APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Perry Avram March, was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, abuse of a corpse, a Class E felony, and destruction of evidence, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty-five years for his murder conviction, two years for his abuse of a corpse conviction, and five years for his destruction of evidence conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences for his Class C and Class E felonies consecutive to his sentence for his murder conviction, and his murder conviction in this case consecutive to his sentence in case no. 2005-D-2854 of twenty-four years for his conviction of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, for an effective sentence of fifty-six years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence (1) his statements to Detective Postiglione on August 12, 2005; (2) his taped conversations with Nathaniel Farris while Defendant was housed in the Davidson County Jail awaiting trial; (3) Leigh Reames’ testimony concerning Defendant’s prior conduct; and (4) the draft of a novel written by Defendant. Defendant also contends that the State’s prosecution of the offenses of abuse of a corpse and tampering with evidence are time-barred and, alternatively, that the tolling of the  statute of limitations in criminal cases violates his constitutional right to travel and denies him  equal protection under the law. Defendant submits that the cumulative effect of these errors denied him his constitutional right to due process. After a thorough review we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kenneth Clay Davis, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of identity theft, a Class D felony, and driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony, and was sentenced, as a career offender, to an effective sentence of twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the denial of the petition was error because: (1) his due process rights were violated by the State’s failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed before the return of the indictment; and (2) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial and affirm the judgment of the Sevier County Circuit Court.

The petitioner, Christopher Perry, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to properly investigate the case and advise him about testifying at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The pro se petitioner, Anthony Leon Moore, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his convictions are void or his sentences illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, George T. McClain, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010). On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court imposed illegal sentences and (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Craig Edwin James, was convicted of speeding in Rutherford County General Sessions Court and appealed his conviction to the Rutherford County Circuit Court. Following a de novo bench trial, the Defendant was convicted of speeding, a Class C misdemeanor, fined five dollars, and ordered to pay $624 in court costs. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) his General Sessions trial was conducted in violation of both Tennessee statute and the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; (2) the designation of his speeding violation as criminal rather than civil violated his right to equal protection; and (3) the United States Department of  Transportation improperly limits state sentencing discretion in violation of the Supremacy Clause. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Appellant, Heather Richardson, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s order denying her relief from the prosecutor’s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. The State concedes that the district attorney general abused his discretion in denying the application. Upon review, we reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for the trial court to order the prosecutor to grant the Appellant pretrial diversion.

The defendant, Robert A. Cantrell, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II multiple offender to sixteen years in the Department of Correction. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial following a bomb threat and ensuing building evacuation that took place during voir dire; (2) whether his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury was prejudiced by the jurors’ exposure to the bomb threat and publicity surrounding the case; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Chuncy Lesolue Hollis, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In a timely appeal to this court, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by issuing an expanded jury instruction on the element of premeditation. Based on our review, we conclude that although the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that the defendant premeditated the killing, the trial court committed reversible error by improperly commenting on the evidence and giving an incomplete statement of the law in its expanded premeditation instruction. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Trestan Lemark Yarbrough, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence for his convictions for facilitation of aggravated assault and two counts of aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence that was more severe than necessary to achieve the purposes set forth in the sentencing guidelines. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s order revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating his original sentence.

The appellant, Gerry Tallant, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder, for which he received a life sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on criminal responsibility, and that the State’s closing argument was improper. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Blount County jury convicted the petitioner, Douglas Jordan, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court found that the state suppressed evidence but that the evidence was not material to the defense. On appeal, the petitioner argues that (1) the state withheld favorable, material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the post-conviction court erred by applying a sufficiency of the evidence standard to the materiality prong of the Brady test; (3) the state’s suppression of evidence violated Article 1, sections 1 and 2, of the Tennessee Constitution; and (4) in the alternative, the petitioner’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate the case. Following our thorough review, we conclude that the state failed to disclose evidence that was both favorable and material to the defense in violation of the petitioner’s right to due process. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for a new trial.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Deadrick Eugene Garrett, of first degree premeditated murder in the shooting death of Dyishun Foust, 1 and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas Milton Carver, III, was convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury with a flight instruction; and (2) whether the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant as a Range II offender. Following review of the record, we conclude no error exists and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ricky Lynn Hill, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner pled guilty to vehicular assault, driving under the influence (“DUI”) fifth offense, attempted tampering with evidence, and leaving the scene of an accident.¹ Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced 1 to an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days and released to intensive probation. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he argued that his guilty pleas were involuntary, that his convictions violated double jeopardy, and that his sentence was excessive. The habeas corpus court denied relief for failure to comply with the habeas corpus statute and for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

