APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Monroe County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Billy R. Summey, for alternative counts of sale or delivery of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant pled guilty to the indictment and received a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation. Pursuant to the guilty plea, the Defendant also reserved a certified question of law that is dispositive of his case challenging the legality of the tape-recorded drug transaction that occurred in his home, without a warrant, between himself and an informant. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael D. Hurst, has appealed the Blount County Circuit Court's September 4, 2009 revocation of his community corrections placement which resulted in his serving the balance of his 2004 eight-year, guilty pleaded sentence for drug possession. The State has moved the court to summarily affirm the circuit court's revocation order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the record supports the State's motion, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

The defendant, Rodney Northern, pleaded guilty to one count of theft in exchange for a four-year sentence to be served as 50 days' incarceration with the remainder on supervised probation. The plea agreement provided that the trial court would later determine the amount of restitution, and after a hearing the trial court ordered $10,500 in restitution to the victim, Melvin Hance. On appeal, the defendant challenges the amount of restitution. After review of the record, we hold that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case because the trial court failed to enter a final judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Derrick Lemon Goode, was convicted 1 of ten counts of forgery, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-114(c). The trial court merged each even-numbered count with the odd-numbered count preceding it, leaving convictions for Counts One, Three, Five, Seven, and Nine. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years and six months for each count. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve these five sentences consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of seventeen and one-half years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him and; (2) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

he Defendant, Raymond Bradley, Jr., pleaded guilty to one count of facilitation of aggravated burglary, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-11-403(b), -14-403(b). He was sentenced to four years to be served on probation. He was also ordered to pay a total of $15,500 in restitution at a rate of $323 per month. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting the amount of restitution and in determining that he had the ability to pay the ordered monthly payments. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Antoinette Feaster, was convicted of one count of possession with intent to deliver over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17- 417(i)(5). She was sentenced, as a Range I, standard offender, to eight years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, she contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the cocaine underlying her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a witness, who was not listed on the defendant's indictment or in discovery material, to testify; (3) the trial court erred in failing to require the State to elect a single offense to be presented to the jury; (4) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict her; (5) the trial court erred in charging the jury; (6) the trial court erred in declining to allow the jury to consider the search at issue in this case; and (7) the trial court erred in denying the defendant a community corrections sentence. After our review, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress due to an unlawful initial stop. We accordingly reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Brandon Forbes, pled guilty in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of theft of property valued at over $1,000 with an agreed total effective sentence of six years as a Range I, standard offender, leaving the manner of service to the discretion of the trial court. Following the denial of alternative sentencing, the Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s dismissal of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. I believe the record contains final orders addressing all issues in the trial court, and I do not believe the failure to place all of the orders in a single judgment document bars our reviewing the restitution issue in this appeal.

In December 2006, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Eric Cathey, for one count of felony first degree murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. These charges were the result of the death of appellant's two-month-old daughter. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found appellant guilty of all three counts. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and merged the aggravated child neglect conviction into the aggravated child abuse conviction. The trial court imposed a sentence of life with parole for the felony first degree murder and twenty years for the aggravated child abuse. The trial court ordered that these sentences be served concurrently. Appellant now appeals his convictions and sentence arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the State's use of its peremptory challenges at jury selection; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in allowing certain photographs into evidence; and (4) the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that appellant's issues do not require reversal. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Deonray J. Fisk, was found guilty of three counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. The Trial Court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to eleven years for each attempted murder conviction, six years for each aggravated assault conviction, and two years for the weapons conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences for attempted murder consecutively. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences for aggravated assault concurrently with each other and with Defendant's sentence for attempted second degree murder in count one of the indictment. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentence for his weapons conviction consecutively with his conviction for attempted second degree murder in count one and concurrently with the other sentences for an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining the length and manner of service of his sentences. After a thorough review, we affirm the trial court's judgments. We conclude, however, that double jeopardy principles require that Defendant's aggravated assault convictions in counts 4, 5, and 6 of the indictment be merged with Defendant's convictions of attempted second degree murder in counts 1, 2, and 3, and we remand for the entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion. Defendant's effective sentence of thirty-five years remains unchanged.

