APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Russel B. Cain, entered a plea of guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery of a victim under the age of thirteen, a Class B felony, but reserved a certified question of law to Counts Two and Three of the indictment. Specifically, he requests this
court to review: “If an indictment alleges multiple counts of child sexual abuse, and if the dates of the separate counts are state[d] as ‘the ___ day of _______, 2007,’ does the conviction of Count One of the indictment bar the conviction on Counts Two and Three of
the indictment under the double jeopardy protection of the Constitution.” The defendant also argues that he was improperly sentenced to consecutive sentences. After careful review, we conclude that the conviction on Count One of the indictment does not bar the convictions on subsequent counts of the indictment when the dates of the offenses are stated as “the ___ day of ____, 2007” and that consecutive sentencing was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.
 

Petitioner Roy E. Keough appeals as of right the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 9, 1997, a jury found the Petitioner guilty of the premeditated murder of his wife, Betty Keough, and the attempted first degree murder of Kevin Berry. For the murder conviction, the jury found that the Petitioner had previously been convicted of one or more felonies for which the statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person. See T.C.A. _ 39-13-204(i)(2). The jury further found that this aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury then sentenced the Petitioner to death. The trial court imposed a forty-year sentence for the attempted murder conviction to be served consecutive to his sentence of death. The Petitioner's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Keough, 18 S.W.3d 175 (Tenn. 2000). On December 12, 2000, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. An amendment was filed on February 14, 2003, and an addendum to the amended petition was filed on November 6, 2007. The post-conviction court held hearings on various dates in September, October, and November 2007. On July 23, 2008, the post-conviction court entered an order denying relief. On appeal to this Court, the Petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following categories: (1) the Petitioner's trial counsel were ineffective, (2) the Petitioner's appellate counsel were ineffective; (3) the Petitioner was denied a fair trial and (4) Tennessee's death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, given existing precedent. I believe though, that once the habeas court concludes that a judgment is void, it should transfer the case to the convicting court—a court of equal jurisdiction—for further proceedings. The habeas court should not be allowed to act further regarding the convicting case by limiting the options available to the Petitioner or to the convicting court upon transfer of the case.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tremaine Nathaniel Pointer, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Criminal Court of Davidson County. In case number 2006-D-2927, Pointer entered a guilty plea to possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. In case number 2007-B-1142, Pointer pled guilty to felony failure to appear, a Class E [*2] felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an eight year term of imprisonment for the drug conviction and was ordered to have a mental health and drug assessment. He was also sentenced to one year for the felony failure to appear conviction, which was imposed to run consecutively to the eight year sentence, for an effective nine-year sentence. The trial court ordered Pointer to serve six months in jail and the remainder of his sentence on supervised probation. After a revocation proceeding on September 19, 2008, Pointer was placed back on probation to be supervised by the community corrections program, and that placement was revoked on June 1, 2009, when the court ordered Pointer to serve his sentence. On appeal, Pointer contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement after revoking his probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking Pointer's probation in cases 2006-D-2927 and 2007-B-1142.

Petitioner, Ambreco Shaw, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, Petitioner contends that (1) counsel failed to fully investigate all possible defenses; (2) counsel failed to adequately meet with Petitioner and allow him to be involved in his defense; (3) counsel failed to properly convey and explain settlement offers; (4) counsel failed to properly advise Petitioner concerning his right to testify; (5) counsel improperly allowed Petitioner to appear at trial in prison clothing; (6) counsel failed to request a mental evaluation in a timely manner; and (7) counsel failed to cross-examine witnesses and provide proof at the sentencing hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Joey D. Herrell, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his application for his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In six separate cases, the petitioner pled guilty to the following: theft of property under $500, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, three counts of attempted aggravated burglary, theft of property over $1000, and evading arrest. The offenses in four of the cases were committed while the petitioner was released on bond from the remaining two cases. All pleas were entered on the same day, and the trial court imposed concurrent sentencing, which resulted in the petitioner receiving an effective sentence of twenty years. He has filed the instant habeas corpus petition alleging that the imposition of concurrent sentencing resulted in illegal sentences because they were imposed in direct contravention of a statute, as he had been released on bond at the time some of the offenses were committed. The habeas corpus court and the State agreed that the sentences were illegal, and the court found that the illegal portion of the sentences was not "a material element" of the petitioner's guilty plea agreement and that, therefore, he was not entitled to withdraw the plea. Rather, the court remanded the case to the trial court for imposition of consecutive sentencing. On appeal, the petitioner disagrees and asserts that he should be allowed to withdraw the plea. Following review of the record, we agree with the petitioner, reverse the decision of the habeas court, and remand with instruction to conduct a hearing to determine whether the illegal sentences were a material, bargained-for element of the plea agreement.

