APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State of Tennessee appeals as of right the Warren County Circuit Court’s dismissal of three counts of an indictment charging the defendant, Angela M. Merriman, with driving under the influence (DUI), second offense; felony reckless endangerment; and reckless driving. Following our review of a destruction of evidence issue under an abuse of discretion rather than a de novo standard, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

In 2006, the Defendant, Jamaal M. Mayes, pled guilty to one count of attempted second degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court entered the agreed upon sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served as a multiple offender. In 2011, the Defendant filed a pro se “motion; application to void the judgment.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Polk County jury convicted the Defendant, Grover L. Parks, of theft of property valued over $10,000 and less than $60,000, and the trial court sentenced him to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to disqualify the special prosecutor from prosecuting the case. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted each of the appellants, Charles Jackson and Willis Holloway, of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. After a sentencing hearing, they received effective forty-four-year sentences. On appeal, the appellants contend that (1) the trial court erred by refusing to allow them to cross-examine a co-defendant about her engaging in prostitution before the crimes; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the co-defendant’s complete written statement into evidence; (3) the trial court erred by giving each juror a copy of the statement; (4) the trial court erred by failing to redact the statement; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the co-defendant’s complete statement into evidence but that the error was harmless. Therefore, the appellants’ convictions are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Tony Scott Walker, appeals the Circuit Court of Gibson County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Thomas W. Meadows, appeals as of right from his conviction for one count of indirect criminal contempt. The Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury found the appellant, Myron McNeal, guilty of attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm during a felony. For the convictions, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-eight years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child and reserved the following certified question: “Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss alleging the State violated the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (T.C.A. 40-31-101 et seq, U.S. Code Title 18-App) and the anti-shuttling provisions therein pursuant to Alabama v. Bozeman, 5[3]3 U.S. 146 (2001).” For differing reasons, the majority of this panel affirms the Defendant’s convictions.

I agree with the portion of the lead opinion by Judge Bivins which holds that Defendant is not entitled to relief pursuant to Article III of the IAD. I also agree and concur with the section of the lead opinion headed “Other Arguments.” I disagree with and therefore dissent from the remaining part of the lead opinion, which addresses Defendant’s claim pursuant to Article IV of the IAD.

I agree with the conclusion of the lead opinion that certain of the issues raised by the defendant are beyond the scope of this certified question. However, I would go a step further and hold that the certified question itself is deficient, meaning that this court is without jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, LeDarren S. Hawkins, of first degree murder and tampering with evidence, and the trial court sentenced him to serve an effective life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court refused to instruct the jury regarding the defense of a third person as an affirmative defense. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Marion County jury convicted the Defendant, Ashlee N. Appleton, of tampering with evidence, and the trial court sentenced her to four years, to be served on community corrections after six months of incarceration. The Defendant appeals, contending that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crime for which she was convicted. The State concedes the error, and both parties assert that this case be reversed. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we agree with the parties. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant’s conviction.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Emoe Zakiaya Mosi Bakari, of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) allowing a State witness to testify about “delayed disclosure” in child sexual abuse cases; (2) allowing a police detective to give testimony suggesting the appellant was uncooperative during the investigation; (3) allowing the State to introduce a photograph of the victims into evidence; and (4) allowing the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument to give personal examples in an attempt to vouch for the victims’ credibility. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing a State witness to testify about “delayed disclosure,” by allowing a police detective to give testimony suggesting the appellant was uncooperative during the investigation, and by allowing the prosecutor to give personal examples in an attempt to vouch for the victims’ credibility. Moreover, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the errors warrants reversal of the appellant’s conviction. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction of attempted rape of a child is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

