APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Timothy “Tink” Watson, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury in October of 2005 for two counts of sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. Petitioner represented himself at trial and was convicted by a jury of one count of sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. After a sentencing hearing, Petitioner received a fifteen-year 1 sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. Petitioner filed several pleadings referred to as “amended” motions for new trial after a hearing. The trial court denied the motions. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to five subsequent indictments through a plea agreement that included a waiver of his right to appeal the felony drug conviction from the October 2005 indictment. Petitioner then sought pro se post-conviction relief. After counsel was appointed, an amended petition was filed. The trial court held a hearing on the petition. It was dismissed after a hearing by the post-conviction court because it was untimely and because Petitioner had waived his claims by his plea agreement. Appellant appeals this decision. After a review, we determine that the petition was untimely and, therefore, properly dismissed by the post-conviction court. However, the record fails to include a judgment form for Count One of the indictment. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed, but the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment form for Count One of the indictment.

The defendant, Paul M. Stackhouse, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals his conviction, claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain expert testimony and by failing to provide a requested special jury instruction regarding same; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a witness to testify regarding a prior inconsistent statement made by one of the State’s witnesses during the State’s case-in-chief and by refusing to provide a limiting jury instruction regarding same; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to grant a judgment of acquittal. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the court below.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Jerry Williams, of alternative counts of aggravated assault. The trial court ordered the convictions merged and imposed a Range I sentence of five years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the five-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm. We remand the case, however, for the entry of a single judgment of conviction reflecting the merged convictions.

A Sevier County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Casey Treat, for driving under the influence and driving under the influence per se. The Defendant pled guilty but reserved a certified question of law, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), as to whether the absence of the video recording of his stop violated his constitutional rights. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because it does not comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), as the certified question is (1) not dispositive of the case and (2) overly broad. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner, Cameron Winselle, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions of two counts of first degree murder on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner specifically contends that trial counsel committed ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence of his diminished capacity, failing to exhaust peremptory challenges, failing to investigate the facts of the offense, and failing to move for the trial judge’s recusal based upon the trial judge’s previous employment as a prosecutor. The petitioner also contends that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise issues on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se petitioner, Philip Reed Bryan, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Gary Reeves, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court convictions of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and criminal trespass, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because sufficient evidence supports both convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Dean Marlin, was found guilty by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of three counts of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; robbery, a Class C felony; aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the especially aggravated burglary convictions. The court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years each for the especially aggravated burglary convictions and the aggravated robbery conviction, to ten years each for the robbery and the aggravated assault,and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault, to be served concurrently for an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that double jeopardy protections and Tennessee Code Annotated section 3914-404(d) bar simultaneous convictions for aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. We affirm the judgments for robbery and assault, but we reverse the especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments in which the Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated burglary are modified to aggravated burglary and he is resentenced accordingly, and the conviction for aggravated assault is merged into a judgment of conviction for aggravated robbery.
 

Originally charged with five counts of aggravated burglary and four counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, the defendant, Jose Jesus Alba-Gutierrez, pleaded guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary in exchange for a total effective sentence not to exceed ten years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court, and the State’s agreement to dismiss the theft charges against him. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the order of a fully incarcerative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Konstantinos Diotis, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief as time-barred. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that application of the statute of limitations in his case is inappropriate because (1) the United States Supreme Court decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), should be applied retroactively and (2) principles of due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations. The petitioner waived his claim of due process tolling by failing to present it to the post conviction court. Further, because we conclude that Padilla should not be applied retroactively, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition as untimely.

The Petitioner, Richard L. Williams, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to second degree murder and twenty-five year sentence. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and did not enter his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily due to the various failures of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Fernandez D. Davenport, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Larry Edward Moore, Jr., was convicted of carjacking, a Class B felony and was sentenced to serve thirty (30) years as a Range III, career offender. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in State v. Larry Edward Moore, Jr., No. M2008-00703-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 457493 (Tenn. Crim. App., filed Feb. 10, 2010) (hereinafter “Moore I”). From that judgment,Defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11. In his application, Defendant presented only one specific issue, which is set forth below. In its order concerning the Rule 11 application, the Supreme Court ordered a supplementation of the record on appeal. The Supreme Court also remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration, in light of the supplemental record, of Defendant’s “argument that the trial court erred in not redacting from [the supplemented exhibit] certain portions of [Defendant’s] statement to police.” Upon reconsideration of Defendant’s “redaction” issue, which we initially held was waived for multiple reasons, we conclude the trial court erred, but the error was harmless. Accordingly, we again affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner,Timmie Darrell Boston,appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After trial, a jury convicted him of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and assault by offensive or provocative contact, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender and received an effective twenty-year sentence. In this appeal, the petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to (1) object to the prosecution’s use of leading questions when examining the victim, and (2) impeach the testimony of the victim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Justin Tyler Brewer, appeals from the Wayne County Circuit Court’s denial of a petition for habeas corpus relief in which he claimed that he received a sentence outside of his range. Petitioner raises an additional claim on appeal, that the judgment for one of his convictions is void because it provides for release eligibility. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that his judgment for second degree murder is void or that his sentence has expired. Further, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief for his aggravated kidnapping conviction according to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101.

