APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Jason Martindill, pled guilty to first degree murder on August 28, 2007, and received a life sentence. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not enter his guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of carjacking, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, six months, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court improperly weighed the enhancement and mitigating factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Shawn Macklin, is charged with sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. He sought pretrial diversion, and the prosecutor denied his request. Upon consideration of the Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari, the trial court found that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We granted this interlocutory appeal to consider whether the trial court properly denied the writ of certiorari by finding that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor acted within his discretion. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case with instructions that the prosecutor shall reconsider the Defendant's application for pretrial diversion in light of only the relevant factors.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Andor Williams, of one count of possession with intent to sell marijuana and one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant, as a Range II multiple offender, to serve a four-year sentence in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred when sentencing him. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

The majority opinion correctly sets out the posture of this case, and I will not restate it. However, I write to dissent from the majority’s opinion because I feel that the facts of this case clearly establish that an illegal judgment of conviction was entered against the defendant and, as such, should not now stand to allow him to be convicted of the very crime that the Tennessee trial court failed to warn him of. In this case, the blatant fundamental unfairness is obvious and, in my opinion, clearly rises to the level of a due process violation.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Titus A. Miller, of simple possession of marijuana and evading arrest, both Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction, to be served consecutively to each other and to a sixty-month federal sentence. The court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences in the county jail, with a release eligibility percentage of seventy-five percent. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the Madison County Circuit Court.

The defendant, Raymond Stanley Hilliard, appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of facilitation of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of the facilitation of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of the possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of a legend drug, three counts of the possession of a schedule IV drug, possession of a schedule II drug, and maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used and sold. He argues that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the entirety of his agreed seven-year effective sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, William "Bill" Bosley, Jr., was convicted by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial based on the State's withholding of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, and (3) the trial court erred in failing to address the need for a change of venue. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

After being indicted by the Gibson County Grand Jury, Petitioner, Clarence Edward Spinks, pled guilty on May 7, 2007, to three offenses. He was sentenced to an eight-year sentence, and the trial court ordered that sentence to be served consecutively to a previously-imposed sentence. On January 21, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court conducted a hearing to determine whether the petition was timely. Petitioner admitted that the petition was filed more than a year after the statute of limitations had run. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition based upon the statute of limitations. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

Appellant, Donna Sue Mrozowski, pled nolo contendere to a Class B vehicular homicide charge stemming from an incident in which she drove her car off a highway, killing a pedestrian. Appellant and the State agreed to an eight year sentence but left the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the court denied Appellant's request for alternative sentencing. Appellant now appeals, and we affirm.

The Defendant, James H. Saint, Jr., was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-504(b). The trial court, applying the 2005 Amendments to our Sentencing Act, originally sentenced the Defendant to serve sixty-six years in the Department of Correction. On his first appeal, however, we reversed his sentences and remanded his case for resentencing under the 1989 Act. See State v. Saint, 284 S.W.3d 340, 348 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Following a resentencing hearing, held on May 14, 2009, the trial court again sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years for each of his six convictions, those sentences to be served consecutively to one another, for a total effective sentence of sixty-six years in the Department of Correction. On this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentences and in ordering him to serve them consecutively. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Melvin S. Nettles, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. In 2007, he pled guilty to sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he received a twelve year sentence to be served on community corrections. He was also assessed a fine of $2,000. The trial court subsequently found that the petitioner violated his community corrections' sentence and ordered confinement. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming: (1) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Barbara Ann Riggs, was found guilty by a Knox County jury of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. __ 39-14-103; -105(4). The trial court imposed a Range I, six-year sentence to be served on probation consecutively to a one-year sentence in another case and set the amount of restitution at $28,600.95. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction, that the trial court erred in enhancing her sentence based upon enhancement factors that were not found by a jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the court erred in awarding restitution for attorney's fees and accountant's fees the victim incurred as a consequence of the crime. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael V. Morris, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range III, career offender to thirty years at sixty percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief in the Hickman County Circuit Court, which was summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his judgment is void because it violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); because, alternatively, the trial court improperly sentenced him under the 2005 amended sentencing act without a waiver, which resulted in a violation of ex post facto prohibitions; and because the trial court erred in classifying him as a career offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant-Appellant, Lawrence Hailey, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of robbery, a Class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to serve nine years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, Hailey argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Nagele, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea to attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, following correction of the judgment to reflect that the Defendant was subject to community supervision for life. We hold (1) that the trial court did not err in denying the motion and (2) that the Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief in his challenge to the constitutionality of the community supervision for life statute. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kevin McDougle, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, in case no. 06-04209. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years for each aggravated robbery conviction and six years for his aggravated assault conviction. Defendant was convicted in case no. 07-01739 of the offense of unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two years for this conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve all of his sentences consecutively for an effective sentence of thirty-two years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever; (2) the trial court erred in providing a jury instruction on flight; (3) the imposition of consecutive sentencing violates his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury; and (4) the trial court erred in finding that Defendant was a dangerous offender for consecutive sentencing purposes. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Roderick Sammual Chadwick, guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. The trial court imposed concurrent terms of twelve years and fifteen years, respectively, for these convictions. Under the same indictment, the Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years for this conviction, to be served consecutively to the effective fifteen-year sentence, for a total effective sentence of twentyone years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that consecutive sentencing was improper. Because the record on appeal does not include the necessary transcripts of what transpired in the trial court, we conclude that the Defendant has waived the issues argued on appeal. We must presume that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions and that the sentencing ruling of the trial court was correct; therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Bernard Henry, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Marquise Harris, has appealed the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) was subject to an illegal search, seizure, and arrest; and (3) he received an unconstitutional enhancement of his sentences. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Demance Marshall Beasley, was charged with: one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39- 13-403(b), -12-107(a); one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-202(c), -12-107(a); and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, see Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102(e)(1). Following a jury trial, he was convicted as charged. In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court erred by foreclosing crossexamination of the victims regarding their drug usage; and (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding identification of the Defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Marshall County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, Ronald Lee Stewart, guilty of aggravated burglary, theft, and vandalism. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range III persistent offender to a total effective sentence of thirteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that his convictions "violate[] the Sixth Amendment because of juror fatigue" and that the trial court erroneously found him to be a persistent offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Maurice Darnell Tyler, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and received a total effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, William Ladonte Davis, pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine with the intent to sell and conspiracy to sell cocaine, receiving sentences of eleven years and five years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing, specifically contending that he should have been sentenced to probation or community corrections. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.