APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Darren Allan Vincent, was convicted upon pleading nolo contendere to misdemeanor assault, sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ confinement, and order to pay a $2500 fine. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying probation and requiring him to serve seventy-five percent of the sentence before becoming eligible for release. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Oscar Dimery, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted the Defendant’s clothing into evidence because the State failed to establish a chain of custody. The Defendant also asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I, however, would affirm the trial court on the merits of its sentencing decision.

A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Anthony Todd Ghormley, of two counts of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, and three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He received an effective sentence of 105 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Ghormley argues that the trial court erred by (1) refusing to hold a competency hearing or reset the trial date when Ghormley’s competency to stand trial was questioned two weeks before trial, (2) allowing Ghormley to represent himself for several months during the pretrial  roceedings, and (3) allowing the State to amend the indictment on the day trial began. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in not holding a hearing to determine Ghormley’s competency to stand trial. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of a competency hearing and remand for a hearing. As to the other claimed errors, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Christopher March, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of two counts of burglary, Class D felonies; five counts of forgery of $1000 or more but less than $10,000, Class D felonies; forgery of less than $1000, a Class E felony; theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor; and attempted theft under $500, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a seven-year sentence for each of the burglary and Class D felony forgery convictions, four years for Class E felony forgery, eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft, and six months for attempted theft. The trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing yielding an effective twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the burglary convictions and (2) the trial court erred by imposing excessive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Scott County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Paul Chappell, for sale of a schedule III controlled substance. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charge. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to twelve years in the Department of Correction to run consecutively with the sentences in seven other cases. The trial court also imposed a $2,000 fine. On appeal, Defendant argues that the playback at trial of the audio recording of the drug transaction was incomplete and that the trial court improperly denied him a new trial based on allegations that witnesses discussed their testimony during trial. After a thorough review, we conclude that the issues raised by Defendant on appeal are waived, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Trina Dawn Holdway Johnson, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that counsel’s faulty advice rendered her guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, James Tilson, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver not less than one-half  ounce of marijuana, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying his request for jury instructions on a lesser-included offense. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Ellis Randall Darnell, Jr., was convicted of one count of manufacturing one-half gram or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; one count of possession with intent to deliver one-half gram or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two concurrent nine-year terms for the methamphetamine convictions and to a consecutive four-year term for the firearm conviction, for a total effective sentence of thirteen years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and that the trial court erred by ruling during a hearing concerning his motion for a new trial that a juror could not testify that other jurors engaged in intimidating conduct during the jury’s deliberations. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following an indictment charging three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and two counts of rape, a Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Adrian Leroy Scott, of three counts of assault, see T.C.A. § 39-13-101(a)(3) (2003); one count of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, see id. §§ 39-13-527(a)(1)(B), 39-12-101; and one count of attempted sexual battery, see id. §§ 39-13-505(a)(1), 39-12-101. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years’ split confinement consisting of six months’ incarceration in the workhouse followed by two and one-half years on probation. In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, the defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by denying (1) his motion to suppress his statement to the police,(2) his motion for a mistrial based upon the undisclosed testimony of a rebuttal witness, (3) his motion to dismiss counts three and five based upon a fatal variance between the indictment allegations and the proof presented at trial, and (4) his request to present evidence at trial concerning the sexual offender registry. The defendant also contends that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences and denying him full probation. The State concedes that the trial court erroneously imposed consecutive sentences and also notes that the trial court failed to merge two sets of alternative counts. On remand, the trial court shall enter corrected judgments reflecting merger and concurrent sentences. Discerning no other error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified.

