APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jawaskii Williams, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury. He was sentenced to twenty-one years for the murder conviction and five years for theaggravated assault conviction, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentences imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Kenneth D. Kisamore, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury for two counts of delivery of more than .5 grams of cocaine, in two separate cases, numbered F-11092 and F11093. The cases were consolidated prior to trial. After a jury trial, Appellant was found not guilty of the offense in case number F-11092 and guilty of the offense, as indicted, in case number F-11093. As a result of the conviction, Appellant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-five years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant has appealed, presenting the following questions for our review: (1) whether it was plain error for the trial court to allow the prosecutor to comment about the sentence received by a defendant charged along with Appellant thereby violating Appellant’s rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-201(b); (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow the testimony of jurors regarding extraneous prejudicial information; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant waived the issue regarding the alleged violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-201(b) for failure to object at trial. Further, we determine that Appellant waived the issue regarding juror testimony for failure to submit an adequate record for review. Finally, after a review of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, McArthur Bobo, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to sixty years in the Department of Correction at 100%. On appeal, he raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach a defense witness’s testimony by introducing a tape-recorded conversation between himself and the witness that took place during his pretrial incarceration; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress  evidence of a pretrial photographic lineup by which two eyewitnesses identified him as the shooter; and (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony by a witness that the victim’s children were at the victim’s home at the time the victim was killed. Based on our review, we conclude that the defendant has waived consideration of the suppression issue by his failure to include an adequate record on appeal. We further conclude that the defendant has waived the emaining two issues by his failure to raise them in his motion for new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher Carter, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Devon M. Crawford, pled guilty to first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him to a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief requesting DNA analysis of unspecified evidence collected by police in his case, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he is entitled to DNA testing under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 and that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record  and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A jury convicted the petitioner, Jason Paul Sherwood, of two counts of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to two consecutive life sentences plus twenty-five years. This court upheld his convictions and sentences. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied relief. The petitioner appeals the court’s denial of post-conviction relief. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Misty Jane Brunelle, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions for three counts of aggravated child abuse and resulting effective sentence of twenty-five years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, she contends that (1) she received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; (2) the post-conviction court erred by denying her motion for further genetic testing on the victim; and (3) the post-conviction court erred by determining that newly discovered evidence does not exist in this case. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s ruling that the petitioner did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel and the post-conviction court’s denial of the motion for additional genetic testing. However, the court’s determination that newly discovered evidence does not exist in this case is reversed because that issue should have been raised in a petition for writ of error coram nobis.

The Petitioner, Deshawn McClenton, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the post-conviction court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Saul Esteban Vasquez, for possession with intent to deliver not less than 70 pounds nor more than 100 pounds of marijuana, a Class B felony, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The Defendant pled guilty to the Class B felony, with the length and manner of service for the sentence left to the discretion of the trial court. The remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying all forms of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Emmanuel S. Trotter, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed his petition as untimely when due process concerns necessitated tolling of the statute of limitations. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Charles Macklin, appeals as of right from the Shelby County CriminalCourt’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree murder and received a sentence of 18 years to be served at 100 percent for the robbery conviction and a concurrent sentence of 18 years to be served at 30 percent for the murder conviction. The Petitioner challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the performance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Michael Wayne Howell, was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993). After his petition for post-conviction relief was denied, Petitioner sought to reopen post-conviction relief proceedings maintaining that he was mentally retarded (hereinafter “intellectually disabled” or “having intellectual disability” or other proper designation in light of statutory amendments in 2010) and thus ineligible to be sentenced to death. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner relief, and Petitioner appealed. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Travis Kinte Echols, of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to life. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues, including that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Finding no errors that warrant reversal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Jeffrey Scott, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant presents nine issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts that were relevant only to show propensity; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements under the state of mind and excited utterance exceptions; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting fifty color autopsy photographs; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing improper lay opinion testimony; (5) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony that was protected by the attorney-client privilege and that violated the defendant’s right to confrontation; (6) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motions for mistrial or to strike a witness’s testimony; (7) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for second degree murder; (8) whether the sequential jury instructions precluded the jury from considering a conviction for voluntary manslaughter; and (9) whether the trial court misapplied enhancement and mitigation factors in sentencing. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tiffany Sanders McNeal, entered guilty pleas in Case No. 2009-D-2911 to two counts of possession with the intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance (one count for a Schedule III drug and one count for a Schedule IV drug), a Class D felony, and in Case No. 2009-D-3417 to one count of attempted aggravated child abuse with a weapon, a Class C felony, in the Davidson County Criminal Court. Pursuant to her plea agreement, the remaining counts in Case No. 2009-D-2911 for the delivery of a Schedule III drug and criminal impersonation were dismissed, and McNeal received concurrent sentences of six years with a release eligibility of  thirty-five percent for the drug convictions and ten years with a release eligibility of forty-five percent for the attempted aggravated child abuse conviction, for an effective sentence of ten years. The manner of service of the sentence was determined by the trial court at the sentencing hearing. On appeal, McNeal argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an alternative sentence and a community corrections sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Capital Appellant, Corinio Pruitt, appeals as of right from his conviction for first degree felony murder and his sentence of death resulting from the August 2005 death of Lawrence Guidroz. On  February 29, 2008, a Shelby County jury found the Appellant guilty of one count of second degree murder and one count of first degree felony murder, and the trial court merged the conviction for second degree murder with the first degree murder conviction. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously found the presence of three statutory aggravating circumstances; specifically, (1) the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies involving the use of violence, (2) the murder was knowingly committed while the defendant had a substantial role in committing a robbery, and (3) the victim was seventy (70) years of age or older. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (7), (14). The jury further determined that these three aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances and imposed a sentence of death. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. On appeal, the Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to find the Appellant intellectually disabled and ineligible for the death penalty, (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for first degree felony murder, (3) whether the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of the autopsy photographs of the victim, (4) whether application of the (i)(7) aggravating circumstance is constitutional, (5) whether the evidence is sufficient to support application of the (i)(7) aggravator, and (6) whether the sentence of death is proportionate in the present case. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Samantha Marie Daniel, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that she received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Robert N. Helton, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for theft of property over $10,000, burglary, and vandalism. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Terry Jones, pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to sell more than twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and a $2,000 fine. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Darrell Lamar Fritts, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his sentences for two counts of burglary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, the State of Tennessee moves the court to summarily affirm the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of the petitioner’s 2010 “Motion to Vacate Convictions.” In the motion, the petitioner, Randall Turner, challenged his 2001 guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated kidnapping,  aggravated robbery, and first degree murder that culminated in an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Because the “Motion to Vacate Convictions” appears in substance to be a proceeding brought pursuant to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and because the Act requires such a proceeding to be brought within one year of the final action in the proceeding, the petitioner’s motion is untimely by several years. Accordingly, we grant the State’s Rule 20 motion and affirm the order of the criminal court.

The Petitioner, James Hathaway, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of  post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving consecutive sentences of life without parole and twenty-five years. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request lesser included offense instructions and failing to obtain additional expert assistance. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ronald Crook, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to properly cross-examine the State’s witnesses and investigate the facts of his case. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Zachary Harrison, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. He argues that the trial court should have instead reinstated his probation because he made a genuine effort to comply with the rules of his probation and his violations were due to factors beyond his control. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the defendant pled guilty to Count 4 of the indictment, rather than Count 2, and that Count 2 was dismissed.

The Petitioner, Eddie Williams, Jr., appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the post-conviction court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.