APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Kenneth McIntyre, pled guilty to a violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender (HMVO) order, a class E felony, and passing worthless checks under the value of $500, a class A misdemeanor. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant agreed to be sentenced as a career offender with the time and manner of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The Defendant-Appellant received a sixyear term of imprisonment for the HMVO conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days imprisonment for the worthless check conviction. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served concurrently. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues the trial courterred inimposing sentence. Because the Defendant-Appellant filed his notice of appeal more than five months after the judgment became final, we dismiss this appeal.

Following a jury trial Defendant, Terry Johnson, was convicted of aggravated robbery of a Family Dollar Store in Memphis. The offense involved the theft of merchandise from the store. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, relying upon State v. Owens, 20 S.W.3d 634 (Tenn. 2000) and State v. Swift, 308 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2010), Defendant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to testimony concerning another theft related offense by Defendant of the same store, also involving merchandise, which occurred about two weeks prior to the offense in the case sub judice. After a thorough analysis, we distinguish Owens and Swift. We also conclude that the admission into evidence of the prior theft related offense was not error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

Petitioner,Terrance Cecil,was found guilty by a Maury County jury of possessing twenty-six grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to serve ten years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment. See State v. Terrance Cecil, No. M2004-00161-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 3044896 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2004) app. denied (Tenn. May 23, 2005). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court granted relief to the extent of setting aside the sentence and granting a new sentencing hearing. The State has not appealed from that order. Petitioner has appealed from the post-conviction court’s denial of the relief requested by Petitioner to set aside his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner failed to prove that he suffered any prejudice from any alleged deficiencies by his counsel. Since the prejudice prong was not proven, we need not address the alleged deficiencies of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

In August 2003, the Petitioner, Thaddius Brown, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received an effective twenty-year sentence. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the crux of the Petitioner’s argument is that he received an illegal sentence because both boxes were checked on his judgment forms for especially aggravated kidnapping indicating that his sentences should run at 30% and 100%. The post-conviction court found that the error in the Petitioner’s judgment forms was a clerical error and that his plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered. We agree. We remand solely for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect a single release eligibility of 100% for the Petitioner’s especially aggravated kidnapping convictions.

The Petitioner, Stephanie Denise Phillips, appeals as of right from the Cocke County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner argues that errors in her trial denied her due process of law. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Daniel Deeter, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State’s motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Kynaston Scott, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Matthew Perry, of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied a pretrial motion to suppress his admissions to police; (2) improperly allowed certain photographs of the victim into evidence at trial; and (3) allowed irrelevant testimony. Finally, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Davidson Countyjuryconvicted the Defendant,Tavares Duone Braden,for the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, promotion of prostitution, possession of marijuana, and evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Corrections. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (4) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities,we conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions and that the trial court properly sentenced him. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Richard E. Brown, Jr., was convicted of one count of driving on a revoked license. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-504. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court improperly found him guilty of driving on a revoked license when the indictment charged him with driving on a suspended license; (2) that he could not be convicted of driving on a revoked license because the Department of Safety never revoked his license; and (3) that he did not effectively waive his right to a jury trial. Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s driver’s license had not been revoked, as the term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-102, prior to the alleged criminal act. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant’s conviction for driving on a revoked license.

The Petitioner, Elmer Harris, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery. The Petitioner received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years in confinement. In this appeal, he argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. He claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate witnesses, failing to question discrepancies in the witnesses’ statements, and failing to provide complete discovery until after trial. He further claims appellate counsel was ineffective because the Petitioner was not notified that his direct appeal had been denied until after the deadline to file a Rule 11 appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court had expired. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court with respect to trial counsel. In regard to appellate counsel, we conclude that the Petitioner is entitled to petition the Tennessee Supreme Court for further review pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Steven Malone, of second-degree murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for the second-degree murder and four years for the aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for second-degree murder, that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody as to certain evidence, that extraneous information improperly influenced the jury’s verdict, and that cumulative error requires a reversal of his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Robert Earl Smith, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Shelby County. He was originally convicted of second degree murder and received a sixty-year sentence as a Range III, career offender. In this appeal, the petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the following grounds: (1) trial counsel’s failure to argue the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt during closing argument; (2) trial counsel’s failure to prepare and investigate the case; (3) trial counsel’s failure to challenge the validity of four prior felony convictions at sentencing; and (4) appellate counsel’s failure to argue the validity of the same prior convictions on appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Artis Whitehead, appeals from the denial of his untimely petition for postconviction relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition after finding that due process concerns did not toll the statute of limitations. The petitioner argues that due process concerns should toll the statute of limitations because (1) appellate counsel still represented him when she sent a letter informing him of the incorrect deadline for filing his petition for post-conviction relief and (2) that incorrect information was a misrepresentation sufficient to cause due process concerns to toll the statute of limitations. Upon our careful review of the record, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

The petitioner, Daniel Wade Wilson, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his confession to police was coerced and because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The State argues that the post-conviction court erred by determining that the one-year statute of limitations for filing the post-conviction petition was tolled and, therefore, that the petition is time-barred. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the State that the statute of limitations was not tolled in this case because trial counsel did not mislead the petitioner regarding the status of his appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

In January 1995, a Unicoi County jury convicted the Petitioner, Billy Joe Smith, of aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, aiding and abetting aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated rape. The Petitioner was, thereafter, sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to a total of 135 years in the Department of Correction. After this Court and our supreme court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal, the Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Following multiple appointments of counsel, amendments to the petition, and other procedural matters spanning ten years, the post-conviction court denied relief after a full evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by (1) denying his motion to continue the evidentiary hearing based upon the unavailability of three material witnesses, (2) denying the Petitioner’s motion to reopen his proof on evidentiary issues surrounding suppression of the evidence, (3) denying relief as to “all issues” raised by the Petitioner, and (4) failing to proceed with his post-conviction hearing in a timely manner. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Willie McLeod, was convicted by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony; disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to an effective term of twelve years in the Department of Correction as a career offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Grover D. Cowart, appeals the Johnson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The appellant, Calvin Cathey, pled guilty in the Crockett County Circuit Court to possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and received an eight-year sentence to be served as one hundred eighty days in jail and the remainder on probation. As a condition of his plea, the appellant reserved a certified question of law, namely whether the search warrant obtained to search his home sufficiently described the property to be searched. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I must dissent from the holding of the majority that the search warrant, despite its failure to name the city in which it is to be executed, nevertheless identifies Appellant’s residence with sufficient specificity. As noted by the majority, the federal and state constitutions as well as statutory law require that a search must particularly describe the place to be searched. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7; T.C.A. § 40-6-103. The majority also correctly points out that this “specificity” requirement is met if the description of the place to be searched “particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place so as to exclude all others, and enables the officer to locate the place to be searched with reasonable certainty without leaving it to his discretion.” State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 572 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Hatchett v. State, 346 S.W.2d 259, 259 (Tenn. 1961); State v. Cannon, 634 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982)).

The Petitioner, John Williams, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his convictions for five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and three counts of aggravated robbery, with an effective sentence of 161 years. He contends that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a public trial and that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to partial closure of the trial and failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. Because the trial court’s order denying post-conviction relief is incomplete, we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of law on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

A Rhea County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, William T. Minton, of two counts of second degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the murder convictions and sentenced the appellant to consecutive sentences of thirty-five years and eighteen years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the medical examiner to offer testimony that lacked any scientific indicia of reliability and was outside her area of expertise; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to present evidence of a State witness’s prior violent acts when the defense’s theory was that the witness killed the victim; and (5) his sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Matthew Jackson , appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee , appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Anthony Murff, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.