The defendant, Marcus L. Branner, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (1997), and two counts of attempted second degree murder, see id. §§ 39-13-210; 39-12-101, for which he received an effective sentence of 24 years’ incarceration. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court committed error at sentencing by imposing enhancement factors not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury to increase his sentence beyond the statutory minimum. We determine that the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court committed no reversible error at sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Wade Payne, of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, possessing cocaine, and possessing less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. The three convictions were merged into a single conviction for selling cocaine, for which the appellant received a sentence of fifteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the State failed to sufficiently establish a chain of custody for the cocaine. He also contends that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of an officer regarding the preliminary testing of the cocaine and in admitting recordings of telephone calls made by the appellant while he was in jail. Further, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Jackie J. Porter, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years, six months with part of the sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2003 conviction for aggravated robbery and resulting thirty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred (1) by dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim for post-judgment jail credit and (2) by failing to address whether the sentence and judgment are void because the trial court relied on an invalid prior conviction to classify him as a Range III, career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Chudney Valaryck Goff, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his two convictions for sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, a Class B felony, and his effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the trial court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b) and (2) counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing (a) to provide the Petitioner with the State’s discovery materials before the Petitioner entered his guilty pleas, (b) to provide the Petitioner with a defense, and (c) to communicate adequately and effectively with the Petitioner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, William Crayton, of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to life without parole in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing the second count of the indictment, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, prior to trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony T. Woods, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of one count of facilitation of intent to deliver less than 0.5 grams of cocaine and one count of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to six years for the facilitation conviction and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the simple possession conviction. The Defendant now appeals. The Defendant claims that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress; (2) denying the Defendant’s request to introduce either an audio tape recording or a transcript of certain testimony from the preliminary hearing; and (3) finding sufficient evidence to support the convictions. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial before the trial court. Additionally, the Defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Finally, he has made no request and offers no evidence to support this Court waiving the untimely notice of appeal in the interest of justice. Accordingly, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

The Petitioner, Carl Ross, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1995 convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of theft over $1000, and resulting sentence of 162 years’ confinement. The Petitioner contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to sentence him as a Range III, career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tracy Glenn, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her Class E felony theft conviction, arguing that she was denied a fair trial and received ineffective assistance of counsel because the jury was not instructed on facilitation as a lesser-included offense. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Antonio Turner, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery, all Class A felonies, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction for each conviction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Aisha Wiggins, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Lemar Brooks, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel regarding his convictions for two counts of premeditated first degree murder. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call two potential witnesses; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction regarding voluntary intoxication; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to request a jury out hearing” regarding the State’s cross-examination about a witness’ gang affiliation; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prejudicial remarks made by the State during closing arguments; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object “to the selective and vindictive prosecution by the State”; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the “physical facts” rule;(7)appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the voluntary intoxication jury instruction issue on appeal; (8) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the State’s prejudicial remarks on appeal; (9) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the State’s “selective and vindictive prosecution” on appeal; (10) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the standard of review used by the trial court in denying the Petitioner’s petition for writ of error coram nobis; (11) the cumulative effect of trial and appellate counsels’ errors establishes that their performance was deficient and that the Petitioner was prejudiced by their performance. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Timothy Leon McKenzie, pled guilty to theft of more than $10,000 and forgery, receiving an agreed term of ten years probation in conjunction with a grant of judicial diversion. Also included in the plea agreement was a condition that the defendant pay the victim of the crimes $157,900 in restitution at a rate of $1315 per month. Thereafter, the defendant was found to be in violation of his probation based upon his failure to report to his probation officer and failure to pay restitution as ordered. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years, which the court ordered to be served in confinement. The court further reaffirmed restitution due in the amount of $156,000 and ordered that payment of such restitution be made a condition of the defendant’s parole. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of confinement; (2) the trial court lacked the authority to impose the special condition that ordered the defendant to make restitution when he was paroled; and (3) the court erred in imposing the full amount of restitution absent an inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial could did not err in ordering a sentence of confinement. However, the court did lack the authority to impose payment of restitution as a condition of parole and did fail to appropriately determine the amount of restitution in consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay. As such, remand is necessary for a determination of the proper amount of restitution in this case.

 A jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, John C. Crim, of eight counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies, and six counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years old, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced him to an effective 212-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Upon our review, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and the judgments of conviction. We further agree with the state that the matter should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
 

Defendant-Appellant, Kenneth Ryan Mallady, was found not guilty by reason of insanity for the offenses of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, and aggravated assault. He appeals the trial court’s order denying discharge from involuntary commitment under the terms of a mandatory outpatient treatment program. Mallady argues that the trial court’s finding that he was unsuitable for discharge was in error because it contradicted the clear weight of the evidence. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order discharging Mallady to mandatory outpatient treatment.