APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Calvin Landers, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to serve a 20-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant now appeals and claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the sentence is excessive. Because the record supports the judgment of the trial court, we affirm both the conviction and the sentence.

Appellant, Timothy Lee Demery, was convicted by a Carter County Jury of second degree murder. As a result, he was sentenced to twenty-three years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated the appeal herein. On appeal, he argues that the trial court improperly denied the motion for new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence that exonerated Appellant and was withheld from the defense during trial. We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to one count of rape and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Petitioner received an eight year sentence for the rape conviction and three year sentences on each sexual battery conviction. The trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service. At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant complained that his counsel forced him to plead guilty, after which counsel moved to withdraw. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw, and it ordered the Defendant to serve the sexual battery convictions concurrently to each other but consecutively to the rape conviction. The court also denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to allow Counsel to withdraw during the sentencing hearing; (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing for the sexual battery and rape convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Eric Shane Heller, was convicted of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, both Class B felonies. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant lacked standing to contest the search warrant which led to his arrest, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the trial court erred by issuing a jury instruction on the flight of the defendant. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse and vacate the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the defendant’s convictions.

The appellant, William Earl Starks, was found guilty by a jury in the Tipton County Circuit Court of rape of a child, and he received a sentence of twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the State adduced insufficient proof of venue.  Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Trumaine Winters, appeals his convictions and the resulting sentencing decisions of the Shelby County Criminal Court. After a jury trial, Winters was found guilty of first degree murder and aggravated robbery. Winters was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for first degree murder and twelve years for aggravated robbery. On appeal, Winters argues: (1) that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court “erred in failing to suppress the identification and subsequent identification testimony of State’s witnesses”; (3) that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors at sentencing for the conviction of aggravated robbery; and (4) that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After review, we conclude that issues (1), (2) and (4) are without merit. However, with regard to issue (3), we conclude, following plain error review, that Winters’ sentence for aggravated robbery must be reversed in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and the case remanded for resentencing.

The petitioner, Maurice Tyrone Hendrix, seeks habeas corpus relief from 1988 Davidson County convictions for four counts of second degree burglary and one count of grand larceny and his resulting effective sentence of thirty-five years. The petitioner contends that his sentences have expired and that the judgments of conviction are void. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Wiled McMillIan, pleaded guilty in the Dyer County Criminal Court to one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. He received a sentence of ten years, to be served in the Department of Correction (TDOC), although the court noted that the petitioner would be allowed to go to long-term drug rehabilitation after he had served six months in the Dyer County jail. Prior to the petitioner’s serving six months in the Dyer County jail, he was transferred to TDOC to serve the remainder of his sentence. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that his guilty plea was involuntary, and that the post-conviction court erred in denying his separate motion to set aside the guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Lamar Fletcher, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for error coram nobis relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Brian Charles LaDue, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of aggravated assault. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a Range I, standard offender to six years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant seeks review of his sentence on appeal. We determine that Appellant has failed to show that plain error review of his sentence is warranted or that the trial court erred by denying probation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Shamarcus Antwan Hunt, was convicted of the sale of cocaine under .5 grams, a Class C felony, and possession of cocaine over .5 grams with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell, a Class B felony. He was sentenced, respectively, to eight years and twelve years in the Department of Correction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court should have declared a mistrial following allegedly improper remarks by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Eric Jason Tolley, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court should have appointed counsel and held an evidentiary hearing to consider his claims.  Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition on the grounds that the petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for habeas corpus relief.

The court hereby grants the petition for rehearing filed by the State of Tennessee in this matter and withdraws the opinion and vacates the judgment previously filed on March 20, 2008. A new opinion and judgment are being filed contemporaneously with this order.

The defendant, Shundell L. Dickerson, was convicted of facilitation of first degree murder (Class A felony) and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to sixty years in prison. He appeals his conviction and sentence. He argues the trial court erred in: (1) precluding him from entering into evidence an anonymous letter mailed to the police in which other persons were named as responsible for the crime; (2) limiting the questioning of a witness regarding his expectations of favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony; and (3) allowing the prosecutor to make improper remarks during closing argument. Finally, the defendant argues enhancement factors were improperly applied to increase his sentence. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Michael Todd Kirkup, of one count of theft of property over $1000, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of second offense driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of six years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to impeach his credibility with his prior convictions for theft and fraudulent use of a credit card; (2) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Katie Ann Walsh, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to violation of a habitual traffic offender order, reckless endangerment, and felony failure to appear, all Class E felonies. The Sullivan County Criminal Court sentenced her to concurrent one-year sentences as a Range I offender for the habitual traffic offender violation and reckless endangerment and fined her $250.00 on each offense. The court sentenced her to one year as a Range I offender for the failure to appear, with a $250.00 fine, to be served consecutively to the other sentences. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in interpreting and applying applicable law in denying her any form of alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, George Garner, Jr., appeals his Rutherford County Criminal Court conviction of one count of attempted second degree murder. In this appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning used in the majority opinion. I write separately to stress the importance of complying with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-13-202, which requires that the “indictment must state the facts constituting the offense in ordinary and
concise language . . . in a manner so as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and with the degree of certainty which will enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment.” To me, alleging the particular property stolen is not surplusage; it is required.  With the indictment alleging the theft of U.S. Currency, proving the theft of other property would constitute a variance.

The defendant, Perry A. March, appeals his jury-imposed, Davidson County Criminal Court theft conviction and his five-year sentence. In his appeal, the defendant claims that the convicting evidence was insufficient because of a variance between the indictment and the proof, that the trial court erred in denying his objection to the use of pattern jury instructions for theft, and that the court erred in enhancing his sentence. Claiming that the trial court did not enter an order to address the defendant’s timely motion for new trial, the State seeks dismissal of the appeal. We reject the State’s claim for dismissal, and because the proof supported the claim of theft, we affirm the conviction; however, we modify the sentence to three years.

The defendant, Hosie Perry, Jr. was convicted by jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder for which he received consecutive sentences of life imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because there was no proof connecting him to the crimes other than uncorroborated accomplice testimony; (2) the trial court erred in admitting autopsy photographs of the victims; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing him to two consecutive life sentences. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffery E. Long, was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to thirteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that the trial court erred in three areas: admission of a photographic lineup, failure to grant a mistrial, and failure to require a different jury panel when it was possible some members saw the defendant led into a holding cell in the courthouse prior to trial. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The appellant, Joseph Bloodgood, pled guilty to facilitation of aggravated burglary and received a sentence of two years. The trial court denied the appellant alternative sentencing, and the appellant now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The last court to consider the petitioner’s mental fitness was the trial court that dismissed his post-conviction case without prejudice in 1988 because the petitioner was mentally incompetent to proceed. We are presently faced with a Motion to Reopen form that is quite limited when compared to the form for a petition for post-conviction relief. It does assert, however, that the petitioner was found incompetent and that he did not seek an appeal because he was unaware of the process due to his incompetence.

In 1982 the petitioner, Lebron Moore, was convicted of aggravated rape and second degree burglary and sentenced to forty years in the Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed in 1988 on the ground that he was mentally incompetent to proceed. In 2005, the petitioner filed a pleading styled “Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Petition,” which the post-conviction court treated as a new petition for post-conviction relief and dismissed as untimely. The petitioner argues on appeal that the post-conviction court erred in finding the petition untimely. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Johnny B. Cox, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of two counts of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to the maximum sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each count, to be served consecutively, with his release eligibility set at seventy-five percent. The defendant was ordered to pay a fine of $2500 for the first count and a fine of $500 for the second count. In this appeal, the defendant raises the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.