APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Steven Chance, pleaded guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of 11 months and 29 days suspended to probation after the service of 48 hours’ incarceration. The trial court also waived as a condition of probation the defendant’s payment of fines and completion of community service hours. A probation violation warrant issued alleging that the defendant failed to pay the court and probation costs. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and extended it for one year to allow the payment of the costs. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court lacked authority to extend his probationary term. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Travis Ward, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Lashawn Bell, pled guilty to one count of especially aggravated robbery, nine counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of criminal attempt to commit aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Mariet L. Patrick, was convicted of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony, possession of .5 ounces or more of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony, and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-503, -17-417. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a traffic stop and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Hardin County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Boris Darrell Fry, of selling .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a standard, Range I offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying him probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Jim Frederick Hegel, of rape of a child and incest. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that he serve consecutive sentences of nineteen and three years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the prosecutor made improper comments during voir dire about the victim’s testimony and credibility that may have biased the jury against the appellant, and (3) the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the Sevier County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Samir Ramon Mejia, of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as six months in jail and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to pat-down the appellant for weapons. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the pat-down and reverse the appellant’s conviction.

In 2007, the Defendant, John Eric Garvin, Jr., pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault, but the trial court suspended the entry of his judgment of conviction and placed the Defendant on judicial diversion for a term of three years. The Defendant subsequently violated the terms of his diverted sentence by, among other things, possessing a Schedule II drug, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and driving on a suspended license, second offense. The Defendant pled guilty to each of these offenses and admitted violating the terms of his diversion. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of two years for his reckless aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve nine additional years for the offenses he committed while on diversion, ordering those sentences to be served consecutively to his two-year sentence for reckless aggravated assault. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his total effective sentence of eleven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we conclude the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Steven Daniel Pack, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Coffee County to driving under the influence, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twentynine days for driving under the influence, third offense, all of which was suspended after service of 180 days in confinement. In regard to the driving on a revoked license conviction, Pack was sentenced to six months, all of which was suspended after service of 60 days in confinement. These sentences were to be served consecutively. Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pack reserved as a certified question of law whether there was reasonable suspicion to support the stop and detention of the defendant as required by the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Hardin County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Joseph Steele, for rape of a child less than thirteen years of age. The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment because the State had allegedly lost or destroyed a videotape of the victim’s interview with Michigan Children’s Services. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the indictment, and the State now appeals the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it dismissed the Defendant’s indictment without discussing the relevant factors required by State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999). We, therefore, reverse and remand to the trial court to reconsider and make findings of fact regarding whether dismissal of the Defendant’s indictment is appropriate in light of Ferguson.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Erik Guerrero, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his conviction claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed proof of the Defendant’s gang membership to be admitted into evidence at trial; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed a recorded telephone conversation between the Defendant and a co-defendant to be admitted into evidence at trial; (4) the trial court erred when it allowed the Defendant’s statements made at the scene of the crime to be admitted into evidence at trial; and (5) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury as to the natural and probable consequences rule. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant of solicitation of a minor to commit rape of a child, a Class B felony; driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; and indecent exposure, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of ten years, two years, and six months, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the solicitation of a minor conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Fayette County jury convicted the Defendant, Charlie B. York, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), and the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the implied consent law with a prior DUI conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction, fifteen days of which were to be served in jail, with the remainder on probation. For the implied consent violation, the trial court suspended the Defendant’s driver’s license for two years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to more than the mandatory minimum sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Nelson Troglin, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to 23 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends (1) that the trial court erred in failing to admonish the jury, instructing the jury to reach a verdict before the July 4th holiday, and in failing to sentence him in open court; (2) that the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion to recuse and his motion for funds to obtain a ballistics expert; and (3) that trial counsel was ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Eric Dewayne McLemore, appeals from the habeas corpus court’s order denying his petition. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the habeas corpus court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the order of the habeas corpus court.

A Sevier County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Kevin Allen Gentry, of twelve counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the charges should be dismissed because the State “held back” the indictment in the instant case in violation of Rule 8(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because of an invalid search warrant, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court erred in sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Campbell County Criminal Court Jury found the appellant, Meagan N. Reid, guilty of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense; possession of a Schedule II controlled substance; and a violation of the implied consent law. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, 125 days of which were to be served in the county jail with the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her possession of a controlled substance conviction and the propriety of the State’s cross-examination regarding a prior conviction for DUI. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for entry of a corrected judgment regarding the appellant’s violation of the implied consent law.

In 1990 a Shelby County jury convicted, the Petitioner, John Michael Bane, of felony murder and imposed a sentence of death. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483 (Tenn. 1993). After a new sentencing hearing, the jury again imposed a sentence of death, and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s imposition of this sentence. State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411 (Tenn. 2001). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his original trial and at his resentencing hearing; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury; and (3) the death penalty is unconstitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Lawrence County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, William Keith Blackburn, of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for review: 1. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the appellant’s convictions; 2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after a detective testified that the appellant exercised his right to remain silent and refused to give police a statement; 3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting, or in the alternative not redacting, an audio tape recording of telephone calls the appellant made while in jail; 4. Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight and attempting to conceal or suppress evidence; 5. Whether the court reporter’s failure to provide a complete transcript denied the appellant a full and complete appellate review; and 6. Whether the cumulative errors require a new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Carl J. Wagner, of second degree murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2006); first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-202(a)(2); and especially aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-403. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 22 years’ incarceration, life imprisonment, and 22 years’ incarceration, respectively, and merged the conviction of second degree murder into the conviction of first degree murder. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. We determine that there is insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions of first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery. We also determine, however, that there is sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction in count one and remand that count for resentencing, and we reverse and dismiss the charges in counts two and three.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Gregory D. Douglas, of second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, David Earl Offut, appeals from the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his guilty-pleaded convictions for three counts of incest for which he is serving an effective sentence of 18 years’ incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. He contends that his guilty pleas were entered involuntarily and unknowingly because trial counsel failed to adequately advise him regarding his release eligibility. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Stanley Butler, of three counts of aggravated assault, see T.C.A. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B)(2006), for which he received a total effective sentence of five years to be served on split confinement consisting of 12 months’ confinement in the local workhouse followed by probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault only in count two. Discerning no infirmity in the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, William Lamont Green, of second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 23 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding no deficiency in the proof, we affirm.

The petitioner, Kerry Chearis, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his convictions are void. Discerning no error, we affirm.