The Defendant-Appellant, Rodney A. Lucas, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County to possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony. He received a sentence of eight years to be served on probation. The trial court revoked Lucas' probation after his second violation. On appeal, Lucas admits that he violated his probation for a second time; however, he claims the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Quidon Clemons, was convicted of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, aggravated stalking, a Class E felony, and violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to two years for aggravated stalking. As to the misdemeanors, Defendant was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days for assault, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for violation of an order of protection. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kenneth J. Cradic, appeals the summary dismissal of post-conviction relief by the Sullivan County Criminal Court. The Petitioner was convicted of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and three counts of incest, a Class C felony. He received a sentence of twenty years for each rape of a child conviction and a sentence of four years for each incest conviction. The trial court ordered that two of the twenty-year sentences for rape of a child be served consecutively to one another but concurrently with the third conviction and ordered that the three counts of incest be served consecutively to one another but concurrently with the rape of a child convictions, for an effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief without appointing counsel. Upon review, we reverse the judgment summarily denying post-conviction relief and remand this case to the postconviction court for a full evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner's claim of ineffectiveassistance of counsel regarding the misapplication of the sentencing law.

Appellant, Alejandro Chevo Guana, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder for killing Tennessee State Trooper Calvin Jenks during a routine traffic stop. He was sentenced to life in prison. He was also convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, for which he was to serve one year. He appeals, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) limiting his cross-examination of his co-defendant to reveal alleged bias; (2) denying a change of venue; (3) refusing to use his proffered jury questionnaire; (4) denying his request for individual and sequestered voir dire; and (5) finding the evidence sufficient for conviction where, he claims, the only evidence of premeditation was the testimony of his accomplice. We affirm.

The Defendant, Ricky Lee Gann, alias Rickey Lee Gann, pled guilty to seven counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more, a Class D felony, two counts of theft of property valued $500 or more, a Class E felony, and two counts of theft of property valued $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced to an effective six-year term in the Tennessee Department of Correction, followed by twelve years of probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences and in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Karen Koons, was convicted by a Lawrence County jury of driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. She received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days probation, following service of forty-five days in jail. On appeal, Koons challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur with the result reached in the majority opinion, given existing precedent. I write separately, though, to express my dissatisfaction with the result reached. I believe that once the habeas court concludes that a judgment is void, whether for an illegal conviction or
illegal sentence, it should transfer the case to the convicting court—a court of equal jurisdiction—for further proceedings. The habeas court should not be allowed to act further regarding the convicting case by limiting the options available to the Petitioner or the convicting court after transfer of the case.

The Petitioner, Tracy Lynn Harris, appeals as of right from the Morgan County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

On April 5, 2007, the Defendant, George R. Fyke, pleaded guilty to four counts of forgery, one count of identity theft, and three counts of passing worthless checks. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received an effective six-year sentence to be served in the Community Corrections Program for these convictions. Thereafter, on April 21, 2008, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of identity theft, one count of theft over $10,000, two counts of theft over $1,000, one count of attempted theft, and two counts of forgery. Also on that day, the Defendant admitted his violation of his April 2007 community corrections sentence. The trial court granted the Defendant a furlough to attend and complete a one-year rehabilitation program before sentencing. Following the Defendant's failure to complete the program, a sentencing hearing was held. The trial court ordered that the remainder of the Defendant's six-year sentence be served in confinement and, for the April 2008 convictions, imposed an effective eight-year sentence to be served on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering revocation of his community corrections sentence and that his eight-year sentence his excessive. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. However, we must remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

