APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Krystal Johnson, pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony. She received an eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. She petitioned the trial court for probation, which the court denied after a hearing. The defendant now appeals the denial of probation or alternative sentencing. Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court (1) did not consider all of the factors enunciated in Stiller v. State, 516 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. 1974) when denying probation; (2) improperly considered that the defendant pled guilty to a Class B felony when the grand jury indicted her for a Class A felony; and (3) did not consider a sentence involving community corrections. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kenneth Meyer, was found guilty by a Bledsoe County Circuit Court jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. _ 39-13-211 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years' confinement. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by admitting only part of a 9-1-1 tape into evidence, (3) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay into evidence, (4) the state improperly withheld exculpatory evidence, (5) the trial court erred by refusing to issue a self-defense instruction requested by the defendant, (6) the trial court erred by considering prior criminal convictions that were not proven by certified copies of conviction and were not disclosed to the defendant before the sentencing hearing, and (7) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Booth, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felonies; one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Booth received concurrent sentences of twenty years for each of the two especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction, and three years for the aggravated assault conviction, for an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, Booth argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument; (3) his separate convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault violate due process pursuant to State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991) and State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997); (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; (5) the trial court erred in failing to merge the two convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping. Upon review, we merge the dual especially aggravated kidnapping convictions into a single conviction and remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments to reflect the merger of these convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The Defendant-Appellant, George John Byrd, was convicted by a Knox County jury of three counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years for each aggravated rape and to twelve years for aggravated assault. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issues presented for our review are whether the trial court erred by (1) allowing testimony of certain thefts by Byrd; and (2) allowing a nurse to testify about statements made by the victim during her medical examination. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles Bates, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, in exchange for a sentence of six years in the Shelby County Correction Center as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. After careful review, we affirm the denial of relief.

Defendant, Jose A. Iniguez, was convicted by a Madison County jury of stalking, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving while unlicensed, a Class C. Misdemeanor. For stalking, the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months, 29 days and for driving while unlicensed a sentence of 30 days, to be served concurrently in the county jail. On appeal, Defendant's sole issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his stalking conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Johnny Lee Lewis, was convicted of two counts of facilitation of second degree murder, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated arson, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-11-403, -13-210, -14-302. This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Johnny Lee Lewis, No. M2002-01350-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22398394 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 21, 2003). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because: (1) trial counsel failed to request that the jury be sequestered; (2) trial counsel failed to interview and present witnesses; (3) trial counsel failed to object, based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to the use of enhancement factors during the Petitioner's sentencing hearing; (4) trial counsel failed to object, based on the Confrontation Clause, to testimony regarding a co-conspirator's statements; and (5) the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors denied him a fair trial. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

The Defendant-Appellant, Don Mask Brown, Jr., was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a violent offender to forty years for second degree murder and, as a multiple offender, to fifteen years for the aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of fifty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Brown claims: (1) the trial court violated the principles of Blakely v. Washington by finding that several enhancement factors were applicable; and (2) the trial court should not have imposed consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Kane Stackhouse, aggrieved of his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty years, appeals contending that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress his statements. We discern no error regarding the motion to suppress; however, we conclude, via plain error, that the trial court erred by failing to merge the second degree murder conviction into the merged convictions of first degree felony murder. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the verdict of second degree murder to be merged into the judgment of first degree felony murder. In all other respects, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The defendant, Dionis Nick Papa, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. Because the record supports the trial court's ordering a sentence of confinement, we affirm.

Petitioner, Andre L. Mayfield, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, challenging his convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping based on newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition without a hearing. Petitioner appeals. We determine that the coram nobis court properly dismissed the petition after finding that the "newly discovered" evidence relied upon by Petitioner would have provided "insignificant assistance to the defense of the charges" had it been presented at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition is affirmed.

The defendant, Jonathan Greer, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to serve fifteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant has raised the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, he contends that his conviction is precluded by State v. Owens, 20 S.W.3d 634, 638 (Tenn. 2000), because the State failed to establish that the taking of the property was contemporaneous with the use of violence or fear. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Terry James Lee aka Terry Lee Williams, appeals the revocation of his probation. He initially entered guilty pleas to felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and reckless aggravated assault, for which he received a total effective sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He served six months of his sentence before being placed on intensive probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation and contends his sentence had expired. The State has moved the Court to affirm the revocation of probation pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review, we affirm the revocation of probation pursuant to Rule 20.

