APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Asata D. Lowe, was convicted by a Blount County jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery, two counts of felony murder in the perpetration of a theft, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of theft. Lowe subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Blount County Circuit Court, which was dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, Lowe argues that the judgments are void because numerous constitutional errors deprived the trial court of authority to try and sentence him. He asserts that his right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s failure to disclose evidence and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury properly, that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the seizure and admission at trial of evidence, that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated by his counsel’s performance at trial, and that his right against double jeopardy and due process rights were violated by multiplicitous indictments. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

A Rutherford County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Elgene Kentea Porter, for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and misdemeanor evading arrest. Defendant was convicted of aggravated rape, robbery, and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years at 100% for aggravated rape, six years at 30% for robbery, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for evading arrest, to be served as an effective thirty-one-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the rape kit into evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his robbery conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

A Hamblen County Criminal Court jury found the appellant, Joel Scott Stephens, guilty of driving on a revoked license and violating the financial responsibility law. He was found not guilty of evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total sentence of six months in the Hamblen County Jail, with ninety days to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of ninety days of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Anthony Brown, of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, simple possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor, and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The conviction for simple possession of cocaine was merged with the Class B felony, and Brown received an effective twenty-year sentence as a Range II offender. On appeal, Brown argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of possession with intent to deliver, (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct at trial, and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Carol Ann Tully, pled nolo contendere to DUI, first offense, and properly reserved a certified question of law to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), after her motion to suppress evidence was denied. Defendant asserts that there was not a valid basis for the traffic stop which directly led to her arrest and that she was therefore subjected to an unconstitutional stop and seizure. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Defendant, Joseph L. Lands, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, and he intended, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), to reserve the following certified question of law for appeal: “Whether proof of actual attempts by law enforcement officers to obtain a lawful warrant must be placed on the record before the court may find that exigent circumstances exist, such that the warrant requirement can be excused?” After review of the entire record, we conclude this appeal must be dismissed.

The defendant, Vernon Motley, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court gave an improper jury instruction on premeditation; (2) the trial court erred when it did not grant the defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on a Brady violation; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony of the victim’s dying declaration to include information concerning the motive for the killing; and (4) the State’s argument during closing was improper and amounted to plain error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Johnny J. Peterson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder and attempted first degree murder convictions. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with the reasoning used. I believe the evidence fairly raised the issue of self-defense, thereby justifying an instruction to the jury. I also believe that under the facts in this case, selfdefense was not inconsistent with a claim of reckless homicide. I, however, am not persuaded that counsel performed deficiently nor that prejudice has been shown.

Jawad Salman (“the Petitioner”) filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea for conspiracy to manufacture less than one hundred plants of marijuana, a D felony. The trial court denied the motion, and final judgment was entered. The Petitioner timely appealed, asserting that his guilty plea was void because of the failure to reduce the Petitioner’s guilty plea to a signed writing and that the trial court erred by not allowing the Petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Frank Warren Currah, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of sexual exploitation of a minor and aggravated stalking and resulting effective sentence of eight years in confinement. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Henry T. Johnson, of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the first degree murder conviction and three years for the aggravated burglary conviction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the State failed to prove premeditation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Christopher Johnson, appeals as of right from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post- conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition because it relied upon “unconstitutional” case law in determining that the petition failed to present a colorable claim for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Steven Thacker, appeals the revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, James Alton Campbell, appeals the partial denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Bo W. Prendergast, of one count of theft of property valued at over $10,000 but less than $60,000, see T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105(4) (2006), and the trial court imposed a sentence of 15 years’ incarceration as a Range III, persistent offender to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and urges this court to conclude that the trial court committed plain error by excluding a State’s witness’s felony convictions for use as impeachment. Discerning neither a paucity in the evidence nor that substantial justice requires consideration of the alleged error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Rodney K. Glover, of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at over $10,000 but less than $60,000, aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property valued at less than $500. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 50 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of sentences as to both the length and alignment of service. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Jeffrey Klocko (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, challenging his convictions for aggravated sexual battery, sexual battery by an authority figure, and assault by offensive or provocative contact, which resulted in an effective sentence of thirteen years. As his basis for relief, he alleged numerous grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to interview the Petitioner’s therapist or mother and failed to call either of them at trial, resulting in ineffective assistance. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
 