The defendant, Joseph Daniel Drew, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of probation on his 12-year effective sentence for guilty-pleaded convictions of robbery and attempted aggravated robbery. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ladonte Smith, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder stemming from a drive-by shooting that occurred at a market. State v. Ladonte Montez Smith, M1997-00087-CCA-R3- CD, 1999 WL 1210813, at *1-5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 17, 1999), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2000). He received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the first degree murder conviction and seventeen years for each conviction for attempted first degree murder, to run consecutively to the life sentence. Petitioner subsequently filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing on the petition, after which the petition was denied. Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review, we conclude that petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Sarrah Hewlett, appeals the trial court's dismissal of her petition for postconviction relief because it is time-barred. On appeal, Petitioner argues that due process considerations require the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations for filing a postconviction petition. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant, Hugo Mendez, pled guilty in 2007, to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and to leaving the scene of an accident causing death, a Class E felony. The agreement provided for sentences of eight years and one year for the respective convictions, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. Nonetheless, the record indicates that the defendant remained incarcerated in the Shelby County Jail. Approximately two years later, the defendant filed a pro se petition requesting that he be allowed to serve the balance of the sentence on probation. The trial court issued an order summarily denying the petition without conducting a hearing. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for probation and also challenges findings which he alleges were set forth in the order. Following review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Davis, appeals from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The habeas corpus court found that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Jevon Bryant, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that: counsel was ineffective; the trial court erred in denying his request to wear his wedding ring at trial; the prosecution made improper comments during voir dire; his prior felony should not have been stipulated for admission; his relatives were improperly banned from the courtroom; and his right to the Confrontation Clause was violated. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Terry Byington, was convicted of DUI, fourth offense, and was sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender for this Class E felony, with a minimum of 150 days to be served day for day. On direct appeal, this Court held that he waived all issues presented except for the sentencing issue and a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, because the motion for new trial was not timely filed, and was therefor a nullify. See State v. Terry Lynn Byington, No. E2003-02316-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1606993, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 19, 1004) perm. app. denied. (Tenn. Dec. 28, 2004). Subsequently, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief and, pursuant to T.C.A. _ 40-30-113, a delayed appeal was ordered by the post-conviction court. Upon delayed appeal, this Court dismissed the appeal because the order denying the motion for new trial was not in the record. The Supreme Court granted defendant's application for permission to appeal, and subsequently vacated this Court's judgment and remanded the case to this Court "for review of the issues raised by [Defendant] in his motion for new trial." See State v. Byington, 284 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tenn. 2009). After review of the issues presented, the briefs of the parties, and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Matthew Steven Wright, was indicted by the Marion County Grand Jury for aggravated assault. Appellant pled guilty to the charge and received a sentence of four years. The trial court suspended the sentence to three years and ten months of probation after the service of thirty-five days in incarceration. After the issuance of a probation violation warrant and hearing, the trial court revoked appellant's probation and ordered him to serve his sentence. Appellant seeks a review of the denial of his probation. We determine that the trial court made adequate findings of fact with regard to the denial of probation. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Tony Lee Crowe, was convicted by a Putnam County Jury of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. As a result, he was sentenced to sixteen years incarceration, to be served at 100%. On appeal, he alleges that the trial court improperly denied his motion for new trial based on newly discovered impeachment evidence and recanted testimony. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Daniel Henderson Jones, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of his motions to withdraw guilty pleas and for reduction of sentences following his negotiated guilty pleas in case number S52,468 to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; in case number S53,126 to one count of possession of .5 grams of cocaine for sale, a Class B felony; one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of maintaining a dwelling where drugs are sold or used, a Class D felony; and in case number S53,127 to possession of cocaine for sale, a Class C felony. He received a total effective sentence of twenty years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions and that his sentences were imposed absent the trial court making required findings relative to enhancement and mitigating factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gary Dewayne Pitts, appeals from the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court revoking his probation. In January 2009, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony simple possession of cocaine and vandalism over $500 and received an effective three-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. His sentence was partially suspended, and he was placed on probation. Subsequently, a violation warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the defendant violated his probation by using illegal drugs. After a hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement so that the defendant could be evaluated for a drug and mental health program. Based upon the results of the assessment evincing an unwillingness on the part of the defendant to abide by the terms of the program, the trial court concluded that the defendant violated the conditions of his probationary sentence and ordered that his original three-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that the remainder of his sentence be served in confinement. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Antonio M. Miller, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to try him as an adult; (2) the prosecutor breached the plea agreement; (3) he was not given a psychological evaluation or a pretrial suppression hearing to challenge his confession; (4) he was not allowed to develop alibi witnesses; and (5) his nineteen-year sentence at one hundred percent is incorrect. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Mark Thornton, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus wherein he challenged his judgments in Cocke County case numbers 6617, 6618, 6820, and 9827. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief on the basis that he received concurrent sentences when consecutive sentences were statutorily required. He also contends that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas in each of the four cases because the concurrent sentence alignment was a bargained for element of each plea. We agree that the judgment in case number 6820 is void, but because the petitioner has failed to establish that he is restrained of his liberty by virtue of the void judgment, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.