APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Robert M. Linder, filed a motion in the Blount County Circuit Court seeking a reduction in his sentence. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellant filed an appeal contesting the trial court's ruling. In response, the State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's ruling pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the motion was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Donald Eugene O'Neal, Jr., was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years' confinement for attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; to four years' confinement for reckless homicide, a Class D felony; and to three years' confinement for delivery of a schedule II drug, a Class C felony; all to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of nineteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the sentences are excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Petitioner, Antonio L. Fuller, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel's assistance was ineffective because he failed to (1) object to the trial court's instruction to the jury concerning the lesser included offense of aggravated kidnapping; (2) object to the trial court's consideration of Petitioner's prior convictions in determining his sentencing range and the length of his sentence; and (3) failed to raise these issues in the motion for new trial. Petitioner contends that appellate counsel's assistance was ineffective because he failed to raise these issues on appeal. Petitioner also contends that the length of his sentence violates the principles set forth in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) and asks this Court to grant him a new sentencing hearing. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Christopher Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his due process rights were violated when the trial court failed to grant a severance. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Orlando Daniel Garcia, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of facilitation of first degree murder, a Class A felony, and possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class E felony, and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of nineteen years and eighteen months for the respective convictions. On appeal, the defendant has raised three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for facilitation of first degree murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting portions of a video tape of the crime into evidence; and (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the defendant purchased and wore a shirt with a Superman logo shortly after the incident. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgments of convictions.

Appellant, Kathy M. Pennington, was indicted by the Lawrence County Grand Jury for one count of possession of oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance. After the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress, appellant pled guilty to the charge. As part of her guilty plea, appellant reserved a certified question for appeal arguing that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the factual findings of the trial court that appellant consented to the search. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael D. Willis, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court's order revoking his probation for promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony, and ordering him to serve his three-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the judgment.

A Greene County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Terri K. Teaster, of vehicular assault, and the trial court imposed a sentence of four years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction, that the State improperly remarked on the defendant's right not to testify, and that the four-year, fully-incarcerative sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In August 1990, a Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner of one count of robbery by use of a deadly weapon and two counts of assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree, all Class A felonies. The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a Range III persistent offender to an effective sentence of 150 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal and that his sentence violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Gerald McEwen, of one count of first degree murder and one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I violent offender to life with the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and as a Range I standard offender to fifteen years for the attempted murder conviction. The court ordered him to serve the sentences concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court violated his right to due process by denying his counsel the opportunity to rehabilitate a prospective juror and by reprimanding the  prospective juror in front of the jury venire; (2) the trial court erred by denying his Batson challenge; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his 1994 convictions should have been served consecutively to his 1993 convictions because he was on bail when he committed some of the offenses. Therefore, he argues that his judgments of conviction are void. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Wilson Palacio, challenges the sentencing decision of the Bedford County Circuit Court. Following his guilty pleas to one count of aggravated burglary and three counts of aggravated robbery, the trial court imposed an effective twenty-five-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant asserts that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a joint jury trial, the Defendant, Katayoun Mohammadi Jaffarian, was convicted of theft of property valued at $500 or less, and the Defendant, Nader Karshenas, was convicted of theft of merchandise valued at $500 or less (collectively "the Defendants"). The defendants were each sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Williamson County Jail. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for a new trial. Nonetheless, the defendants thereafter sought to amend their motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. In this direct appeal, the defendants argue that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support their convictions and that the trial court erred by denying their amended motion for new trial. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Roger Stephen Riner, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of first degree murder, felony murder, and aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the first degree murder conviction. Appellant was sentenced to life for the first degree murder conviction and ten years for the aggravated robbery conviction, to be served consecutively to the life sentence. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) whether the trial court erred by allowing certain photographs of the victim's injuries to be admitted as exhibits; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view appellant's multiple tattoos; and (4) whether the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing. Further, appellant waived the remaining issues for failure to include the motion for new trial and/or transcript of the motion for new trial in the record on appeal and failed to establish plain error by the trial court with respect to these issues. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellant, Shawn Simmons, appeals from his conviction for first degree murder in Lincoln County. Appellant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; and (3) the trial court improperly ruled that the State could use prior convictions to impeach appellant's testimony in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Further, we determine that the trial court properly instructed the jury on flight where the evidence supported such an instruction and that the trial court properly ruled that the State could use appellant's prior convictions for impeachment if he chose to testify. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the defendant, Bryan Keith Good, of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years for the Class C felony and six years for each of the Class E felonies. The court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction, for an effective sentence of twenty-seven years. On appeal, the defendant (1) challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon; (2) argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; and (3) contends that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences and in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that the convictions for both attempted aggravated robbery and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon violate double jeopardy protections. The defendant's convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon are hereby merged. The defendant's remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed. We remand solely for the entry of appropriate judgments consistent with this opinion.