Appellant Linda M. Moran pled guilty to a 207-count indictment after it was revealed that she had stolen approximately $73,000 from her employer over the course of nearly a decade. At sentencing, Appellant argued that she should be given some form of alternative sentencing. The trial court disagreed and imposed an effective sentence of nine years in custody. Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tenithia Malena, was convicted by a Hardeman County Circuit Court jury of one count of burglary, a Class D felony, and one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. The trial court approved the sentence recommendation by the State and sentenced Malena as a Range I, standard offender to three years of supervised probation for the burglary conviction. The court also ordered her to pay $20,000 in restitution by April 4, 2008 and ordered her to pay the restitution balance of $34,662.44 in monthly payments of $350.00 starting May 1, 2008. In addition, the trial court sentenced her, pursuant to the State's recommendation, as a Range I, standard offender to six years of supervised probation for the theft conviction, which was to be served consecutively to the burglary conviction, for an effective nine-year probationary sentence. In this appeal, Malena challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the admission of her financial records as evidence related to the theft charge, and (3) the trial court's denial of her motion for new trial on the ground that extraneous prejudicial information was considered by the jury. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Joseph Dejuan Webster, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder. State v. Joseph Dejuan Webster, No. M2007-00050-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2229208, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 29, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). He received a life sentence for the conviction which was ordered to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. Id. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner filed an amended petition, and the post-conviction court held a hearing. After the hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We have reviewed the record and conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Karen Marable, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Shelby County of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. She was sentenced as a standard offender to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Marable claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred in responding to a jury question; and (3) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Thomas Joseph Cordle, appeals from the revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentences in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Paul Williams, appeals from judgments entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving on a suspended license, violation of the passenger vehicle safety belt law, and violation of the motor vehicle registration law. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict him, that his convictions violate his constitutional right to travel, and that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terry Lynn Raney, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief wherein he challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine, keeping or maintaining a dwelling place where controlled substances are used or sold, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana on grounds that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. Because there is a clerical error in the judgment form for the petitioner's conviction of possession of cocaine, the case is remanded to the Criminal Court for Sullivan County for the entry of a corrected judgment form.

The petitioner, Michael Davis, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his especially aggravated robbery conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Because we conclude that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a jury instruction on facilitation as a lesser- included offense of especially aggravated robbery, and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the petitioner's trial would have been different had counsel done so, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for the granting of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant-Appellant, Devon O'Neal Wiggins, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of sale of cocaine over 0.5 grams, a Class B felony; possession of cocaine under 0.5 grams with intent to sell or deliver, a Class C felony; possession of marijuana under 0.5 ounce, a Class A misdemeanor; and evading arrest, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender, to thirty years for the sale of cocaine over 0.5 grams, fifteen years for the possession of cocaine under 0.5 grams, eleven months and twenty-nine days for the possession of marijuana, and six years for the evading arrest conviction. He was ordered to serve the above sentences concurrently to each other, but consecutively to another unrelated case. On appeal, Wiggins argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for sale and possession of cocaine; (2) the testimony of a State's expert witness concerning an exemplar graph violated his right of confrontation; (3) the trial court erred by not charging the jury on the offense of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance; (4) Wiggins' prosecution for possession of marijuana was not commenced within the one-year statute of limitations; (5) the trial court improperly commented upon the evidence; (6) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument; (7) the sentence imposed by the trial court for sale of cocaine was excessive; and (8) cumulative error necessitates reversal of Wiggins' convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Wesley Earl Brown, of two counts of rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for each rape conviction, to be served consecutively, and ten years for each sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the rape convictions, for a total effective sentence of sixty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and (3) the trial court's sentence violated the Petitioner's constitutional right to a jury. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.