APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Marquette Woods, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerome Williams, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief on the basis that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter his 1986 conviction of aggravated rape because the indictment failed to allege an offense. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Scotty Lee Myers, was convicted of second degree murder, and he received a sentence of twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Hanes Cooper, appeals as of right from the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. The Defendant pled guilty to attempted theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, official misconduct, and conspiracy to commit forgery of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. After the plea agreement was entered, the Defendant filed an application for judicial diversion which the trial court denied. Following the denial of his application for judicial diversion, the Defendant was sentenced, pursuant to the plea agreement, to a six-year term of probation. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his application for judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court, but we remand the case for correction of the judgments.

Glen Curtis Letsinger (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his conviction of rape of a child and the resulting minimum sentence of fifteen years. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea and that his plea thereby was rendered constitutionally infirm. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Christopher Vigil, appeals from his conviction for criminally negligent homicide. As a result of the conviction, Appellant was sentenced to two years in incarceration. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for criminally negligent homicide where the proof showed Appellant was engaged in conduct that he knew, or should have known, created a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the victim and constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care of an ordinary person under those circumstances and that Appellant’s actions proximately caused the victim’s death. Further, the trial court properly sentenced Appellant to two years where the record indicated Appellant had a “significant” prior criminal history. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Barry Wayne Dunham, appeals the Macon County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder, for which he is serving a life sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Dexter McMillan, filed in the Knox County Criminal Court a motion to reopen his case, which the trial court treated as a petition for post- onviction relief. The trial court dismissed the petition, and the appellant appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the petition. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Kale Sandusky, pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417, -425 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ probation for the possession with intent to sell conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ probation for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, to be served concurrently. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the arrest warrant that led to a search of his home. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the Defendant.

The defendant, Larry Thomas Johnson, appeals his Bedford County Circuit Court guilty- pleaded convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, claiming that the trial court erred by imposing a Range II sentence in the absence of any notice from the State that it would seek enhanced punishment. Discerning no error, we affirm

The petitioner, Michael Wilsey, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention via rendition warrant, and the State moves this court to summarily affirm the denial via Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals .The State’s motion is well taken, and accordingly, the denial of habeas corpus relief is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20. Additionally, the petitioner’s request for bond pursuant to Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure is denied.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Chad Allen Love, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to establish the Defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crime. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss the judgment of the trial court.

Arthur Lee Taylor (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and/or deliver and possession of dihydrocodeinone and his resulting effective thirty-year sentence as a career offender. He alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our careful review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Ernest W. Mays, pled guilty, in two separate cases, in the Dickson County Circuit Court to: (1) two counts of selling cocaine less than .5 grams, a Class C felony; (2) conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping, a Class C felony; (3) simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and (4) retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant was to receive an effective sentence of ten years, as a Range II offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Following review of the record before us, we conclude no error occurred and affirm the sentences as imposed.

The defendant, Johnny Coffey, appeals his Bradley County Circuit Court jury conviction of second degree murder, claiming that the trial court erred by denying him funds to procure additional expert assistance, by denying his request to play witness statements in their entireties, by refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial, by denying his request for a jury instruction on self-defense, and by failing to apply certain mitigating factors to reduce his sentence. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Criminal Court of Morgan County granted habeas corpus relief to the Petitioner, Gary Wayne Calhoun, for convictions in the Criminal Court of Sullivan County for “bringing stolen property into the State valued in excess of $200.00” in case number 21,478 and for “simple robbery” in case number 22,532. The Respondent, David Mills, Warden, has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Lorenzo McLemore, III, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated burglary, and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. During the first phase of McLemore’s bifurcated trial, he was convicted of three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and the trial court declared a mistrial on the especially aggravated burglary count. During the second phase, the jury found McLemore guilty of employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of four years at thirty percent for the three convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and a consecutive sentence of six years at one hundred percent for the conviction for employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, McLemore argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony and that the trial court committed plain error in bifurcating his trial. The other Defendant Appellant, Melissa Denise Gaines, McLemore’s mother, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of attempted first degree murder and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. She was subsequently found guilty of three counts of reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court dismissed the firearm charge because the reckless endangerment convictions did not qualify as a dangerous felony for the firearm charge. Gaines argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for reckless endangerment. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the petitioner, David Hammond, of rape, and he was sentenced to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Jessica Birkhead, appeals under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 after the trial court’s grant of judicial diversion on a charge of vandalism under $500. On appeal
Appellant asks this Court to determine: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient; (2) whether the trial court improperly considered irrelevant evidence; (3) whether the trial court improperly excluded responses to requests for admissions in a related civil suit; and (4) whether the trial court should have remanded the matter for a preliminary hearing because there was no transcript or recording of the hearing. We determine that no final judgment of conviction exists that would entitle Appellant to an appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 and that Appellant has not presented a compelling case for the grant of an extraordinary appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Accordingly, Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

