APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Michael Nyok Lueth, was convicted as charged by a Davidson County
Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), sixth offense (Count 1); DUI per
se, sixth offense (Count 2); and driving on a revoked license (Count 3). The trial court
sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent six-year sentences
for the DUI convictions, merged the DUI convictions, and imposed a concurrent sentence
of eleven months and twenty-nine days imprisonment for the conviction for driving on a
revoked license. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in telling
prospective jurors that an interpreter had been provided for the Defendant “out of an
abundance of caution”; (2) the trial court erred in providing a special instruction to the jury
that it was not allowed to consider the Defendant’s lack of fluency in English when
assessing the evidence in the case; (3) the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s
motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor, relying on the trial court’s proposed special
instruction, stated during its rebuttal closing argument that the jury could not allow the
Defendant’s failure to speak English fluently to affect how the jury viewed the evidence;
and (4) he was improperly sentenced as a second offender for his conviction for driving on
a revoked license. After review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand the
case for entry of a corrected judgment form in Count 3 reflecting that the conviction offense
is driving on a revoked license, first offense, a Class B misdemeanor, and that the
Defendant’s sentence is six months, served concurrently with the sentence in Count 1.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Justin Darnay Graves, of two counts of
simple possession of heroin, introduction of contraband into a penal facility, tampering
with evidence, speeding, and driving while unlicensed, for which he received an effective
sentence of six years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for tampering with evidence.
The defendant also argues the trial court erred in classifying his conviction for introduction
of contraband into a penal facility as a Class C felony. Following our review, we affirm
the judgments of the trial court with respect to the defendant’s convictions for simple
possession, introduction of contraband into a penal facility, speeding, and driving while
unlicensed. However, we reverse and vacate the defendant’s conviction for tampering with
evidence because we conclude the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
Furthermore, we remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing reflecting that the
introduction of contraband into a penal facility conviction is a Class D felony and for
corrected judgment forms in counts one and two.

Petitioner, Jerome Barrett, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief from his first degree murder conviction. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by not recusing itself and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Keith Trammell, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Following our review,
we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Devon Brown, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis, wherein he challenged his
2012 convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault,
facilitation of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and
reckless endangerment. Specifically, the Petitioner contended that he had recently
discovered the State withheld evidence that several of the victims’ vehicles present on the
scene were stolen, information that would have materially impacted the credibility of the
State’s witnesses at trial and might have led to a different outcome. The coram nobis court
found that the petition was time-barred, that the Petitioner was not entitled to due process
tolling, and that the Petitioner had not presented newly discovered evidence entitling him
to a new trial. The Petitioner appeals, and following our review, we affirm.

Makyle J. Love, Petitioner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On
appeal, he alleges that the post-conviction court improperly denied post-conviction relief
because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review,
we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Edwin Orlando Millan, appeals from the Bradley County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his filing a false police report and
tampering with evidence convictions. The post-conviction court granted relief in
connection with the filing a fraudulent insurance claim conviction after determining that
the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, the Petitioner
contends that the court erred by denying relief on his remaining convictions because (1) he
received the ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) the State elicited false trial testimony in
violation of his due process rights, (3) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 376 U.S. 83 (1986), and (4) he is entitled to relief pursuant
to the cumulative error doctrine. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Jonathan Howell, the Defendant, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal
Court’s denial of probation following his plea of guilty to theft of property valued at
$60,000 or more. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying an
alternative sentence and by basing its denial solely on deterrence. Following our review,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Melvin Summerville, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court
of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life in confinement. On
appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) allowing testimony about a
previous domestic assault against the victim in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence
404(b); (2) allowing cellular telephone records into evidence when the State did not
establish relevance for the records; and (3) failing to suppress the testimony of a material
witness when the State did not reveal the name of the witness and turn over police body
camera video involving the witness until the “eve” of trial. Based on our review, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeffrey Michael Davis, of one count of
attempted aggravated burglary and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court
sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly allowed irrelevant
testimony; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted
aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated assault; and (3) the trial court improperly
instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated assault. After review, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Justine Welch, of first degree premeditated
murder, attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury, attempted first
degree murder, vehicular homicide, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and two counts of
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Defendant
received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus
sixty-two years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that (1) the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree
murder; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress witnesses' out-of-court
and in-court identifications of him due to an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup;
and (3) the trial court erred in declining to issue a special jury instruction on identification.
After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Following the trial court’s revocation of his probation, Defendant, David Chad Moss, appeals arguing that the trial court failed to award him jail credit while incarcerated in Kentucky for an unrelated offense.  Upon our review, we conclude that Defendant has failed to prepare a sufficient brief in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) and Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b).  Accordingly, the issue is waived and the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Ugenio Dejesus Ruby-Ruiz, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 convictions for nine counts
of rape of a child, two counts of rape, five counts of aggravated sexual battery, and three
counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and his 121-year sentence at 100% service. The
Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Antwain D. Coleman, of aggravated
assault, domestic assault, and theft. The trial court imposed an effective seven-year
sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that
the evidence is insufficient to support his theft conviction and that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.