The appellant, Joe Michael Turner, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court Jury of two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of one hundred years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court should have merged the kidnapping convictions. Therefore, the judgments of conviction for the especially aggravated kidnapping and the aggravated kidnappings are vacated and the case is remanded for entry of a judgment of especially aggravated kidnapping that includes the merged aggravated kidnapping convictions. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

The Defendant, Joshua Lynn Parker, was convicted by a Cocke County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and attempted rape, a Class C felony. See T.C.A.__ 39-13-210 (1997) (amended 2006) (second degree murder); 39-12-101 (2006) (criminal attempt); 39-13-503 (2006) (rape). The defendant was sentenced to serve thirty-five years years at 100 percent for second degree murder conviction and eight years at thirty-five percent for attempted rape conviction. The sentences were imposed to run consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the admission of hearsay statements by the victim violated his Confrontation Clause rights; and (3) testimony regarding his service on the "can crew," a work group of jail inmates, prejudiced him at his trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Timothy Delando Metcalf, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Sullivan County to burglary, a Class E felony, and theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and appeals the denial of his request for an alternative sentence. Metcalf received a sentence of one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the burglary conviction and a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the theft conviction. In this appeal, Metcalf claims the trial court should have also granted probation for the burglary conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s
conviction of second degree murder should be upheld despite the absence of any proof that the defendant knowingly inflicted the lethal wound. The majority agrees that the evidence did not establish a knowing killing, the elemental and factual foundation for second degree murder. Indeed, the majority agrees that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder. Despite these conclusions, the majority relies upon the mens rea regime for felony murder to impart culpability to the defendant for second degree murder.

The Petitioner, Leonard Edward Smith, appeals as of right from the May 21, 2004 and March 2, 2007 orders of the Hamblen County Circuit Court denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his 1985 conviction and life sentence for the first degree felony murder of John Pierce, his 1989 conviction for the first degree felony murder of Novella Webb, and his 1995 sentence of death for the murder of Novella Webb.1 On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief relative to the Petitioner's conviction and life sentence for the murder of John Pierce and the Petitioner's conviction for the murder of Novella Webb, but we reverse the denial of postconviction relief relative to the Petitioner's death sentence for the Webb murder and remand for a new sentencing hearing in that case. We do so based upon the conclusion that the postconviction court erred in denying the Petitioner's claim that his trial attorneys provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in their investigation and presentation of available evidence in support of their motion to recuse the 1995 resentencing judge.

The Petitioner, Leonard Edward Smith, appeals as of right from the May 21, 2004 and March 2, 2007 orders of the Hamblen County Circuit Court denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his 1985 conviction and life sentence for the first degree felony murder of John Pierce, his 1989 conviction for the first degree felony murder of Novella Webb, and his 1995 sentence of death for the murder of Novella Webb.1 On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief relative to the Petitioner's conviction and life sentence for the murder of John Pierce and the Petitioner's conviction for the murder of Novella Webb, but we reverse the denial of postconviction relief relative to the Petitioner's death sentence for the Webb murder and remand for a new sentencing hearing in that case. We do so based upon the conclusion that the postconviction court erred in denying the Petitioner's claim that his trial attorneys provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in their investigation and presentation of available evidence in support of their motion to recuse the 1995 resentencing judge.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Derrick Johnson ("Johnson"), of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to life with the possibility of parole and a six-year consecutive term of imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Johnson argues: (1) the insufficiency of the convicting evidence as to the first degree premeditated murder; and (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeremy Trent Keeton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He originally agreed to plead guilty to the sale of a Schedule II drug (methamphetamine), a Class C felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to twelve years, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutive to two other cases for a total effective sentence of thirty-nine years. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in ruling that he had failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective and in ruling that his guilty plea was entered voluntarily. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.