APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Latisha Jones, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief.  She was convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, both Class A felonies. She was sentenced to life for the murder conviction and to twenty-three years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the sentences set to run consecutively. On appeal, she argues that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. After careful review, we affirm the denial of relief by the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jeff Carter, was charged with one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522(b). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of  aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than thirteen years old, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504(b). In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court  erred in allowing the State to use the doctrine of election to offer proof of prior bad acts, after the State had provided a bill of particulars describing one particular incident and  repeatedly said that it intended on electing that incident; (2) the trial court did not follow the procedures mandated in Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear about prior bad acts that occurred outside the time frame of the indictment; (4) the evidence at trial was insufficient because there was no evidence offered to support the time frame stated in the indictment; (5) the trial court erroneously allowed three witnesses to testify that the Defendant had confessed to them, without finding whether the alleged confessions pertained to the charged crime or prior bad acts; and (6) the trial court’s failure to give a specific unanimity instruction was reversible error. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did commit reversible error when it allowed testimony of other bad acts and three irrelevant admissions of guilt that the Defendant allegedly made. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Jimmy Curtis Adkins, was found guilty by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a class D felony, and initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-433, -435 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to six years’ and fourteen years’ confinement, respectively, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the Defendant’s convictions in Georgia. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and (3) the trial court erred during sentencing by considering prior convictions that were not proven by certified copies of the convictions and by considering enhancement factors that were not submitted to the jury. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Larry Scott Reynolds, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court improperly excluded evidence from Karla Teutsch, whom he alleges was a legitimate suspect in this murder investigation; (3) the trial court improperly admitted a statement by the victim as an excited utterance; (4) a question by a juror pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1 violated his right to an impartial jury and that such questioning is unconstitutional; (5) the trial court erred when it failed to provide the jury with a curative instruction about people crying in the courtroom during the trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Perdido Cook, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After being convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery, he was sentenced to an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate and prepare for his case. After careful review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Aaron Williams, pled guilty to four counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends: (1) his conviction was based on a coerced confession; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Steve Wallace, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief attacking his 1986 convictions for second degree burglary and aggravated assault. The Petitioner alleged, among other things, that his  judgments of conviction were void because ineffective assistance of trial counsel led him to enter a guilty plea which was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief and, furthermore, that he did not state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the order summarily dismissing the petition.

The pro se defendant, John N. Moffitt, was convicted of one count of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after seven days of incarceration. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred when it allowed an officer to commit perjury and in refusing the defendant’s request to play the surveillance disc from the hospital. He also argues that it was error for the State laboratory to destroy his blood sample before he filed a motion for independent testing. After review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The petitioner, Matthew Jackson, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and theft of property over $500, a Class E felony. He was subsequently sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily denying his petition, specifically contending that his sentence is void and illegal pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower’s court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Lake County Circuit Court.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Samuel Jacob Webb, pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he understood that he would be placed on parole for his eight-year sentence and returned to federal custody to serve his federal sentence for another charge. The trial court denied relief after a hearing, and the Defendant now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Montgomery Koons, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-506(c) (2010). He was sentenced to four years each for the first count and second count as a Range I standard offender and six years for the third count as a Range II standard offender, with all sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered the defendant to serve one year of incarceration and five years of probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court denied his due process right of compulsory process when it quashed his subpoena for the minor victim to testify at the sentencing hearing, (2) the trial judge abused his discretion by declining to recuse himself from the sentencing hearing, (3) the trial court erred by denying his application for diversion based on an erroneous application for certification of eligibility, (4) the trial court erred by denying him full probation, and (5) the trial court erred by entering a Probation Order for six years of probation after one year of incarceration. Because the defendant was denied his due process right to compulsory process at the sentencing hearing and because the denial of judicial diversion was based on an inadvertently submitted preliminary draft of the application, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a new hearing, at which the trial court shall consider judicial diversion and if diversion is denied, the manner of service of the defendant’s sentences.

The Petitioner, Darrell Wayne Bumpas, pled guilty to robbery and resisting arrest, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Kevin M. Frierson, for possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him, which was discovered on the Defendant’s person and seized by a police officer who had stopped a vehicle in which the Defendant was a passenger. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Defendant pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of a schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver, but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search of the Defendant was constitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Lawrence Earl Wade, pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the petitioner agreed to a sentence of fifteen years for the robbery charge and to a life sentence for the murder charge. On appeal from the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to investigate his mental history and that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his guilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Derrick Sloan Taylor, of attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence about him firing a gun on another occasion; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant-Appellant, Paul William Perry, Sr., appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence. He originally pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Hardeman County to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and vandalism between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. Perry was granted an alternative sentence of four and a half years with the Corrections Management Corporation. Perry admits that he violated the terms of his sentence; however, he argues that the trial court erred by revoking the sentence and ordering confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On August 18, 2008, the petitioner, Ricky Lynn Hill, pled guilty to DUI, leaving the scene of an accident, and attempted tampering with evidence; he also pled nolo contendere to vehicular assault. After holding that the petitioner could not be convicted of DUI for double jeopardy reasons, the circuit court sentenced the petitioner to an effective sentence of five years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. The petitioner now appeals the judgment of the Chester County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm the judgment denying habeas corpus relief.