Defendant, Lindsey Ray Butler, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury in a one-count indictment for possession of marijuana with intent to sell in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-417(a)(4)(g)(1). Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of simple possession of marijuana, and the judgment reflects that he was sentenced by the trial court to serve 11 months and 29 days, consecutive to a five-year sentence he is currently serving. In this direct appeal, Defendant challenges the legality of a search of his residence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marcos Acosta Raymundo, a.k.a. Marcos Raymundo Acosta, was charged with one count of aggravated child abuse of a child less than eight years old, a Class A felony, one count of aggravated child neglect of a child less than eight years old, a Class A felony, and two counts of child abuse of a child less than six years old, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-15-401(a), -402(b). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of four offenses: one count of attempted aggravated child abuse of a child less than eight years old, a Class B felony, and the other three offenses as charged. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for count one, attempted aggravated child abuse, twenty-five years for count two, aggravated child neglect, four years for count three, child abuse, and four years for count four, child abuse. The trial court ordered that count two was to be served concurrently with count one, and that counts three and four were to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to count two. Thus, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-nine years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) his convictions for counts one, two, and four violated the principles of double jeopardy. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of count two, aggravated child neglect, and that the defendant's convictions for count one, attempted aggravated child abuse, and count four, child abuse, violate the principles of double jeopardy. Thus, we reverse the defendant's convictions on counts two and four, and affirm his convictions on counts one and three. We remand to the trial court for a redetermination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jermaine Mitchell Gray, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession to police; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Scott Winfrey, pleaded guilty to twenty-nine Class A misdemeanors consisting of one count of aggravated criminal trespass, one count of stalking, thirteen counts of harassment, and fourteen counts of violation of an order of protection. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense and ordered that ten of his violation of an order of protection sentences run consecutively. In a previous decision, we remanded this matter for re-sentencing, concluding that the trial court erroneously applied Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13- 113(g). See State v. David Scott Winfrey, No. M2008-01429-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2486180 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug. 14, 2009). The defendant now appeals the consecutive sentences imposed upon re-sentencing and contends that they are not in accordance with our previous opinion in this matter. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher Lovin, appeals the Claiborne County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to object to the State's amendment of his indictment, (2) failing to examine and rebut the State's medical witnesses properly, (3) failing to object to the State's use of demonstrative evidence, and (4) failing to object to the State's presentation of two theories of causation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Vincent Jordan, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's order revoking his probation for robbery, a Class C felony, and ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Viola Darlene Stephens, pled guilty to theft of property valued at less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft conviction, to serve six months, and six months for driving on a revoked license, to be fully served in incarceration. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not stating whether it had considered a sentence of community corrections. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Petitioner, Victor L. Dobbins, was found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17- 1307(b)(2). This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Victor L. Dobbins, No. M2007-01751-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2648951 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 3, 2008), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2008). The petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because: (1) trial counsel failed to properly investigate his case and (2) the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors entitles him to a new trial. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kelvin Reed, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the offenses of first degree murder and felony murder, and defendant was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for his murder conviction and three years for aggravated burglary. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, including testimony about the music played at defendant's birthday party, testimony that one witness had seen defendant with a gun, and photographs of the victim; and (3) that the judgment for aggravated burglary should be corrected to reflect defendant's actual sentence. Following review, we affirm the convictions and remand to the trial court solely for entry of a corrected amended judgment for aggravated burglary in accordance with this opinion.

The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Michael Patterson, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Blount County to two counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, two counts of theft of property between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony, and one count of theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. He received an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Patterson subsequently appealed his guilty pleas, and a protracted procedural history developed. On appeal, two of Patterson's claims remain: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying, without a hearing, his "Motion for Modification or Reduction of Sentence"; and (2) whether his convictions are void because he did not sign the plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Donna Harvey, and a codefendant pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to theft of at least $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. __ 39- 14-103, -105(3) (2006). The defendant received a four-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender, suspended to time served with the balance on supervised probation. The trial court ordered the defendant and codefendant to pay $64,852 in restitution with joint and several liability. At issue in this appeal is the amount of restitution for damages caused by the crime. We reverse the order setting the restitution amount and remand for a restitution hearing, at which the trial court shall consider the defendant's financial resources and ability to pay and determine the proper amount and schedule of restitution.