APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief. The Appellant filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Enrique Alejandro Perez, appeals as of right from his jury conviction in the Hamblen County Criminal Court for aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, for which he received a sentence of ten years as a violent offender. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the jury panel based upon his allegation of an under-representation of Latino persons, (3) the aggravated kidnapping statute, as applied in this case, is unconstitutional because he was not separately indicted for the underlying offense of rape, (4) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping, and (5) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Deonte McBee, appeals from his convictions of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of robbery; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to life for the murder conviction, to twenty-five years as a violent offender for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and to twelve years as a Range I offender for each of the aggravated robbery convictions. The aggravated robbery convictions were imposed consecutively to each other and to the murder conviction, and the effective sentence is life plus forty-eight years. In this appeal, the Defendant claims (1) that there was insufficient proof to support the felony murder conviction, (2) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to consider the murder offense and its lesser included offenses in sequential order, and (3) that the trial court erred in giving a criminal responsibility instruction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James Earl McGriggs, was convicted of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery and was sentenced, respectively, to twenty-five years, ten years, three years, and eight years. The trial court ordered that the aggravated rape sentence be served consecutively to the aggravated kidnapping sentence, with all other to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions. Following our review, we affirm  the judgments.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Donald Edward Lynch, of two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and six counts of rape of a child. He challenges his convictions, arguing that the video recording used in his conviction was discovered through an illegal search and seizure. He also challenges the legal sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We discern error in the judgments for Counts eight through 10 of rape of a child and remand for correction of clerical error. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Marktrail Lee, was convicted of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse by neglect. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-three years at 100 percent. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Wadie Holifield, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Tipton County Circuit Court. The petitioner was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the single issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to: 1) investigate his mental health and his claim of impotence as possible defenses; 2) ensure an untainted jury by requesting “the Rule” prior to voir dire; 3) effectively preclude introduction or properly cross-examine a witness following testimony about the petitioner’s prior drug habit; and 4) effectively advise the petitioner. As an initial argument, the State contends that the petitioner has waived review based upon an untimely notice of appeal. We agree that the notice was not timely filed, but, in the interest of justice, we elect to review the petitioner’s issue. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of relief.

The petitioner, Joe Tyree, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner submitted a guilty plea to one count of violation of the sex offender registry. On appeal, he contends that: defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel; his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and the post-conviction court failed to comply with the statute that requires the court to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to each issue. After careful review, we conclude no reversible error exists and affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, George Hampton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate and prepare the case for trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Robert Cummins, appeals the denial of habeas corpus relief by the Circuit Court for Bledsoe County. The Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and received a thirty-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in dismissing the petition. He claims that an illegal sentence is a proper ground to allege in a habeas corpus petition, that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered, that his sentence is illegal because it does not conform to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-112(a)(1) (2006) and 40-35-501(i)(1), (2)(B) (2006), and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel should have known the sentence was illegal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Derrick Futch, was convicted of two counts of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery, Class D felonies, and one count of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by forgery, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced to three years for each conviction of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery and two years for his conviction of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by forgery. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in consolidating the three offenses for trial; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to impeach the defendant’s testimony with evidence of a prior conviction; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (4) whether the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors violated due process and the defendant’s right to a fair jury trial. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Darnell Hubbard, of the first-degree premeditated murder of his wife, and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior acts of violence against the victim. He also challenges the trial court’s admission of evidence relating to an ex parte order of protection that the victim obtained against him and other statements the victim made to her son and police. We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements from the victim in violation of the appellant’s confrontation rights. However, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the appellant’s guilt, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s conviction.

The petitioner, Lamar Ross, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief as it relates to the petitioner’s convictions on two counts of aggravated rape, which were merged into a single judgment of conviction by the trial court and modified on direct appeal. On appeal from the judgment of the post-conviction court, the petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective and that he was thereby prejudiced. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, David Andrew Campbell, pled guilty in eight cases, which were consolidated for this appeal, to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; five counts of theft under $1000, a Class D felony; ten counts of automobile burglary, a Class E felony; and fourteen counts of theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in setting the length and alignment of his sentences. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. As such, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

The defendant, Luther Mowery, was convicted of failure to obey a traffic signal and ordered to pay court costs. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, a claim with which the State agrees. Following our review, we, likewise, agree and, accordingly, reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.

The Petitioner, David Wayne Smart, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petition alleged that the trial court unconstitutionally merged the provision requiring a minimum life sentence for first degree murder and the provision prohibiting instructions on possible penalties to the jury. The Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the order summarily dismissing the petition.

The defendant, Stacey Wayne Creekmore, presents for review a certified question of law following his guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(I). As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant explicitly reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless stop. The defendant argues that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, as required under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, to conduct an investigatory stop of his vehicle. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial of the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Dontae Lamont Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The appellant, Justin K. Boldus, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s judgment affirming the Dickson County General Sessions Court’s finding him in contempt of court and sentencing him to ten days in jail. On appeal, the appellant raises various issues, including that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We agree that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for criminal contempt of court. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is dismissed.

In 1988, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of third degree burglary and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of five years, to be served on intensive probation. In 1989, he was transferred to regular probation. In 1990, probation violation warrants were filed, alleging that he had violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer and that he had absconded. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his five-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the order of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court dismiss the above-captioned appeal. This Court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal as a motion to reopen a petition for post-conviction relief. Additionally, viewing the action as an original petition for post-conviction relief, the petition is time-barred. Accordingly, the action of the lower court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Petitioner, Jimmy Townsend, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Eric Wayne Dunn, pleaded guilty to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and leaving the scene of a property damage accident, a Class C misdemeanor. For the offense of DUI, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was suspended to supervised probation after he served twenty-four hours in the Dickson County Jail. For the offense of leaving the scene of an accident, he was sentenced to thirty days, which was suspended to supervised probation after he served twenty-four hours in the Dickson County Jail, and he was required to pay restitution to the victim. His sentence for the offense of leaving the scene of an accident was to be served concurrently with his DUI sentence. The Defendant-Appellant entered a conditional plea agreement and attempted to reserve certified questions of law under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. In an addendum to the judgment of the conviction for DUI, he set out two certified questions of law: whether he was unlawfully seized at his residence and returned to the accident scene and whether his alleged seizure would preclude admission of the breath test. Because this addendum was not entered by the clerk until after the notice of appeal was filed in this matter, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal and, therefore, it is dismissed. We remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 2 to reflect the correct conviction offense of DUI (.08% or more) and a corrected judgment in Count 1 to reflect the dismissal of the offense of    DUI.

The Petitioner, Oliver J. Higgins, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition for post-conviction relief fails as it is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant, Jeffrey D. Allen, was convicted by a Crockett County jury of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of attempted first degree murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, he argues that the sequestered jury was improperly separated and that the trial court erred by not suppressing his statement to police, ruling a witness unavailable, admitting prior bad act evidence, and allowing improper opinion evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment form to reflect that the defendant received a life sentence for his first degree murder conviction.