APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After the appellant, Lonnie L. Cross, led police on a high-speed chase, a Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted him on two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, felony evading arrest with risk to others, driving on a revoked license, and speeding. The trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eight years in custody. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support two of his convictions: the evading arrest conviction and one of the reckless endangerment convictions. The appellant also challenges the trial court's reliance on two sentencing enhancement factors. Upon review, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the appellant's convictions. We also conclude that, although the trial court erred in its application of one of the enhancement factors, the error was harmless. However, our review of the record reveals that the trial court committed plain error. The appellant's conviction on the reckless endangerment in count three violates constitutional double jeopardy protections. We therefore affirm the judgements of the trial court as to count one, reckless endangerment, and count two, evading arrest. The judgment of conviction in count three is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for merger of the conviction in count three with the evading arrest conviction in count two.

The defendant, David Smith, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony under the dying declaration exception; (2) the trial court erred in conducting its own voir dire of the defendant regarding his decision to testify; (3) the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on flight; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (5) the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence based on the use of a firearm. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant, Manuel Haynes, of two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to serve an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, twenty years for the first count consecutive to fifteen years for the second count. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors when sentencing the defendant on the first count; (3) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; (4) the trial court erred by failing to re-read portions of the jury instructions; (5) the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on the intoxication of a juror. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Brent Richardson, was convicted of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, carjacking, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and sentenced the defendant to an effective term of life plus forty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend two counts of the indictment after the jury had been sworn and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dennis Ray Bailey, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Dickson County of driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended after serving 45 days in confinement, and ordered to pay a $600 fine. Bailey claims on appeal that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Billy Ray Farris, pled guilty in the Chester County Circuit Court to second degree murder, and he received a sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Jesse B. Gilliland, was arrested at the Cool Springs Mall in Franklin, Tennessee for videotaping underneath women's skirts. Officers obtained a search warrant and while conducting the search, discovered marijuana. The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for one count of possession of marijuana weighing less than a half of an ounce. Appellant filed a motion to suppress based on lack of probable cause for the search warrant. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant entered a negotiated plea to the marijuana charge with a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. As part of his plea agreement, Appellant reserved a certified question arguing that there was not probable cause to support the search warrant because the facts as alleged, of Appellant photographing underneath women's skirts in a public place, did not constitute a crime. On appeal, the State concedes that the facts as presented do not actually constitute crime under our State's current statutory scheme. Therefore, we must reverse trial court's judgment, order that the evidence found as a result of the execution of the search warrant be suppressed, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Donald Clark, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Patty Sue Lawrence, was convicted of two counts of prostitution, a Class B misdemeanor, and one count of submitting a false police report, a Class D felony. The trial court ordered an effective sentence of three years in custody. She appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. We affirm.

The Dickson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Julie Petty, for one count of sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of statutory rape by an authority figure. These charges came about as a result of Appellant's sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old girl who was a student at the school where Appellant was a substitute teacher and softball coach. Appellant entered an open plea to one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four years with one year to be served in confinement and the remaining three years to be served on probation. Appellant appeals from the trial court's imposition of this sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court should have imposed a three-year sentence with the entire sentence to be served on probation. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that there is no basis for reversal of the trial court's judgment. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Bruce Huffines, appeals pro se the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for forgery, a Class E felony. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. The State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In 1981 a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael Eugene Sample, and his co-defendant, Larry McKay, of two counts of felony murder and imposed upon both men a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the Petitioner's convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. McKay and Sample, 680 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034 (1985). The Petitioner filed multiple post-conviction petitions, one of which was filed in 1995 and is the subject of this appeal. In that petition, the Petitioner contended that: (1) the State violated his right to due process and a fair trial by suppressing exculpatory evidence against him; (2) the State knowingly presented false testimony; and (3) his sentence of death violates Apprendi because the jury imposed the sentence based upon aggravating circumstances that were not contained in the indictment, presented to the grand jury, or proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and, after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Ernest Hurd, appeals as of right from the Anderson County Criminal Court's denial of his motion to set aside the judgment declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO). See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 55-10-601, et seq. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the default judgment declaring him to be a MVHO is void because it was not properly certified under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58. Therefore, he argues that he cannot be convicted of violating the MVHO statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 55-10-616. Following our review, we hold that the default judgment met the requirements of Rule 58 and that, even if the judgment had not met these requirements, a delay of over sixteen years in challenging the judgment precludes any relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1981 a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Larry McKay, and his co-defendant, Michael Sample, of two counts of felony murder and imposed upon both men a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the Petitioner's convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. McKay, 680 S.W.2d 447 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034 (1985). The Petitioner filed multiple post-conviction petitions, one of which was filed in 1995 and is the subject of this appeal. In that petition, the Petitioner contended that the prosecution violated his right to due process and a fair trial by suppressing exculpatory evidence against him. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and, after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Israel Dean Bolinger, was indicted by the Greene County Grand Jury on one count of aggravated robbery. He was convicted of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to five years in prison. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal, failing to apply the physical facts rule, denying certain redactions in a statement, and in determining his sentence. We affirm.

The petitioner, Frederick Carey, pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to three counts of the sale of cocaine, Class B felonies, two counts of assault, Class A misdemeanors, and one count of resisting official detention, a Class B misdemeanor. The petitioner agreed to a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each Class B felony, to be served concurrently, and to time served for the misdemeanor convictions. On appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of relief, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel presented an unenforceable plea agreement upon which he relied in choosing to plead guilty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In January 2007, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner, Timothy Webber, for one count of second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault in connection with the death of a homeless woman and the beating of a man. On October 22, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to seventeen years to be served at 100%. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not explain to Petitioner that he was pleading guilty to a "knowing killing." In addition, Petitioner alleged that because he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel, his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the issues. In a written order, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed to this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that trial counsel and the trial court explained to Petitioner that he was pleading guilty to a knowing killing and that Petitioner understood that fact. Therefore, he was not afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and his plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

On March 13, 2007, Appellant, Catherin Vaughn, pled guilty in Rutherford County Circuit Court to child abuse of a child under the age of six. The trial court ordered her to serve three years on probation. On December 18, 2008, Appellant made several threatening comments about a juvenile court judge in front of the worker who was teaching Appellant parenting skills and anger management. These threats were reported to the police. As a result, on January 1, 2009, Appellant was arrested for retaliation for past actions against a judge. A probation violation warrant was filed against Appellant. The trial court held a probation violation hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated her probation. The trial court revoked her probation and sentenced her to serve twenty-one days in incarceration and serve two more years on probation. Appellant appeals from the revocation of her probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's probation. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, James David Allen, III, pled guilty to vandalism, a Class E felony, and received a sentence of two years of probation under the judicial diversion program. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 40-35-313(a)(1)(A). Following the filing of a violation of probation warrant and an amended violation of probation warrant, the Defendant was sentenced to serve seven consecutive weekends in the Blount County Jail. Following the service of the seven weekends in jail, the Defendant was directed to return to supervised probation for the balance of his sentence. On April 7, 2009, a second violation of probation warrant was filed. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's sentence of probation and ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of the two-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip G. Harris, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, in the Circuit Court for Coffee County. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a violent offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The judgment order did not impose lifetime community supervision following the expiration of Harris' sentence as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524. Consequently, the State filed a motion to amend the judgment order. The trial court entered a corrected judgment order that imposed lifetime community supervision. On appeal, Harris challenges the validity of his guilty plea and the constitutionality of the lifetime supervision statute. The State contends this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure does not provide for an appeal as of right. Upon review, we agree with the State and dismiss Harris' appeal.