APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendants, Brenda Faye Brewington and Brian Dewayne Brewington, were convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies, and two counts of child neglect, Class E felonies. For their convictions, the defendants each received an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment to be served at 100 percent. On appeal, the defendants raise the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims, and photographs and a videotape of their home; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain their convictions for aggravated child neglect; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.

After a bench trial, the Lauderdale County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Brittany Ann Kiestler, of two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and ordered her to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that  the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Patrick Smallwood, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, Ben Blevins, pled guilty to eight counts of passing worthless checks, four counts of forgery, and five counts of attempted money laundering. According to the plea agreement, Appellant’s effective sentence was three years, the manner of service to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The trial court denied alternative sentencing based on Appellant’s prior criminal history, inability to pay existing restitution, failure to abide by terms of prior probation, behavior of continually reoffending and in order to deter similar behavior. The trial court ordered the sentence served in incarceration. Appellant appeals, pro se, arguing that he should have been granted some form of alternative sentencing. We determine that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s holding that lifelong community supervision is not a direct punitive consequence of the petitioner’s pleading guilty to aggravated sexual battery. Tennessee expressly makes life supervision a part of the sentence. See T.C.A. § 39- 13-524 (providing for “a sentence of community supervision for life”). Thus, I agree with the conclusions reached in New Jersey and Nevada. See State v. Jangochian, 832 A.2d 360, 362 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003); Palmer v. State, 59 P.3d 1192, 1196-97 (Nev. 2002). The post-conviction court’s factual findings, though, fail to reflect whether the court accredited the petitioner’s testimony that he was unaware of this consequence at the time he signed the documents and that he would not have pled guilty had he been told about such a consequence. Thus, I

In 2005, the petitioner, Marcus Ward, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated assault and one count each of especially aggravated kidnapping, intentionally evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and aggravated sexual battery and received an effective sentence of thirteen and one-half years. No direct appeal was taken. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. This appeal is only as to his conviction for aggravated sexual battery, with the petitioner asserting that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not informing him that registration as a sexual offender was a consequence of his guilty pleas, the trial court  plain error by not informing him of this registration requirement, and the post-conviction court erred in finding that the registration requirement was a “collateral,” rather than direct, consequence of his pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In November 2005 the petitioner, Ronnell Leberry, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In November 2007, following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Keith Collins, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Christopher Lance Shockley, on four counts of rape of a child and nine counts of aggravated sexual battery. The Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years. This Court affirmed the sentence on appeal. The Petitioner then filed a post-conviction petition claiming that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Laquenton Monger, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Michael J. Floyd, appeals as of right the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Wayne County Circuit Court. The petitioner alleges that his conviction and resulting sentence for aggravated robbery is illegal and void due to an involuntary guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Mustapha Boutchiche, was convicted of sexual battery, a Class E felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the victim was untruthful in a prior proceeding, admitting the victim’s 9-1-1 phone call, not requiring the State to make an election of offenses, and ordering that he undergo a psychosexual evaluation prior to sentencing. He also argues that his sentence was excessive because the trial court enhanced his sentence based on enhancement factors not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and denied probation because he refused to undergo the psychosexual evaluation. We affirm the defendant’s conviction and the trial court’s denial of probation but modify his sentence to one year.

The petitioner, Arthur W. Stamey, III, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal, he contends that due process principles require the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations and that newly discovered, exculpatory evidence warrants coram nobis relief. Because the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing the petition for writ of error coram nobis, the judgment of that court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a determination of whether due process principles require the tolling of the coram nobis statute of limitations.

The defendant, Buford C. Throneberry, appeals his conviction of disorderly conduct that followed a bench trial in the Rutherford County Circuit Court. The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Because we conclude that the State failed to prove that the defendant’s words or actions prevented anyone from carrying on lawful activities, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.