Appellant, Frederick Edward Braxton a/k/a Frederick Frank Brown, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, evading arrest, and criminal impersonation. On appeal, Appellant complains that: (1) the indictment did not adequatelycharge Appellant with selling a controlled substance in a drugfree school zone; (2) the State did not establish a sufficient chain of custody prior to the introduction of the cocaine into evidence; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he sold cocaine in a drug-free school zone. After a review of the record, we determine the indictment was not invalid for failing to reference the Drug Free School Zone Act because it adequately described the offense. Further, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the cocaine into evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant sold cocaine weighing less than .5 grams within 1000 feet of a Drug Free School Zone. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, James John Lewis, pled guilty to four counts of rape of a child and four counts of incest, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-five years, twenty years of which to be served at 100% and the remaining five years to be served at 30%. Two years later, the Defendant filed a petition to correct an illegal sentence and to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that he was not informed his sentence required that he be placed on community supervision for the remainder of his life. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

The Defendant, Tianje R. Johnson, pled guilty to four counts of sale of a controlled substance, four counts of delivery of a controlled substance, and two counts of possession with the intent to deliver or sell a controlled substance. The appropriate counts were merged and the trial court sentenced her on the five remaining counts to an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied her an alternative sentence and erred when it denied her motion to reduce her sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Gerald James Wingard, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to ten years as a Range I offender. On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying his request for a particular jury instruction; and (3) the trial court erred by refusing to apply certain mitigating factors offered by the defendant at sentencing. After careful review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Carl T. Jones, pled guilty to robbery and agreed to a sentence of six (6) years. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Davidson County Criminal Court. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition. The Petitioner now appeals that dismissal. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner’s notice of appeal is untimely. Moreover, the Petitioner offers no reasons why the interests of justice would support a waiver of the filing deadline. Accordingly, we dismiss the Petitioner’s appeal

Defendant, Kristie M. Smith, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for the first degree premeditated murder of her boyfriend, Curtis Phoenix. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction; 2) the admission into evidence of Defendant’s recorded phone calls from jail was error; 3) the admission into evidence of letters written by the Defendant while in jail was error;and 4) Defendant received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the  defendant, Jonathan Ray Swanner, of three counts of rape of a child, see T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2006), and one count of aggravated sexual battery, see id. § 39-13-504(a)(4). The trial court imposed sentences of 24 years’ incarceration for each rape of a child conviction and 11 years’ incarceration for the aggravated sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently at 100 percent. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court’s ruling that the defendant could not testify about the victim’s prior allegation of molestation resulted in a denial of the defendant’s right to testify; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to use leading questions in its direct examination of the victim; that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the victim; that the State violated the rules of discovery by not disclosing the victim’s statement prior to trial; and that the trial court erred by not giving a limiting jury instruction regarding prior inconsistent statements. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Lee McKinney, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his eight-year sentence for reckless aggravated assault. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing or the appointment of counsel. Because the Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites for seeking habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Eric Ricardo Middleton, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder; second degree murder, a Class A felony; and tampering with the evidence, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the doctor who performed the autopsies on the victims to testify as an expert; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction that Mary Thompson, the co-defendant, was an accomplice as a matter of law; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jessie Lee Palmer, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Dyer County to promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender and received four years’ imprisonment. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Palmer reserved certified questions of law addressing whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained following the stop and search of a taxicab in which Palmer was a passenger. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant, raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether he has standing to challenge the search; (2) whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the car; (3) whether the taxicab driver’s consent to search was obtained as a result of an illegal stop; and (4) whether the evidence seized from the taxicab should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.