APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Antwan Deemeek Hudson, was convicted by a Sullivan County Jury of two counts of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced him to two, concurrent sentences of twenty-five years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred in allowing a doctor to testify as to a statement made to him by the victim’s parents, and the trial court erred in excluding Appellant’s testimony regarding the results of a medical test. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is actually a plea for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we are precluded from doing. In addition, we conclude that the evidence is more than sufficient to support his convictions. We also conclude that the statement made by the parents to the doctor was erroneously allowed into evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule, but the error was harmless. Due to errors on the judgment forms, we remand for the correction of the judgment forms to reflect that Count 1 and Count 3 will run concurrently to each other. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Bethany Jean O’Donnell, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probationary sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to multiple charges, the defendant was sentenced to five consecutive terms of eleven months and twentynine days, to be served on supervised probation. A violation warrant was subsequently issued and, at the following hearing, the defendant acknowledged that she had committed the violation. The trial court then found the defendant to be in violation of the terms and conditions of her probation and ordered that the remainder of her sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that the decision was error and, further, that the court erroneously concluded that she would not be entitled to good conduct credits when serving her misdemeanor sentences at seventy-five percent. Because we conclude no error has occurred and because the case holds no precedential value, we affirm the ruling of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Following the Wilson County Circuit Court’s denial of hismotion to suppress,the defendant, Jeffrey I. Parsons, pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), first offense, see T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401 (2006), seeking to reserve a certified question of law concerning the legality of the stop leading to his arrest. Because the certified question was not properly reserved for review, we dismiss the appeal.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dennis Lee Rose, of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life for the murder conviction and three years for each of the aggravated assault convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of  Evidence; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to use the prosecutor’s notes for impeachment and by refusing to allow the defense to make an offer of proof regarding the State’s failure to provide the notes to the defense before trial; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to present surrebuttal testimony; and (5) the appellant’s convictions for premeditated murder and one count of aggravated assault violate double jeopardy. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

The defendant, Dennis Brewer, was convicted by a Madison County jury of DUI and DUI per se. He then pled guilty to DUI, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, with a minimum of nine months to serve prior to release into a rehabilitative program. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Lester Paul Doyle, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to three counts of aggravated burglary based on offenses he committed while serving a community corrections sentence for drug convictions in a prior case. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s community corrections sentence in the drug case and sentenced the defendant to serve concurrent terms of four years in the Department of Correction in the aggravated burglary case, with the aggravated burglary sentences to be served consecutively to the sentences in the drug case. The defendant now appeals the trial court’s sentencing determinations, arguing that his community corrections sentence in the drug case should not have been revoked and that the trial court should have sentenced him to some form of alternative sentencing in the aggravated burglary case. He does not challenge the trial court’s order of consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court but remand for correcting clerical errors and the entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect that the aggravated burglary sentences in case number 9354 are to be served consecutively to the drug sentences in case number 9201.

The appellant, Glyn Dale, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s ordering him to serve concurrent twenty-five-year sentences for two convictions of rape of a child. On appeal, the appellant contends that his sentences are excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Laraiel Winton, aggrieved by his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that successor counsel committed ineffective assistance, that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during argument, and that trial counsel committed ineffective assistance in several instances not previously raised on direct appeal. Determining that the allegations concerning trial counsel’s performance were previously determined, that the prosecutorial misconduct claim is waived, and that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice concerning successor counsel’s ineffective assistance, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Susan Gail Stephens, was charged with two counts of statutory rape and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The Defendant applied for pretrial diversion and has twice been denied. In the instant appeal, the Defendant challenges the prosecutor’s second denial of her application for pretrial diversion. Specifically, she claims that the prosecutor erred on remand by: (1) declining to consider any new information submitted by the Defendant since the date of the original application—information allegedly relevant to her amenability to correction; and (2) failing to properly consider and weigh her amenability to correction as instructed by this court in its previous decision. Following a careful review of the record and the applicable authorities, we agree with the Defendant that the prosecutor should have considered any evidence on remand, whether favorable or unfavorable, that was relevant to the Defendant’s current status for amenability to correction. Accordingly, we hold that an abuse of prosecutorial discretion occurred and once again remand the case to the prosecutor for consideration of all relevant factors. The judgment of the trial court upholding the prosecutor’s denial of diversion is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to remand to the prosecutor for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, George Arthur Lee Smith, appeals from the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for the following reasons: 1) for failing to move to suppress a recorded conversation between Petitioner and a co-defendant; 2) for failing to argue at trial the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to hearsay as rebuttal to the State’s theory of motive; 3) for failing to call Petitioner’s mother and stepfather as witnesses at trial; 4) for failing to move to strike the testimony of Petitioner’s sister at trial; 5) for failing to request a jury instruction regarding corroboration of accomplice testimony; 6) for failing to request a limiting instruction concerning evidence of Petitioner’s prior bad acts; 7) for failing to assert intoxication as a defense; and 8) for failing to object to improper comments by the prosecutor during voir dire and closing argument. Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred by not allowing hearsay testimony from Petitioner’s mother at the post-conviction hearing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement Defendant, Georgia Ann Tate, pled guilty to three counts of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and received a sentence of five years for each count, to be served concurrently with each other. Also, pursuant to the plea agreement, she pled guilty to one count of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine and received a sentence of eight years to be served consecutively to the other sentences, for an effective sentence of thirteen years. The manner of service of the effective sentence was agreed to be determined by the trial court. Other pending charges were dismissed. The trial court ordered the entire effective sentence to be served by incarceration. Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by denying her an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Tammy Bernice Davenport, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probation and subsequent sentencing. The defendant pled guilty in 2008 to the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture and received a ten-year sentence to be served on supervised probation. Following a prior revocation and reinstatement of her probation, a second violation warrant was issued alleging a violation based upon new charges and the use of intoxicants. Following a revocation hearing at which the defendant acknowledged her violations, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered that her sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the defendant to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. Following review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s actions as a defendant already on probation is not entitled to a second grant of an alternative sentence. Because we conclude no error occurred in this case and because the case has no precedential value, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The defendant, Joseph Dean Moore, appeals his conviction and sentence after being found guilty by a Cannon County jury on the charge of failure to appear, a Class E felony. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, arguing that his resolve to kill himself constituted a good, reasonable excuse for failing to appear at a legal proceeding. Further, he contends that the maximum sentence of four years, as a Range II offender, was excessive and that he should have been given an alternative sentence of probation. Concluding that no reversible error occurred upon this record, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The Defendant, Joshua David McBurnett, pled guilty to five counts of statutory rape by an authority figure and three counts of incest, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-532, 39-15-302 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four concurrent terms of four years’ confinement for two counts of statutory rape and two counts of incest, two concurrent terms of five years’ confinement for one count of statutory rape and one count of incest, and two concurrent terms of six years’ confinement for the remaining two counts of statutory rape. The trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing yielding an effective fifteen year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his fifteen-year sentence is excessive.
 