The petitioner was found guilty of five counts of rape, all Class B felonies; twelve counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, all Class C felonies; and seven counts of statutory rape, all Class E felonies. He was sentenced to nine years for each Class B felony, three years for each Class C felony, and one year for each Class E felony. His sentences for the Class B felonies were ordered to be served consecutively. His sentences for the Class C felonies were ordered to be served consecutively but concurrently to the Class B felonies. His sentences for the E felonies were ordered to be served consecutively but concurrently to the B felonies, for an effective sentence of forty-five years. In this post-conviction appeal, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective and that the post-conviction court erred in rejecting the challenge to his sentence because it was previously determined on appeal. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Christopher Hatcher, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and reckless endangerment. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The Defendant, Ben Thomas Dowlen, Jr., pled guilty to attempted possession of a schedule I substance, a Class C felony, and agreed to a sentence of ten years as a Range II offender. The trial court imposed the agreed upon sentence, denied alternative sentencing, and ordered the Defendant to serve his ten-year sentence in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant an alternative sentence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude the trial court did not err when it denied alternative sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant urges this court to reverse his conviction for aggravated robbery based upon his argument that the proof is insufficient to support the element that the robbery was either accomplished with a deadly weapon or by the display of something the victim might have reasonably believed to be a deadly weapon. After analyzing the defendant’s actions in isolation before and after disarming the victim, the majority concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support this element of aggravated robbery and modifies the conviction to robbery. For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent from this conclusion.

The Defendant, Mark Anthony Foulk, was convicted by a jury of: one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of vandalism in the amount of $500 or less and one count of driving under the influence, both Class A misdemeanors; one count of speeding and one count of failure to obey a traffic control device, both Class C misdemeanors. He was sentenced to an effective term of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the vandalism, aggravated burglary, or aggravated robbery, and was otherwise insufficient to prove the elements of aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated burglary; (3) he was effectively denied his right to a jury trial; (4) the court improperly instructed the jury that a certain State’s witness, Detective Dale Quillen, was an expert on gunshot wounds and stippling; (5) the court improperly enhanced his sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery; and (6) the court improperly ordered consecutive sentences. We agree with the Defendant that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of aggravated robbery, and accordingly modify this conviction to the lesser included offense of robbery. We also conclude that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant’s sentences and failed to make the required findings to impose consecutive sentences.  We conclude that the Defendant’s other points of error lack merit. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

The petitioner was originally indicted on multiple sex offenses and felony failure to appear. A Morgan County jury found the petitioner, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr., guilty of felony failure to appear but deadlocked as to his eight other sex offense charges. Before a retrial on the sex offenses and before a judgment of conviction was entered on the felony failure to appear conviction, the petitioner pled guilty to multiple counts, and the parties agreed that the judgment of conviction arising from the jury trial would reflect that the petitioner was convicted of misdemeanor failure to appear rather than felony failure to appear. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming that his convictions were void because he had been convicted by a jury of a felony but the trial court agreed to allow that conviction to be reduced to a misdemeanor. Further, he asserted that the reduction of this charge from a felony to a misdemeanor was a material element of the plea agreement, and he sought habeas corpus relief from all of his judgments. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Appellant pled guilty in the Wilson County Criminal Court to one count of vehicular homicide, one count of vehicular assault, and one count of leaving the scene of the accident. In exchange for the guilty pleas, Appellant received sentences of three years, two years, and one year, respectively. The trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service of the sentence. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve eight months of the sentence day-for-day, followed by ten years of probation. Appellant seeks review of the sentence on appeal. We determine that the trial court erroneously deprived Appellant of good conduct credits by ordering him to serve eight months of the sentence day-for-day. Consequently, we reverse that portion of the sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of an order deleting the requirement that the sentence be served day-for-day. The remainder of the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, R. L. Williams, appeals from the denial of his 2007 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2003 rape convictions. He asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because trial counsel failed to effectively challenge the DNA evidence, which he posits was the only convicting evidence because the testimony of the victim was unreliable. Holding that he has failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Mickey Jeffries, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to adequately communicate a plea agreement to him. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Randall A. Myers, appeals the sentence imposed by the Blount County Circuit Court following his open guilty plea to two counts of filing a false report, Class D felonies, and one count of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. After hearing the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of four years, three years, and eleven months and twenty-nine days. The court further ordered the sentences to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the two felony sentences are excessive; (2) the court erred in denying an alternative sentence; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences as imposed.