APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Crystal G. Barnes, was convicted of the promotion of methamphetamine manufacturing, possessing drug paraphernalia, and introducing drugs into a penal institution. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years to be served on probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered her to serve six months in confinement before being released again on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the length of confinement ordered by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner of one count of first degree murder and five counts of attempted first degree murder, Class A felonies. He received an effective sentence of life without parole plus 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. A panel of this court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. The petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction court heard and denied. On appeal, the petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel’s failure to include an issue in the motion for new trial resulted in waiver of that issue for purposes of appellate review. Following our review, we  affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Quintell Deshon Hardy, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court of Hardeman County. He pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was sentenced as a multiple offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In the habeas corpus petition, the petitioner claimed his sentence should be vacated because the State gave no notice of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence, as required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-202(a). Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Adrian K. Nelson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Felicia Mae Langford, appeals the revocation of her probation. She pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Macon County to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. Langford received a probationary sentence of six years. The trial court revoked her probation following an arrest for shoplifting. On appeal, Langford admits that she violated her probation. She claims, however, that the trial court erred by revoking her probation and imposing her original sentence of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Herman Shurn, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for aggravated robbery and two years for criminally negligent homicide, to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the trial court’s amendment of the indictment over his objection; (2) the trial court’s denial of his request to include facilitation of the charged offenses; (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions; (4) the trial court’s finding of enhancement factors in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); and (5) the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Daniel Gonzalez, Jr., appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentences for three convictions for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony, and two convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his effective six-year sentence in confinement. He contends that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant-Appellant, James Todd, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Todd received a twenty-five-year sentence at thirty percent for the attempted first degree murder conviction and a consecutive ten-year sentence at thirty-five percent for the aggravated assault conviction, for an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Todd argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify at trial that she previously identified Todd as the perpetrator at a prior hearing; (3) the trial court erred in admitting unauthenticated and unfairly prejudicial photographs at trial; (4) the trial court erred in adding language to the jury instruction on duress; (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (6) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jamie Lynn Middlebrook, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued $1,000 or more, a Class D felony. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. The jury was unable to fix the property value for the theft charge; therefore, the trial court declared a mistrial as to that count. At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant pled guilty to theft of property valued $500 or more, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 6 years as a career offender for the theft conviction and 13 years as a persistent offender for the aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively to a sentence imposed in another case. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction of aggravated assault; (2) that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to admit evidence of prior bad acts; and (3) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffery D. Lemay, pleaded guilty to one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s order finding him competent to stand trial. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(a). Following our review, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly certify a question of law that is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Racardo Arnette Spencer, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his community corrections sentence because there was no substantial evidence to determine that the Defendant had violated the  terms of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the  Defendant’s community corrections sentence.

The petitioner, Kimberly Thurman, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from her conviction for second degree murder. The petition was filed outside the one-year statute of limitation for filing a post-conviction petition, but the petitioner alleged that the limitations period should be tolled because she was unable to manage her personal affairs or understand her legal rights and liabilities. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Orville Losey, was found guilty by a Coffee County Circuit Court jury of three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010). He pled guilty to resisting arrest with a weapon, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-16-602 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight and one-half years’  confinement for each of the aggravated assault convictions and to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ confinement for the resisting arrest conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and (2) his sentences are excessive and not consistent with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Reform Act. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement that he personally negotiated with the State, the Petitioner, Joshua Dunn, pleaded guilty to violating his probation, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and one count of arson. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, all of the Petitioner’s sentences were ordered to run concurrently for a total effective sentence of fifteen years at 100%. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the sole issue that the Petitioner raises is that his Trial Counsel’s representation, or the Petitioner’s selfrepresentation, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because the Petitioner pleaded guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery without seeing discovery regarding the extent of the victim’s injuries. After our review, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief.

The petitioner, William A. Hawkins, aggrieved by his Sullivan County jury conviction of premeditated first degree murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his conviction was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel and other constitutional deprivations. Following the appointment of counsel, amendment of the petition, and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying him relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the trial court.

