APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. Because he failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Napoleon Stephan Meredith, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow the appellant to be viewed from a close distance by the jury and that the error forced him to relinquish his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court found the Defendants, Elisha Tomlinson and Tommy Gregory, in contempt of court for their part in the depleting of $250,000 in certificates of deposit held as collateral for the bond writing ability of Aaron Bonding Company. On appeal, both Defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain this finding. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Deanna Machelle Fletcher, pled guilty to three counts of identity theft, a Class D felony; burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony; three counts of forgery, a Class E felony; and three counts of theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-150, 39-14-402, 39-14-114, 39-14-103 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years’ confinement for identity theft, four years’ confinement for burglary of an automobile, four years’ confinement for forgery, and eleven months and twenty-nine days’ confinement for theft, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentences and ordering confinement. Without the guilty plea hearing transcript, we presume the trial court’s determinations were correct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Devon O’Neal Wiggins, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of sale of cocaine over 0.5 grams in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered that this sentence be served consecutive to a thirty-year sentence for case number 07-CR-461. On appeal, Wiggins claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the jury  instructions should have included the offense of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bifurcated trial; (4) the testimony of an expert witness violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause; (5) his sentence was excessive; (6) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence; (7) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (8) cumulative error. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sevier County Circuit Court jury found that the Defendant, Andrew Reginald MacKinnon, violated the implied consent law. See T.C.A. § 55-10-406 (2006) (amended 2008, 2009, 2010). The trial court ordered that his driving privileges be revoked for one year. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress because the State failed to lay a proper foundation for admitting a witness’s opinion testimony into evidence and (2) the jury instructions for violation of the implied consent law were insufficient because the trial court failed to define “reasonable grounds.” Because the trial court failed to determine the issue of the implied consent violation, submitting it to the jury instead, we vacate the judgment.

The defendant, Gregory D. Roberts, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of illegal voting, a Class D felony, for having intentionally voted in a November 2008 election knowing that he was ineligible to vote due to his felony convictions for infamous crimes. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to four years in the Department of Correction, with the sentence suspended to fifteen days in the county jail with the remainder of the time on supervised probation. The defendant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to disregard a lay witness’s testimony regarding similarities in signatures; and (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded for a new hearing. Given that the Defendant does not raise any issue regarding the trial court’s failure to determine the implied consent law violation, that no prejudice has been demonstrated, and that the trial court acted as the thirteenth juror, I would address the issues raised on appeal.

The defendant, Michael Martin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor. The aggravated assault conviction merged into the attempted second degree murder conviction, and the defendant was sentenced to eighteen years as a Range II offender on the attempted second degree murder conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days on the violation of an order of protection conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing photographs of the victim’s wounds into evidence; (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence regarding injuries the victim’s grandparents sustained during the commission of the offense; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted second degree murder; (4) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial was sufficient to justify a new trial; and (5) the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range II offender. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Stacy Lee Fleming, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of delivery of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Fleming claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by restricting the cross-examination of a State’s witness; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred by sentencing Fleming as a career offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerry Wayne Lankford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was convicted by a McMinn County jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony. State v. Lankford, 298 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). The petitioner was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for aggravated burglary and ten years for theft of property, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Id. On appeal, the petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Rodney M. Butler, appeals pro se after the Madison County Circuit Court summarily dismissed his post-conviction petition seeking relief from his guilty plea to driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony, for which he received a three-year sentence with a 35 percent release eligibility. We conclude that Petitioner should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing, and for the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Small, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. On appeal, Small argues that the trial court erred in imposing a twenty-year sentence consecutive to his effective sentence of forty years for three previous convictions for aggravated robbery. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, George Franklin, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State acknowledges on appeal that the petition was timely filed because the petitioner delivered it to the appropriate prison official for mailing within the one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for consideration of the petition.

The petitioner, Kendrick D. Rivers, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, resisting arrest, evading arrest, and criminal trespass. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to serve an effective term of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to meet with the petitioner a sufficient number of times and to properly investigate the case. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The pro se petitioner, Michael Ware, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the order of the habeas corpus court dismissing the petition.

The Petitioner, Phillip Shane Duncan, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of twenty-five years for his second degree murder conviction. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the habeas corpus court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Camille Kristine Chesney, of facilitation to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and driving on a suspended license. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced her to concurrent sentences of four years for the facilitation to sell cocaine conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction, to be served as ninety days in jail and the remainder on supervised probation. She also was fined three thousand five hundred dollars. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal stop and arrest and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s conviction for facilitation to sell cocaine but reverse the conviction for driving on a suspended license.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Cantrell Lashone Winters, of possession of 50 grams or more of hydromorphone in a school zone with intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony, see T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4), (j)(3); 39-17-432(b) (2006), and evading arrest, a Class D felony in this case, see id. § 39-16-603(b)(1), (3). In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his person following his arrest, the trial court’s denial of his request for substitute counsel, the admission of expert testimony on illegal drug packaging, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Because the evidence adduced at trial does not establish that the defendant created a risk of death or injury, his conviction of Class D felony evading arrest must be modified to Class E felony evading arrest. The judgments of the trial court are otherwise affirmed.

Petitioner, Mack Tremaine Jones, was convicted of one count of first degree murder and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. As a result, Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and twenty-two years for each of the nine counts of attempted first degree murder. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Mack Tremaine Jones, No. W2005-00014-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1840798 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 27, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2007). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief, on the basis that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner has appealed. On appeal, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant, Lisa Joyce Tyler, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation. On appeal, she argues that the non-payment of her restitution was not willful but, instead, due to her inability to pay. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Victor Pritchard, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntary guilty pleas. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant, Daniel Leon Lee, was convicted by a Maury County Jury of attempted possession of cocaine over .5 grams and simple possession of marijuana. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. We affirm Appellant’s convictions for attempted possession of cocaine over .5 grams and possession of marijuana because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. However, we determine that the trial court improperly utilized convictions that appeared in Appellant’s presentence report but did not appear on the notice to seek enhanced punishment in order to establish Appellant’s sentencing range. Additionally, the trial court failed to place adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to sentencing on the record. Consequently, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner, Dearice Cates, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise the statutorily mandated mitigating factor that he “voluntarily” released the victims of his especially aggravated kidnappings alive. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-305(b)(2). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.