The petitioner, Ydale Banks, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated burglary, facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated assault. He argues that: (1) the post-conviction court erred in finding that he was not prejudiced by the instructions submitted to the jury that contained the trial court’s handwritten corrections; (2) the post-conviction court erred in determining that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (3) the post-conviction court erred in not granting a new trial due to cumulative error. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A jury convicted Antonio Sellers (“the Defendant”) of second degree murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three years of incarceration. In this appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s ruling on an evidentiary issue regarding leading questions on redirect examination and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon our thorough review of the record, we have determined that the Defendant is entitled to no relief on the issues raised. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, William L.A. Church, challenges the trial court’s denial of his petitions for writ of error coram nobis relief from his convictions for passing a forged check and aggravated assault, alleging that newly discovered evidence warrants relief. Upon review, we conclude that the petitioner failed to allege any “newly discovered evidence” and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tommy Earl Jones, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based upon its finding that the petition was filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State’s motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
 

The petitioner, Tarina Simmons, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, entered best-interest guilty pleas to two counts of second degree murder and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of thirty-five years. Thereafter, she filed a post-conviction petition alleging that her guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, she contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately consult with her about the plea process and review the evidence against her; (2) overemphasizing the possible number of years the petitioner could receive in jail, resulting in the pleas being coerced; and (3) allowing the petitioner to proceed when her mental state was not stable enough to allow her to properly participate in the process. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
 

The appellant, Aaron Switzer, was convicted in the Blount County Circuit Court of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and domestic assault, and he was granted probation after service of nine months in confinement. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation for failure to comply with the terms of release. After the revocation, the trial court imposed a sentence of split confinement, and the appellant appeals that ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur with the majority opinion in result only for the reason that the post-conviction trial court erred by granting Petitioner a delayed appeal as to her sentence. The post-conviction trial court filed a fifteen-page order of disposition of the post-conviction petition, setting forth in detail its findings of fact and conclusions of law. I have carefully reviewed this order and have found no findings of fact by the post-conviction trial court which support the granting of post-conviction relief to Petitioner to the extent of granting a delayed appeal of the sentence imposed upon her. In fact, I find the term “delayed appeal” mentioned only in the order’s introduction, (“The Court, however, shall grant Petitioner the opportunity to seek a delayed appeal as to her sentence.”) and in its conclusion (“The Court, however, shall grant Petitioner the opportunity to seek a delayed appeal as to her sentence.”). No reasons are provided for the granting of the delayed appeal. The proof at the post-conviction hearing was that trial counsel informed Petitioner that he would not be representing her on appeal of her sentence, but that he informed her she was entitled to an appeal of the sentence. Furthermore,the record reflects that trial counsel was retained to represent Petitioner in the trial court, but had not been retained to represent her on appeal. Petitioner filed a pro se “Notice of Appeal,” but on the advice of the inmate “law clerks” at the correctional facility, she voluntarily dismissed her appeal. There is nothing in the post-conviction trial court’s comments from the bench following the hearing, or in its order on the post-conviction petition, setting forth any deficiency by the trial counsel, or, obviously, any resulting prejudice to Petitioner as a result of deficient representation by trial counsel regarding appeal of the sentence. It appears from the record that the post-conviction court gratuitously granted Petitioner a delayed appeal with no constitutional basis found to grant such relief. Trial counsel may have provided deficient representation ;if so,Petitioner may have been prejudiced thereby. However,the post-conviction court made no factual findings to either support or reject these conclusions. Accordingly, I would reverse that portion of the order granting a “delayed appeal” and affirm the dismissal of the Petition for post-conviction relief.