APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant-Appellant, Darrell Anderson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life. In this appeal, he presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in giving a description of photographs that were not in evidence in response to a jury question; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to make an offer of proof regarding the truthfulness of an officer's testimony; (4) whether the trial court erred in making comments in the presence of the jury which were unfairly prejudicial; (5) whether the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence; (6) whether he was unfairly prejudiced by the conduct of the State; (7) whether the trial court erred in qualifying an expert and admitting his conclusions; and (8) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the State's duty to preserve evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Vincent Hunt, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus forty years to be served in the custody of the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors in arriving at the forty-year sentence for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and in ordering the sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence of life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Timothy Scott Rauhuff, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to manufacturing no less than 20 and no more than 99 marijuana plants. He received a four-year suspended sentence. Subsequently, the State brought a revocation action, alleging that the appellant violated the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered him to serve one year in confinement and the remainder of the sentence on intensive probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's imposition of a period of continuous confinement. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's ruling pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant to a period of continuous confinement. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Washington County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, David A. Phillips, of reckless homicide, vehicular homicide, reckless aggravated assault, felony reckless endangerment, and misdemeanor drag racing. The trial court merged the reckless homicide conviction into the vehicular homicide conviction and sentenced the appellant to six years. The trial court sentenced the appellant to two years for the reckless aggravated assault conviction and one year for the felony reckless endangerment conviction with all the sentences to be served concurrently for a total effective sentence of six years. The trial court dismissed the misdemeanor drag racing conviction because it was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant; (3) the trial court erred by allowing two State witnesses to give improper testimony; (4) his sentence is excessive and the trial court should have ordered alternative sentencing; and (5) the trial court erred by denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment as to the appellant's felony reckless endangerment conviction.

The Petitioner, Jocques Lyons, was charged with one count of first degree premeditated murder, one count of first degree felony murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. On June 27, 2007, he pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery, accepting under the terms of his plea agreement a twenty-five year sentence for each charge, to be served concurrently as a violent offender at 100%. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 24, 2008. A postconviction hearing was held on March 16, 2009, following which the post-conviction court denied the petitioner relief. He now appeals that denial, contending that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because: (1) his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in investigating the petitioner's case. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Flint Green, was convicted by a jury in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for a new trial based upon two jurors observing him "in custody" during trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Myrtle B. Lambert, appeals from her guilty-pleaded convictions of several counts of identity theft, forgery, and theft. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that it was without jurisdiction to consider a pro se letter filed with the court on March 4, 2008, which, she claims, should have been treated as a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Although we find the defendant's argument misplaced, we conclude that the court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant's March 4, 2008 letter as a notice that the defendant would proceed pro se until having counsel appointed and her March 25, 2008 letter as a filing challenging jurisdiction. Because the defendant, though technically represented by retained counsel, had expressed that her relationship with counsel had ended, we hold that the trial court should have considered the letter as a pro se motion for an arrest of judgment. Because the record before this court is insufficient to determine whether Sullivan County possessed territorial jurisdiction to convict the defendant, we remand to the trial court for further fact finding.

The Defendant, Andrew Hunter Heffel, was charged with one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Before trial, he moved to suppress certain incriminating statements he made. The trial court granted his motion to suppress. The State was granted an interlocutory appeal from the order of the trial court suppressing the Defendant's statements. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The pro se Petitioner, William Hunter Williams, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. The State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, John Lee Shields, pled guilty to one count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, with sentencing left to the determination of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years suspended to probation after the service of ten months incarceration in the county jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to split confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified by this opinion.

The Defendant, Sidney Terrell Cason, was charged with one count of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-13-403(b), -402(b), -304(b)(1). On August 11, 2008, he pleaded guilty to one count of especially aggravated robbery and one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-210(c). He was sentenced on that day as a violent offender to concurrent sentences of forty years as a Range II, multiple offender for second degree murder and fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender for especially aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of forty years in the Department of Correction. On September 9, 2008, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Criminal Court of Davidson County denied the motion. The Defendant now appeals, contending that this denial was error. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony Cook, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years for his attempted murder conviction and three years for each aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the photographic lineup used by a State’s witness to identify Defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that Defendant’s convictions of the two counts of aggravated assault in addition to the conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder violates double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge Defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault into his conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder. Weaffirm the trial court’s judgment as to Defendant’s conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder and his sentence of twenty years. We remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment  consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Henry Zillon Felts, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. See State v. Henry Zillon Felts, No. M2005-01215-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2563374 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug. 25, 2006). He subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief. The Criminal Court of Sumner County found that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because: (1) trial counsel failed to fulfill his promise to the jury that the Petitioner would testify; and (2) trial counsel failed to argue attempted voluntary manslaughter as a defense. The post-conviction court thus set aside the Petitioner's convictions and granted him a new trial. In this appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred in granting the Petitioner relief. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Quortez Deshawn Duncan, was convicted by a Maury County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years in the Department of Correction, to be suspended after service of one year. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient and that the Defendant's sentence is consistent with our 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act and its amendments, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony Cook, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years for his attempted murder conviction and three years for each aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the photographic lineup used by a State's witness to identify Defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that Defendant's convictions of the two counts of aggravated assault in addition to the conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder violates double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge Defendant's convictions of aggravated assault into his conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder. We affirm the trial court's judgment as to Defendant's conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder and his sentence of twenty years. We remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, James Stout, of one count of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner, a Range II offender, to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, his second such petition, alleging that his conviction is void because: (1) his indictment was void because the grand jury foreperson issuing the indictment was appointed by a Shelby County trial judge; (2) his sentence is unconstitutional because, on the judgment of conviction, the trial judge checked both boxes indicating that his sentence should run at 35% and 100%. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals that judgment. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Keith Dotson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his conviction of aggravated burglary on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief based upon its finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and prepare adequately for the fingerprint evidence presented at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Teddy Ray Mitchell, appeals from his jury conviction in the Criminal Court of Hamblen County for disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, for which he received a sentence of thirty days in jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) that his conviction violates his First Amendment right to free speech, and (3) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an altercation with another police officer that was contemporaneous to the offense. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction of disorderly conduct. Accordingly, the Defendant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

The Defendant, Roy Rowe, Jr., pled guilty to seventeen counts of sale of a controlled substance, and, after merging several of the counts, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to an effective sentence of six years. The trial court imposed a split sentence, ordering that the Defendant serve 365 days in the county jail, with the remainder of his sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence to the maximum within the range. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The appellant, Johnny L. Sapp, was found guilty of one count of possession of a motor vehicle from which the serial number has been removed in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-5-111 and two counts of altering the serial number on a motor vehicle in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-5-112. He received a total effective sentence of two years. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that his convictions for possession of a motor vehicle from which the serial number had been removed and altering the serial number on a motor vehicle violate double jeopardy; and that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion or probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Dock Walker, appeals as of right from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court denied the petition for failure to state a cognizable claim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie Lewis, of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it imposed an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Arealie Boyd, pled guilty to forgery over $1,000, a Class D felony, on March 30, 2009. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced her to a two-year sentence in the Shelby County Correctional Center, suspended all but thirty days of the sentence, and placed her on probation for six years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and manner of her sentence. Specifically, she contends that the trial court should have sentenced her as an especially mitigated offender to either full probation or judicial diversion. Additionally, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.