The defendant, Darrin Mosby, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to two counts of carjacking, a Class B felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent ten-year sentences, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the imposed sentences, specifically contending that: (1) the term of ten years is excessive in light of the trial court’s misapplication of an enhancement factor and failure to consider mitigating factors; and (2) the court erred in ordering the sentences be served in confinement. Following a review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration based upon this opinion.

In this interlocutory appeal, the appellant, Mark Patton, appeals the Roane County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss a three-count indictment against him. The appellant claims that he is immune from prosecution pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-47-107 because the State compelled him to testify about matters related to the indictment at a proceeding to oust him as Roane County Constable. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the order of the trial court and dismiss the indictment.

Petitioner, Christopher Michael Flake, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of two counts of first degree murder. On direct appeal, Petitioner’s convictions were reversed on the basis that the jury improperly rejected the proof at trial that established Petitioner was insane at the time of the offenses. State v. Christopher Flake, No. W2001-00568-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1298733 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 12, 2002), rev’d on appeal by State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn. 2003). The Supreme Court reversed the decision of this Court on appeal. State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn. 2003). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, among other things, on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Lawrence J. Brozik, was charged with ten counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1005(c) (2003). Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of ten counts of facilitation of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403(b) (2003). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to five years for each count and ordered that five of his sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him; (2) the State failed to disclose promises made to, or agreements with, the minor victim’s husband; (3) the trial court erred when it found that he was the leader in the commission of an offense involving two or more criminal actors; (4) the disparity between the Defendant’s sentence and the minor victim’s husband’s sentence violated the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989; (5) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; and (6) the trial court erred when it found that evidence presented at the motion for new trial hearing was not sufficient to support a new trial. After our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions but modify his sentences to be served concurrently.

The petitioner, Melvin Reed, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. He entered a guilty plea to possession with intent to sell cocaine and was sentenced to ten years incarceration. On appeal, he argues that the indictment that led to his conviction was void. The State has moved to affirm the judgment from the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review, we grant the motion, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20.

Appellant, John C. Howard, was indicted for three counts of aggravated child abuse. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault in an open, best interest plea. After a sentencing hearing, a five-year split confinement sentence was imposed. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve one hundred twenty days in incarceration for each offense, followed by five years of probation, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court further denied judicial diversion. Appellant seeks a review of the trial court’s denial of diversion. Because we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying judicial diversion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendants, Timothy Washington Lyons and Antonio Lamont Scales, of the attempted second degree murder of Teresa Crenshaw and the reckless aggravated assault of Quanita Robinson. The trial court sentenced each defendant to 22 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s failure to provide the “missing witness” instruction, and the propriety of the sentences imposed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the convictions. Because the trial court mistakenly believed it was imposing sentences for Class C felony aggravated assault rather than Class D felony aggravated assault, utilized improper enhancement factors, and imposed consecutive sentences without making required findings of fact, the sentences imposed are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. In addition, new judgment forms for the aggravated assault convictions must be entered to reflect that the defendants were convicted of Class D felony aggravated assault.

The Petitioner, Douglass Marshall Mathis, filed in the Davidson County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction for first degree murder and accompanying life sentence. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were not void. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The appellant, Wendell Wayne Sweeton, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 150 days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s rulings regarding purported discovery and Brady violations, the denial of appellant’s suppression motion, and the admissibility of the appellant’s prior DUI convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.