APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se Petitioner, Robert M. Winters, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's order summarily dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus attacking his convictions for felony murder and aggravated robbery. He alleges that his indictment is void for failing to charge an offense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, James F. Wiggins, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. He received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days and was ordered to serve forty-eight hours in jail and the rest on probation. The Defendant's plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop which led to his arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dwight Shankle, was convicted by a McMinn County jury of manufacture of methamphetamine under 0.5 grams, a Class C felony. He was sentenced as a multiple offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and assessed a $25,000 fine. On appeal, he claims the insufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On May 11, 2009, the Defendant, Ricky Lee Cook, pleaded guilty to Class D felony evading arrest and driving under the influence ("DUI"), third offense. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received a sentence of eleven-months and twenty-nine days at 75% to serve for the DUI conviction and a sentence of three years at 30% to be probated for the felony evading arrest conviction. These sentences were consecutive terms. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Sumner County Criminal Court denied the motion. The Defendant now appeals, contending that this denial was error. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Warren County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Andy McAmis, for one count of aggravated assault in connection with a fight. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eight years as a Range II, standard offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and to rebut his assertion of the affirmative defense of self-defense; the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial; and the trial court erred in admitting inflammatory photographs. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient and that the trial court did not err in denying the mistrial or allowing the photographs into evidence. However, there is a mistake on the judgment form identifying Appellant as a Range I offender instead of a Range II offender. Therefore we affirm Appellant's conviction but remand for correction of the judgment.

The Defendant, James G. Coons, pled guilty to second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court did not adequately consider his mental health as a mitigating factor in his punishment. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. As such, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated rape. He was sentenced to death for each murder conviction. He received consecutive twenty-five year sentences for the especially aggravated robbery and aggravated rape. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d 42 (Tenn. 2004). The Appellant subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court. He now appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues numerous violations of his constitutional rights during his trial proceedings, including denial of the effective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Adam D. Sluder, pled guilty to theft over $500, two counts of violating the sexual offender registration law, six counts of statutory rape, and felony failure to appear, all Class E felonies. The Defendant received a two-year sentence for each offense as a Range I, standard offender with the failure to appear sentence to be served consecutively, for an effective four-year sentence. The trial court denied the Defendant's request to serve his sentence on probation or in community corrections. The Defendant appeals the trial court's decision, contending that confinement is an improper punishment given the nature of the offenses, his criminal history, and his rehabilitation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Harold James Greenleaf, Jr., appeals from the order of the trial court denying his petition requesting forensic DNA analysis. Upon his plea of guilty in 2000, the Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to forty years in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner seeks DNA testing of evidence related to the investigation and prosecution. After our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Rutherford County Circuit Court.

The appellant, Willie James Krisle, was convicted in the Sumner County Criminal Court of two counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of a substance containing cocaine, see Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-417(c)(2)(A), and he received a total effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, specifically contending that there was insufficient evidence corroborating the testimony of his accomplice, co-defendant Robert Hargrove. Upon review, we affirm the appellant's convictions.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Joe Maine, was convicted of the 1997 first degree murder of Amy Lynn King and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The Defendant waived a jury determination of his sentence, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder conviction and a concurrent twenty-five year sentence for the conspiracy conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends, relative to his first degree murder conviction, that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to suppress his statement; (2) the trial court erred in declining to declare a mistrial when inadmissible photographs were published to the jury; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to use the actual skull of the victim as an exhibit for demonstrative purposes; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdicts; (5) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant; and (6) the trial court erred in not granting a new trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 1985, a jury found the petitioner, David W. Dunn, guilty of first degree murder. He received a life sentence. In his petition for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner contended that the judgment against him was void because the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender, and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose a life sentence with a thirty percent release eligibility. The habeas corpus court denied relief and remanded the case to the Criminal Court of Davidson County for entry of a corrected judgment. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we conclude that the petitioner failed to timely file his notice of appeal and that his claims do not warrant consideration in the "interest of justice." Therefore, we dismiss his appeal.