The Appellant, James M. Flinn, appeals from the Roane County Criminal Court’s denial of his pro se “Motion for Preliminary Examination or Probable Cause Hearing” and his pro se “Motion to Suppress and Return Items Seized Pursuant to Search Warrant and Warrantless Searches.” On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions because (1) he was entitled to a preliminary hearing in the Roane County Criminal Court to determine if police had probable cause to detain him and (2) the Roane County Criminal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over his motion to suppress and return property obtained during the search of his home. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s order granting the petitioner, Michael T. Henderson, partial habeas corpus relief from his Knox County convictions of burglary and larceny. Also on appeal, the petitioner argues in his brief that the habeas corpus court erred in denying a portion of his claims. Following our review we reverse the partial award of habeas corpus relief and affirm the denial of the remaining habeas corpus claims.

The appellant, Mark Frederic Taylor, was convicted of two counts of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud and one count of fraudulently obtaining benefits for medical assistance, and he received a total effective sentence of fourteen years, eight years of which was to be served on probation. Subsequently, the trial court found that the appellant violated his probationary sentence by receiving new convictions. Therefore, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and  ordered him to serve his entire sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contests the  revocation and the imposition of an incarcerative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with the opinion’s conclusion that because the Petitioner’s grand larceny and burglary sentences had been served, the Petitioner was not “in custody” on them, thereby barring habeas corpus relief. I believe they were part of consecutive sentences that were to be treated in the aggregate, allowing for habeas corpus relief from any judgment that was void.

Appellant, Gary Lynn Harvey, was found guilty by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101 & 39-17-305. The trial court sentenced Appellant to elevenmonths, twenty-nine days on probation for the assault conviction and to thirty days on probation for the disorderly conduct conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge because the presentment  was insufficient; (2) refusing to dismiss the disorderly conduct charge because section 39-17-305(b) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (3) finding the evidence sufficient to support his conviction for disorderly conduct; (4) finding the evidence sufficient to support his conviction for assault; (5) not declaring a mistrial due to an officer’s conduct during jury deliberations; (6) not finding prosecutorial misconduct after Appellant was charged with assaulting an officer who denied being assaulted; (7) not declaring a mistrial following the discharge of a juror during deliberations and the recall of an alternate juror who had already been discharged; (8) not providing Appellant with a written copy of the jury instructions before his closing argument; (9) incorrectly charging the jury on reasonable doubt; (10) incorrectly charging the jury on self-defense; (11) incorrectly charging the jury on lawful resistance; (12) denying him the right to present a complete defense by erroneously excluding newspaper articles as hearsay evidence; (13) violating his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses; (14) improperly conducting voir dire; (15) denying him the right to present a complete defense by erroneously excluding witness testimony and by granting the State’s motion to quash subpoenas against the Knoxville Sheriff and two chief deputy sheriffs; (16) refusing to grant a change of venue; and (17) denying his right to a speedy trial by delaying in ruling on his motion for new trial. Because Appellant was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial when the trial court substituted a discharged alternate juror for a disqualified original juror during deliberations, we reverse the judgments and remand the case for a new trial.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, James G. McCreery, Jr., of use of a weapon during a felony, felony reckless endangerment, criminal trespass, and two counts of reckless aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to a three-year suspended sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for  criminal trespass and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to self-defense. After a  thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Rickey Clyde Taylor, appeals as of right from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and received an effective 28-year sentence for the convictions. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner alleges that as a result of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, his guilty pleas were involuntarily entered. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Clifton Douglas, appeals as of right from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the State failed to provide proper notice of its intention to seek enhanced punishment as required by statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-202(a). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Petitioner, Marcus Welcome, was convicted by a Knox County jury of criminal responsibility for aggravated robbery. As a result, Petitioner was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in confinement. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Welcome, 280 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court determined that Petitioner had failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial in Putnam County, Defendant, Dennis Russell Shaw, was convicted of driving on a revoked license, second offense or subsequent offense, violation of the registration law, and violation of the financial responsibility law. He has appealed only the driving on revoked license conviction, arguing that his conviction was improperly enhanced beyond a first offense.  After reviewing the briefs of the parties and the record, we affirm.