APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Stanley Harvill, appeals the circuit c 1 ourt’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the court’s order.

Appellants, Monterrio Watson and D’Angelo Barnes, were both convicted by a Shelby County Jury of two counts of aggravated robbery. Appellants were both juveniles at the time of the offenses but were transferred to criminal court for trial as adults. Appellant Barnes was sentenced by the trial court to serve ten years for each conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Appellant Watson was ordered to serve eight years and six months for each conviction, to be served concurrently. Both Appellants filed timely motions for new trial. The trial court denied both motions and these appeals ensued. The appeals were consolidated by this Court. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the trial court properly denied Appellant Watson’s request for an acceptance hearing in criminal court after the transfer from juvenile court. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant Watson waived the issue related to the transfer from juvenile court for failing to provide an adequate record on appeal. Moreover, Appellant Watson failed to file a motion for an acceptance hearing within ten days of the transfer order as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-159(d). Further, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for aggravated robbery. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
 

The defendant, Preston Rucker, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping and sentenced, respectively, to concurrent sentences of twenty-four years and twenty years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred in concluding that a police report was not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Oscar Joe Garcia, was convicted of four counts of facilitation of attempted second degree murder, four counts of facilitation of aggravated assault, one count of felony reckless endangerment, and one count of possession of a weapon with intent to employ during the commission of an offense. The trial court merged the facilitation of aggravated assault convictions into the facilitation of attempted second degree murder convictions and sentenced the defendant, as a Range I standard offender, to six years for each of the facilitation convictions, two years for the felony reckless endangerment conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the weapon conviction. The court ordered the six-year sentences to be served consecutively and the remaining sentences to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences and in denying his motion to correct and/or reduce his sentence. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rain Thomas Chesher, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the circuit court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment

A jury convicted the defendant, Jaroz Dantae Thomas, of underage driving while impaired, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to 11 months, 29 days of probation, supervised by Community Corrections; a $250 fine; suspension of his driver’s license for one year; and twenty-four hours of community service. On appeal, the defendant challenges his sentence. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but modify the defendant’s sentence to strike the 11 months, 29 days of probation. The case is remanded for entry of a corrected judgment consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Timothy Dewayne Williams, was convicted by a Tipton County Criminal Court jury of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class B felony; evading arrest in a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor; and driving while his license was suspended, a Class B misdemeanor. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified.

The petitioner, Kenneth L. Anderson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of elbow counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that a trial court is free to set any sentence
within the appropriate sentencing range “regardless of the presence or absence of mitigating and enhancement factors.” I write separately, however, to emphasize that the 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act, when read in conjunction with those provisions not affected by the amendments and the Sentencing Commission Comments, are in and of themselves open to two interpretations: (1) that, although the enhancement and mitigating factors were rendered advisory, a trial court still has no discretion to enhance a defendant’s
sentence without finding applicable one of the enhancement factors enumerated in Code section 40-35-114 and (2) that a trial court is free to choose any sentence within the appropriate range so long as the imposition of the sentence complies with the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act. The latter was first alluded to by our supreme court in State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 355 (2008). For the reasons set forth below, it is my view that latter interpretation is constitutionally required.

The Defendant, Terry Wayne Hawkins, was convicted by a Monroe County jury of aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to eleven years as a Range I, violent offender. In this appeal as of right, he contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Although concurring in the majority opinion, I express concern about whether
the certified question is dispositive of the case. Specifically, I question whether the stop of the defendant’s vehicle yielded any evidence that was necessary to the State’s proving the defendant guilty of DUI.

The Petitioner, Cory Myers, appeals pro se from the Circuit Court 1 for Gibson County’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The judgment form in this case shows that Myers originally pled guilty to first degree murder for which he received a life sentence. However, in this appeal, Myers argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because another form, entitled “Plea of Guilty and Waivers of Jury Trial and Appeal” (hereinafter “plea agreement form”), shows that he pled guilty to the offense of “felony homicide.” Based on the plea agreement form, Myers claims his conviction is void because “felony homicide” does not exist under Tennessee law. Upon review, we affirm the judgment dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Appellant Donald Lockhart was indicted by a Loudon County Grand Jury for driving under the influence in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401. The trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence derived from the stop of Appellant’s vehicle. Thereafter, Appellant pled guilty to the charge, but under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b) preserved the following issue for appeal: “Whether the trial judge erred by failing to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to a traffic stop of the [Appellant] that was conducted by the Lenoir City Police Department and which the [Appellant] alleged was conducted in the absence of a valid warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion, all in violation of [Appellant’s] constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures?” On appeal, he argues that the citizen informant’s tip, combined with an officer’s determination that Appellant was impaired during a welfare check minutes before the stop, was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Upon review, we affirm.

The defendant, Antonio Hill, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and attempted robbery, a Class D felony, as lesser included offenses of the indicted offenses of aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences of five years and three and one-half years for the respective convictions. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of whether his sentence is excessive. Specifically, he contends that the trial court erred in considering the enhancement factor that the defendant possessed or employed a firearm during the commission of the offenses based upon the jury’s rejection of the greater offenses, which included possession of a firearm as elements of the offense. Following review of the record and applicable sentencing law, we affirm the sentences as imposed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Amos Oyeleye, of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to five years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it set the length of his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Lance Murray, of facilitation of robbery. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Terry Cary, was convicted by a Madison County jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony, and sentenced as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Defendant, Tywan Garcia Armstrong, was convicted by a jury in Marshall County of (Count 1) sale of a Schedule II Controlled Substance, a Class B Felony; (Count 2) delivery of a Scheduled II Controlled Substance, a Class B felony; (Count 3) possession with the intent to sell a Schedule II Controlled Substance, a Class B felony; (Count 4) possession with the intent to deliver a Schedule II Controlled Substance, a Class B felony; and (Count 5) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of an offense, a Class E felony. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his car; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for Counts 1, 2, and 5; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to apply the mitigating factors submitted by the Defendant at the sentencing hearing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Curtis Daniel Hart, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He was initially convicted of second degree murder, simple possession of marijuana, and simple possession of Alprazolam, a Schedule IV controlled substance, and sentenced to thirty-five years in confinement as a Range II offender. On appeal, the petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective in a variety of areas but failed to prove any of the allegations. Therefore, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Michael Joseph Grant, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The petitioner claims the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing and allowed evidence of witness statements that would have impacted the outcome of the proceedings. We conclude the writ of error coram nobis upon this record is not available to the petitioner because he pled guilty. The summary dismissal is affirmed.

A Madison County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Carlous Leon Clark, for attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and assault. The Defendant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that a trial would not comply with the speedy trial provisions of the United States and Tennessee constitutions. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and a Madison County jury convicted the Defendant of attempted first degree murder, assault, two counts of aggravated assault, and aggravated criminal trespass. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Joby Lee Teal, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his “Motion for Correction of Void Judgment.” The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that the petitioner’s motion should be treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and that he failed to state a cognizable claim because he is not “imprisoned or restrained of liberty.” We agree, grant the State’s motion, and affirm the judgment from the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Marshall County jury convicted the defendant, Ricky Eugene Scoville, of two
counts of harassment. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Herman Sowell, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his motion requesting the trial court to modify his sentence of confinement to a suspended sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding no change in circumstances which would justify the requested modification. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Clarence Carnell Gaston, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to reopen his post-conviction petition. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner did not comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the denial of his motion, this court has no jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.