A Knox County jury convicted Petitioner, Charles Edward Graham, of reckless aggravated assault, tampering with evidence, possession of marijuana, and failure to provide proof of financial responsibility, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twentyseven years. State v. Charles Edward Graham, No. E2005-02937-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 199851, at *1, *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 24, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sep. 15, 2008). Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal to this Court. Id. at *1. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner now appeals this denial. We determine that the post-conviction court’s denial was proper because trial counsel did not coerce or unduly influence Petitioner with regard to his decision not to testify at trial; trial counsel was employing a reasonable trial tactic by not requesting jury instructions on any lesser included offenses; and trial counsel was not deficient with regard to attempting to obtain a plea bargain. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The appellant, Lynn Gary Fryer, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to aggravated assault, for which he was given a seven-year probationary sentence. Thereafter, he trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After his conviction for second degree murder was upheld on appeal, Petitioner, Criss Williams, sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court’s alleged improper jury instructions, and the trial court’s alleged misapplication of enhancement factors. See State v. Criss Williams, No. W1999-00823-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 278111, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 9, 2001), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. June 18, 2001). The parties waived a hearing on the post-conviction petition and submitted the petition on the record. The post-conviction court determined that Petitioner failed to prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and, therefore, denied post-conviction relief. On appeal, we determine that the issue of whether the trial court should have charged lesser included offenses has been waived because it was not raised on direct appeal. We further determine Petitioner has failed to prove that trial counsel’s failure to object to the absence of instructions on lesser included offenses and appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on appeal was prejudicial to his case or amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Robert Fusco, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, which were merged, and one count of each of the following offenses: conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann.§§ 39-12-101,-12-103,-13-202,-13-304,-13-305, -13-402, -13-403, & -14-403. The trial court determined that the Defendant was a Range II, multiple offender for sentencing purposes and imposed an effective 65-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the lesser-included offense of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) whether the assistant district attorney general committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (3) whether the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for especiallyaggravated kidnapping,conspiracyto commit aggravated robbery,and conspiracy to commitaggravated kidnapping;(4) whether his dual convictions for especiallyaggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery violate due process concerns because the restraint of the victim was not beyond that necessary to complete the robbery; (5) whether the trial court erred bynot merging his two conspiracy convictions because the offenses were the object of the same agreement; (6) whether the trial court erred by using certain out-ofstate convictions to enhance his sentencing range; and (7) whether his sentence was excessive.Following our review, we remand this case to the Montgomery County Circuit Court for the entry of corrected judgments to reflect merger of the Defendant’s conspiracy convictions. In all other respects, we conclude that there is no reversible error in the judgments of the trial court and affirm.

Petitioner, Mike Settle, appeals the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief in which he claimed that he was entitled to habeas corpus relief because his plea agreement and sentences for crimes committed in 1999 in Madison County are void because his sentence for escape was ordered to be served concurrently to a federal sentence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3). Petitioner failed to follow the mandatory procedural requirements for the valid filing of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Therefore, we affirm the judgment dismissing the habeas petition.

The Petitioner, Tracy Thomas Hepburn, was convicted of twenty-four counts of burglary, three counts of attempted burglary, fourteen counts of misdemeanor vandalism, eight counts of felony vandalism, ten counts of misdemeanor theft, and three counts of felony theft. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on January 13, 2011. State v. Tracy Thomas Hepburn, No. M2008-01979-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2889101 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, July 23, 2010) perm. app. denied (Tenn. January 13, 2011). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that: (1) his convictions were based on a coerced confession; (2) his convictions were based on a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination; and that (3) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim. The Petitioner appealed, and, on appeal, both parties agree that the post-conviction court erred and that the case should be reversed and remanded. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we agree with the parties that the petition for post-conviction relief raises a colorable claim. We, therefore, reverse and remand to the post-conviction court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.