APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant,TerriL.Newsome,was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with ninety days’ confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

Appellant, Michael Lewis, was indicted by the Bledsoe County Grand Jury for child abuse. Appellant waived his right to counsel and represented himself at trial. He was convicted and sentenced to three years in incarceration. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was granted by the trial court. The State filed an application for permission to appeal pursuant toTennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 and an application for stay. This Court granted the appeal and found that the trial court improperly granted the new trial, reinstating Appellant’s convictions and sentence. State v. Michael Lewis, No. E2008-02141-CCA-R9-CD, 2009 WL 4017158 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 20, 2009). On remand, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. Appellant appeals to this Court, seeking resolution of the following issues: (1) whether the indictment was valid; (2) whether the verdict form was invalid; (3) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury; (4) whether the trial court improperly allowed testimony from Tonya Hickman and Rhonda Sills about statements made by the victim; (5) whether the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of Appellant’s children at the sentencing hearing; and (6) whether the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant is not entitled to relief with respect to issues 1-5. However, we determine that the trial courtimproperly ordered Appellant to serve his sentence consecutively to a sentence for civil contempt. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect that Appellant’s sentence is to be served concurrently to his sentence for civil contempt. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Christopher Lee Pettigrew, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Shawn Merritt, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se petition to set aside his guilty pleas. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because the trial court failed to inform him of the lifetime supervision requirement attending his convictions of rape of a child, rendering his pleas involuntary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Rebecca Ann Galyean, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of one count of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, two counts of vehicular assault by intoxication, a Class D felony, and two counts of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the convictions for driving under the influence into the conviction for vehicular homicide. The Defendant-Appellant received an effective eleven-year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the Defendant-Appellant’s blood analysis tested positive for “less than 0.25 µg/ml” of Tramadol; (2) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial based on the removal of Defendant-Appellant’s mother from the courtroom during trial; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our review, we affirm the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions; however, we conclude that the trial court erroneously sentenced her beyond the statutory maximum for vehicular assault. Therefore, we modify the Defendant-Appellant’s sentences for vehicular assault to four years, the maximum in the range, and remand to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments.
 

The petitioner, Dexter Johnson, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In 1994, the petitioner pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery, receiving an effective life sentence in the Department of Correction. In the instant petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner alleges that his convictions are void based upon the State’s failure to provide a factual basis to support the pleas. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that nothing in the petition would support a finding that the convictions were void. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the court erred in its summary dismissal. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Nicholas Ray Tipton, was convicted by a Washington County jury of three counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to a twenty-two year term of imprisonment for each conviction, with two sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective forty-four year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Tipton raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the three counts of aggravated rape should be merged into a single conviction; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing an emergency room physician to testify regarding the effect of intoxication on a man’s ability to ejaculate; (4) whether the sentence length for each conviction was excessive; and (5) whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Charles Bradford Stewart, Appellant, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for one count of reckless endangerment, one count of vehicular assault, one count of failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, and two counts of aggravated assault. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of one count of reckless aggravated assault and one count of vehicular assault, both Class D felonies. Appellant pled guilty to failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility. The trial court merged the convictions for reckless aggravated assault and vehicular assault into one conviction for vehicular assault and sentenced Appellant to twelve years in incarceration as a Career Offender. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve one year in confinement and the remainder of the sentence on Community Corrections. The State appealed. On appeal, the following issue is presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court imposed an improper sentence by allowing Appellant to serve a sentence of split confinement. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that as a Career Offender sentenced to twelve years, Appellant was statutorily ineligible for a CommunityCorrections sentence. Accordingly,the matter is reversed and remanded for resentencing.

The petitioner, Alvin Green, filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of forty-six years, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, James G. Watson, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he failed to receive statutorily mandated pretrial jail and good behavior credits toward his sentences, which rendered his confinement illegal. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Nelson Troglin, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his attempted first degree murder conviction, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, at the motion for new trial, and on appeal. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, James L. Lessenberry, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for nine offenses: rape, a Class B felony; incest, a Class C felony; four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, Class C felonies; and three counts of attempted rape, Class C felonies. Under the plea agreement, he is to serve twelve years for rape as a violent offender and six years as a Range I offender for each of the remaining convictions, with all sentences to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to a previous drug conviction for which the trial court revoked his five-year community corrections sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the trial court erred in denying his post-conviction claim that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An Obion County jury convicted the Defendant, Walter Andrew Ware, of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and aggravated child endangerment. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to sixteen years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented, which was circumstantial, is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court made an improper ruling during voir dire. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Deangelo M. Radley, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of unlawful possession of a weapon, see T.C.A. § 39-17-1307 (2006), and attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law, see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2), concerning the legality of the vehicle stop leading to his arrest. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly certify a question of law that is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Paul Leon Cox, filed a motion to suppress evidence derived from a traffic stop conducted by a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) officer outside of TVA property. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appeals the trial court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jackie F. Curry, appeals the Johnson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Majid Farraj, pled guilty to theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to five years in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Corey Hennings, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his attempted first degree murder conviction, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Will Rogers Salmon, pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to DUI, first offense, and violation of the implied consent law and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail, suspended to supervised probation following the service of forty-eight hours. As a condition of his guilty pleas, the defendant attempted to reserve the following two certified questions of law: (1) whether reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, justified his traffic stop and detention; and (2) whether the arresting officer’s intrusion into his vehicle constituted a custodial environment that required the suppression of any post-arrest statements pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Based on our review, we agree with the State that the trial court properly found that the traffic stop and detention were justified. We further agree that the defendant’s second certified question of law is not dispositive of his case and, thus, is not properly before this court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Hardin County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Kenneth D. Hubanks, for possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to sell more than one-half ounce of marijuana, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, obtained by execution of a search warrant upon his residence, which the trial court denied. The Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendre to all of the charges but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search warrant established probable cause to search his residence. After review, we conclude that the Defendant has failed to comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Tobias Senter, a/k/a Toby Senter, was convicted by a Cocke County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a life sentence imposed by a federal district court. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Valentino L. Dyer, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, and aggravated assault. The trial court modified the conviction for especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary, merged the convictions for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment into the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of eight years at thirty-five percent for the aggravated burglary conviction and thirty-two years at 100 percent for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively to the defendant’s sentences in another case. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the indictment was defective for failing to state sufficient facts; (2) whether he adequately waived his right to testify in his own defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by disallowing evidence of the victims’ alleged activity as drug dealers to show their reputation for dishonesty; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (5) whether the trial court properly sentenced him as a Range II offender and whether the sentences were excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Arthur Donahue, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by basing its revocation decision on his mere technical violations of the sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Willie Michael Richardson, pled guilty in the Warren County Circuit Court to initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, and evading arrest. The trial court merged the first two convictions and sentenced the appellant to twelve years in confinement. For the evading arrest conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty nine days to be served consecutively to the twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that his twelve-year sentence is excessive and that consecutive sentencing is improper. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Malcolm Dudley Thomas, of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by ruling that the State’s rebuttal witnesses could testify about the victim’s character for truthfulness and (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial by placing or attempting to place prejudicial and irrelevant facts before the jury. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State’s rebuttal witnesses to testify about the victim’s character for truthfulness. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.