In this extraordinary appeal, the Defendant, Allison Elizabeth McLean, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order affirming the Assistant District Attorney’s (“ADA”) denial of pretrial diversion and the trial court’s refusal to grant an interlocutory appeal of it’s denial of her pretrial diversion request. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari because the Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) abused her discretion by (a) failing to support her decision with “substantial evidence;” (b) failing to consider and give proper weight to the Defendant’s amenability to correction; (c) giving weight to the circumstances of the case and the need for deterrence without supporting it with evidence; (d) considering improperly the victim’s age to “enhance” the circumstances of the offense; and (e) giving “little or no weight” to the Defendant’s lack of criminal record and her eight-year marriage; and (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the ADA’s denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ian Zraik McClellan, pled guilty to an indictment against him. The State alleged that the indictment charged the Defendant with aggravated vehicular homicide, and the Defendant contended the indictment sufficiently charged him with only vehicular homicide. At the time he entered his plea, the Defendant agreed to allow the trial court to determine whether the indictment sufficiently charged him with aggravated vehicular homicide. After a hearing, the trial court determined the indictment sufficiently charged the Defendant with aggravated vehicular homicide. On appeal,the Defendant contends first that the indictment was not sufficient to charge him with aggravated vehicular homicide and only sufficiently charged him with vehicular homicide and second that his guilty plea was not validly entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide.

Petitioner, Romalis Gray, pled nolo contendere to attempted second degree murder and received a sentence of 8 years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn.1977) and Rule 11 (c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. He argues the trial court failed to: (1) advise him that if he pled guilty, the court could question him under oath, and those answers could be used against him in a prosecution for perjury if the statements were false; and (2) advise him of the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Daryl J. Carter, was convicted after a trial by jury of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The defendant appeals his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a statement made to police and by prohibiting his defense counsel from cross-examining the defendant’s ex-wife concerning her love life. In addition, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the prosecution engaged in misconduct during its closing argument. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that: (1) the trial court did not err by declining to suppress the defendant’s pretrial statement; (2)the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the defendant’s cross-examination of his ex-wife; and (3) the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. While we agree with the defendant that the prosecutor made an inappropriate statement in his closing argument, we do not believe that this inappropriate statement prejudiced the defendant to the degree necessary to warrant the reversal of his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Brandon Newby, of carjacking and evading arrest, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of eight years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Bernardo Acuna Rodriguez, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury for second offense driving on a revoked license. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the arresting officer’s stop and seizure of Defendant. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion, and as a result, dismissed the indictment. The State now appeals. After a review of the record, we conclude that the officer’s stop of Defendant was constitutionally valid, and therefore, the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed, the order dismissing the indictment is reversed, and this case is remanded.
 

A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Jon Logsdon, of two counts of solicitation of a minor to commit especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, two counts of solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape, a Class E felony, and four counts of solicitation of the sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony. He received an effective sentence of four years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for review on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of Logsdon’s reasonable belief that undercover officers posing as minors were under eighteen years of age. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jerry W. Elliott, was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”), a Class A misdemeanor, and violations of the open container, financial responsibility, and registration laws, all Class C misdemeanors. He was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction and thirty days for violations of the open container and registration laws. He also received fines for each conviction as well as for violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court separately found the defendant guilty of violation of the implied consent law, for which his driver’s license was revoked for one year. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of DUI and also argues that his conviction for violation of the implied consent law is improper because the charging instrument is not in the record. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Calvin Landers, was convicted by a jury of rape of a child and sentenced to twenty years. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Calvin Landers, No. W2007-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2901603 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jul. 25, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2009). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also asserted that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) , that his conviction was based on evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest, that his conviction was based on evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search, and that there was a “fatal variance” between the indictment and the proof. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a thorough review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief where the proof showed that trial counsel made a tactical decision to forego a motion to suppress; met with Petitioner at least ten times prior to trial; and was given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Moreover, Petitioner did not raise his issue with regard to exhibits in the petition for post-conviction relief so it cannot be raised on appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The appellant, Steven Larry Kilgore, Jr., pled nolo contendere in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to misdemeanor theft of property and received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on probation. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant reserved a certified question of law as to whether the police had reasonable suspicion to seize and detain him and whether the subsequent, non-consensual search of his car and seizure of evidence was illegal. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Demario Rawlings, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but five days suspended. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner,Michael Smythe,appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief filed 14 years after the entry of his guilty pleaded convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault for which he received sentences of 17 years’ and 6 years’ incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.