The Defendant, Herandus Washington, pleaded guilty to reckless vehicular homicide, a Class C felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-213(a)(1), (b)(1) (2018) (subsequently amended).  At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant sought judicial diversion.  The trial court denied diversion and imposed a five-year sentence, to be served on probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Spencer L. Phillips, Defendant, claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
probation or an alternative sentence and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement.
Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In April of 2013, Defendant, Yvette Adele Slee, was convicted of aggravated child abuse and attempted first degree murder for suffocating the victim, Defendant’s eight-month-old child. She was sentenced to an effective sentence of 22 years in incarceration. Subsequently, in May of 2018, the victim died as a result of complications from injuries originally sustained by the aggravated child abuse. Defendant was then indicted for first degree felony murder, the subject offense of this direct appeal. After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty as indicted. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether her conviction for first degree felony murder violates double jeopardy. After a review of the record, the briefs, and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Darrin Jeremiah Baker, appeals from his guilty pleaded convictions for
possession with the intent to sell or deliver more than 0.5 gram of methamphetamine, a
Class B felony; attempted possession with the intent to sell or deliver less than fifteen
grams of heroin, a Class C felony; possession with the intent to sell or deliver less than
fifteen grams of fentanyl, a Class C felony; and driving under the influence, a Class A
misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (possession of heroin and fentanyl) (Supp.
2022), -17-434 (possession of methamphetamine) (2018), 55-10-401 (driving under the
influence) (2020), 39-12-101 (attempt) (2018). The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range
I offender and agreed to an effective ten-year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the
trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing.
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Shannon Leigh Smith, appeals her Union County Circuit Court jury
conviction of second degree murder, arguing that the State improperly withheld favorable
and material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Because the
withheld evidence was not material to the outcome of the case, we affirm.

Petitioner, Nemon Winton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request specific jury instructions and for utilizing an improper trial strategy.  After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Alexander Jackson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions for two counts of rape and
his resulting sentence of nine years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that
he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the
judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Darryl Robinson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his
post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery and
convicted felon in possession of a handgun and his resulting effective sentence of sixteen
years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
court.

Defendant, Charles Bradford Lampley, was convicted by a Maury County jury of first
degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault resulting in death, for which he
received an effective sentence of life. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial
court erred in not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the evidence is
insufficient as it relates to his conviction for first degree premediated murder; (3) the trial
court failed to exercise its mandatory function as the thirteenth juror as to his conviction
for first degree premeditated murder; (4) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
on the issue of voluntary intoxication; (5) the prosecutor made numerous improper
references to his decision not to testify, shifted the burden of proof, and improperly offered
his opinion on the truth or falsity of evidence and on Defendant’s guilt during closing
argument; and (7) he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a
thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

Defendant, Ambrus Gay, was charged in a five-count indictment with two counts of
aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of robbery. The case
proceeded to a jury trial. At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court partially granted
Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, reducing the robbery charge to the lesserincluded
charge of theft. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged on all counts, and
the trial court imposed an effective 10-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, Defendant
contends: 1) the trial court should have suppressed his confession based on a violation of
his Miranda rights; 2) the trial court should have suppressed his confession because it was
not voluntarily made; 3) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to sever the
offenses; and 4) the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated robbery
convictions because he had completed the thefts prior to producing a weapon. Discerning
no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 1998, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Derwin V. Thomas, of two counts
of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and two
counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of
life without the possibility of parole. The Defendant unsuccessfully sought review on
multiple occasions, by direct appeal, post-conviction petition, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Most recently, the Defendant filed a
“Motion for Life Imprisonment,” alleging that the State failed to give him proper notice of
its intention to seek life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and a Motion for
Rule 36.1 relief1, alleging that the trial court failed to charge the jury with relevant lesser included
offenses. The trial court summarily dismissed both the Defendant’s motions, and
the Defendant now appeals. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it
dismissed his motions. After review, because the notice of appeal in this case was untimely
filed and because the Defendant has offered no facts supporting a waiver of this untimely
filing in the interests of justice, the appeal is hereby dismissed