidence was denied. Defendant asserts that there was not a valid basis for the traffic stop which directly led to her arrest and that she was therefore subjected to an unconstitutional stop and seizure. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.