The defendant, Charles Cox, stands convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to 11 months, 29 days in the county jail for the misdemeanor and to eight years as a Range II, multiple offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Marshall County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Huedel Sparkman, of one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, class B felonies. At sentencing, the trial court merged the convictions and imposed a sentence of 25 years’ incarceration to be served as a Range III, persistent offender, consecutively to any unserved sentence. In this appeal as of right, the appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Randy Parham, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; theft of property valued at $1000 or more, a Class D felony; and domestic assault causing bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to thirty-five years at 100% for the attempted first degree murder conviction, fifteen years at 100% for the aggravated robbery conviction, six years at 35% for the theft conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor assault conviction. Finding the defendant to be a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered that the sentences for his felony convictions be served consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of fifty-six years in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his felony convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by not merging the aggravated robbery conviction with the theft conviction and the attempted murder conviction with the assault conviction; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing. Based on our review, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions but that the defendant’s domestic assault conviction should have been merged into the conviction for attempted first degree murder. We further conclude that the trial court did not make adequate findings in support of the sentences imposed. We, therefore, merge the domestic assault conviction into the conviction for attempted first degree murder and remand for resentencing and for the entry of corrected judgments to reflect the merger and the fact that the defendant was convicted in count four of theft of $1000 or more, rather than theft of $10,000 or more as erroneously marked on the judgment.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Brian Wesley Lacey, of 12 counts of the rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of sexual battery. The trial court imposed sentences of 20 years for each rape of a child conviction, eight years for both aggravated sexual battery convictions, and one year for the conviction of sexual battery and ordered partially consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of 60 years’ incarceration to be served at 100 percent. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting an audio recording into evidence without first conducting a hearing outside the presence of the jury as required by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and by imposing consecutive sentences. We discern no error in the defendant’s convictions but do find that the trial court erroneously ordered the defendant to serve 100 percent of his convictions of aggravated sexual battery in counts one and nine as a “child rapist.” The case is remanded to the trial court for the entry of a corrected judgment for those counts. The remainder of the defendant’s sentences are affirmed, and the correction of these judgments does not alter the total effective sentence.

The defendant, Terence Alan Carder, appeals the order entered against him by the McNairy  County Circuit Court, ordering that he pay $80,000 in restitution. The defendant pled guilty to theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to two years of probation following the service of sixty days in jail. Additionally, the court ordered the defendant to pay $80,000 in
restitution at a rate of $1000 per month. On direct appeal, a panel of this court affirmed the  sentence but remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the amount of restitution in light of the defendant’s ability to pay. On remand, the trial court, while acknowledging that the defendant would not be able to pay the entire $80,000 in restitution during the term of his sentence, nonetheless, entered an order that the amount of restitution ordered would remain at $80,000. However, the court did modify the terms of repayment to $100 per month. On appeal, the defendant again contends that, given his financial resources and ability to pay, the trial court erred in ordering him to pay $80,000 in restitution. We agree. Because it is unclear from the record exactly how many months the defendant has remaining on his sentence in light of his recent incarceration for a separate crime, we must again remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order of restitution reflecting a total amount of $100 times the months remaining on the defendant’s sentence in which he is expected to pay.

The Defendant, Lawrence D. Ralph, was convicted of driving under the  influence (DUI), fourth offense; DUI per se, fourth offense; driving on a revoked driver’s license, fifth offense; violation of the habitual traffic offender status; and two counts of evading arrest. The trial court merged the DUI per se conviction with the first count and merged the driving on a revoked license conviction with the habitual traffic offender conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years each for the DUI, fourth offense conviction; the habitual traffic offender status conviction; and the felony evading arrest conviction, to be served consecutively for an effective 12-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of DUI, fourth offense and (2) that the trial court’s sentence was excessive. Following our review, we  affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles Hall, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of alternate theories of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The court merged the second count into the first count and sentenced the defendant as a repeat violent offender to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the pretrial photographic identification by the victim was overly suggestive and the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing or rule on his motion to suppress the identification; (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence that a small child was present during the commission of the robbery; (3) he was dissuaded from testifying because of the comments of the prosecutor and trial court; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (5) the trial court erred in determining that he was a repeat violent offender; and (6) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Martez Rhodes, pursuant to a plea agreement, entered an Alford “best interest” plea of guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. The agreement provided for a four-year sentence for each conviction, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for a total effective sentence of eight years, to be served in the Department of  Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying probation and in imposing consecutive sentences. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. However, we note the transcript shows an Alford “best-interest” guilty plea. The judgment reflects a plea of nolo contendere. We remand for a correction of the judgment.