The defendant, Cassandra Hendricks Franklin, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In a timely appeal to this court, she argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction and that the trial court erred by denying defense counsel's motion to withdraw from representation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Lori Michelle Waller, appeals following the revocation of her probation. The Appellant admitted her violation of probation. In her brief, the Appellant alleges that her term of split confinement has been served. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the decision of the lower court. After review of the pleadings and record before this Court, we conclude that the State's motion is well-taken. Accordingly, the action of the lower court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A jury found the defendant, Perry Avram March, guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder and two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder. The trial court merged the solicitation counts into the conspiracy count and entered a judgment for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The court sentenced the defendant to twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) whether a fatal variance existed between the evidence presented at trial and the allegations in count one of the indictment; (2) whether solicitation to commit first degree murder is protected speech under the First Amendment; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's discussions about express kidnappings in Mexico; (5) whether the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury concerning the mens rea for the discrete elements of conspiracy to commit a homicide; (6) whether the trial court's instruction of criminal responsibility permitted the jury to impute the conduct of another to the defendant; (7) whether the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's request to instruct the jury that they could not convict the defendant of more than one offense; (8) whether the defendant's sentence is excessive; and (9) whether the Sixth Amendment requires that the facts necessary to impose consecutive sentences be found by the jury or admitted by the defendant, and (10) whether the cumulative effect of the errors during the defendant's trial violated his due process guarantees. After a thorough review of the record, the parties' briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Chase Courtland Powell, of one count of theft and one count of robbery. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and that the convicting evidence was legally insufficient to support his robbery conviction. We hold that the evidence supports his robbery conviction, but we note that the judgments of conviction reflect sentences for both theft and robbery in contravention of the protections against double jeopardy. Accordingly, the defendant's conviction judgment for theft is vacated, and the jury's guilty verdict for the theft is merged into the judgment of conviction of robbery. The defendant's robbery sentence is affirmed, and we remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, John W. Couch, was indicted by the Franklin County Grand Jury for one count of cruelty to animals. After a guilty plea, Appellant was sentenced by the trial court to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor. The trial court ordered Appellant to spend forty-five days in incarceration and the balance of the sentence on supervised probation "until all requirements [are] met." The trial court also required Appellant to pay a $1,000 fine and perform 50 hours of community service as part of his sentence. The trial court denied a motion for new trial and/or reduction of sentence. Appellant appeals, arguing that he was improperly sentenced. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect Appellant's eligibility for work release.

The defendant, James Paul Kinard, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years for each Class A felony conviction and twelve years for the Class B felony conviction. The sentences for the Class A felonies were ordered to be served consecutively, and the sentence for the Class B felony was to be served concurrently for an effective seventy-five-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the victim's prior allegations of abuse were inadmissible; and the defendant was sentenced improperly. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The petitioner, Jason Martindill, pled guilty to first degree murder on August 28, 2007, and received a life sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not enter his guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of carjacking, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, six months, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court improperly weighed the enhancement and mitigating factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Andor Williams, of one count of possession with intent to sell marijuana and one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant, as a Range II multiple offender, to serve a four-year sentence in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred when sentencing him. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

The Defendant, Shawn Macklin, is charged with sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. He sought pretrial diversion, and the prosecutor denied his request. Upon consideration of the Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court found that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We granted this interlocutory appeal to consider whether the trial court properly denied the writ of certiorari by finding that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor acted within his discretion. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case with instructions that the prosecutor shall reconsider the Defendant's application for pretrial diversion in light of only the relevant factors.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Titus A. Miller, of simple possession of marijuana and evading arrest, both Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction, to be served consecutively to each other and to a sixty-month federal sentence. The court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences in the county jail, with a release eligibility percentage of seventy-five percent. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the Madison County Circuit Court.

The majority opinion correctly sets out the posture of this case, and I will not restate it. However, I write to dissent from the majority’s opinion because I feel that the facts of this case clearly establish that an illegal judgment of conviction was entered against the defendant and, as such, should not now stand to allow him to be convicted of the very crime that the Tennessee trial court failed to warn him of. In this case, the blatant fundamental unfairness is obvious and, in my opinion, clearly rises to the level of a due process violation.

The defendant, Raymond Stanley Hilliard, appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of facilitation of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of the facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of the possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a legend drug, three counts of the possession of a schedule IV drug, possession of a schedule II drug, and maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used and sold. He argues that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the entirety of his agreed seven-year effective sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.