Artis Reese (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated criminal trespass, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial and that one of his convictions offends due process. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Eric Thomas, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his four 1999 convictions for robbery. He claims that he is illegally incarcerated because his sentences expired before his resentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Doyle Everette Haney, appeals his Cocke County Circuit Court jury convictions of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine for which he received concurrent sentences of 30 years’ incarceration as a career offender. In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, the defendant argues that the State failed to comply with discovery requirements, that juror misconduct infected his trial, and that the trial court erred at sentencing. Although not raised by the defendant, we determine that the trial court erred by failing to merge the jury verdicts into one judgment of conviction. On remand, the trial court shall enter a single judgment of conviction indicating the merger of the jury’s verdicts, and the judgment in count two shall be vacated.

This is a delayed appeal from a jury conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), ninth offense. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant, Horace Oscar Wakefield, received a sentence of four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. After a review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction for DUI. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The defendant, Alma Cisneros Childers, appeals the sentence of incarceration she received following the revocation of her probation by the Lincoln County Circuit Court. She pled guilty to violating the terms and conditions of her probation but now contends that she should have been given a community corrections sentence rather than one of incarceration. After review, we conclude that the defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the revocation or in imposing a sentence of incarceration. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

On April 25, 2001, Petitioner, Roger Joseph, pled guilty to first degree murder. The Bradley County Criminal Court sentenced him to life in prison with possibility of parole. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on February 17, 2010. On February 28, 2010, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition for being untimely and because Petitioner had filed a previous petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was taking various psychiatric medications at the time he entered his guilty plea and, therefore, his plea was not entered voluntarily. He also argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he knew Petitioner was taking medication. Because Petitioner has shown no due process violation or other reason for tolling the statute of limitations, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition.

The defendant, Andrew Bryan Mann, was convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder after he shot and killed his girlfriend’s father and stepmother. He was sentenced to two consecutive life terms in the Department of Correction. The primary issue at the defendant’s trial was whether or not the defendant’s killing of the victims was premeditated. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress; (2) refusing to allow his expert witnesses to testify concerning the defendant’s ability to premeditate; (3) admitting photographs of the crime scene; (4) excluding a report made in 2003 by his girlfriend to the Department of Child Services claiming that she had been abused by one of the victims, and (5) imposing consecutive life sentences on the grounds that he was a dangerous offender. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we reject each of these claims and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant,Brian Kenneth Henneberg,appeals his Williamson CountyCircuit Court jury conviction of first degree premeditated murder, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred by permitting a police officer to offer expert testimony, that the trial court erred by denying his request for a curative instruction, and that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Darren Allan Vincent, was convicted upon pleading nolo contendere to misdemeanor assault, sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ confinement, and order to pay a $2500 fine. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying probation and requiring him to serve seventy-five percent of the sentence before becoming eligible for release. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Oscar Dimery, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted the Defendant’s clothing into evidence because the State failed to establish a chain of custody. The Defendant also asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I, however, would affirm the trial court on the merits of its sentencing decision.