APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Shannon Alan Griffin, was charged with two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault involving use of a deadly weapon, and two counts of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury after twice hitting his landlord with his car. The jury found the defendant guilty of all four counts of aggravated assault but could not reach a verdict on the two counts of attempted first degree murder. The trial court merged the four aggravated assault counts into two convictions and, as to the attempted first degree murder counts, declared a mistrial and ordered a new trial. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10, the defendant appeals from the trial court’s decision, arguing that he may not be retried on the attempted first degree murder counts because there did not exist manifest necessity for a mistrial and a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Following our review, we affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Adell Watkins, was indicted for one count of the knowing sale of cocaine and for one count of knowingly and unlawfully delivering cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. She was convicted on both counts. Her convictions were merged and she received an eight-year sentence.  The defendant argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her convictions.  Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Capital Petitioner Tyrone Chalmers appeals as of right the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1997, the petitioner was convicted of one count of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The jury sentenced him to death after finding that the evidence of an aggravating circumstance, that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), outweighed evidence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge imposed a sentence of twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, to run concurrently with the death sentence but consecutively to sentences previously imposed in another case. See State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Tenn. 2000). On April 19, 2001, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. An amended petition was filed on September 22, 2003. An evidentiary hearing was conducted in August 2005. On January 24, 2006, the trial court entered an order denying post-conviction relief. On appeal to this court, the petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following broad categories: (1) the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the constitutionality of the imposition of a sentence of death. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The petitioner, Gregory Morrow, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell and two counts of possession of marijuana and resulting fifteen-year sentence to the Department of Correction. He claims that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. We hold that his petition was not filed timely and is therefore barred by the one-year statute of limitations, and we vacate the judgment denying post-conviction relief and remand the case for entry of an order of dismissal.

The petitioner, who is serving a twenty-year sentence for aggravated rape, filed the present post-conviction action alleging he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The trial court conducted a hearing and denied his claim, and he appealed. Upon review, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying relief, and we affirm its judgment.

The petitioner, David Lee Cook, appeals the circuit court’s order summarily dismissing his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the circuit court’s order.

The defendant, Krista Regina Lesch, pled guilty to three counts of obtaining a Schedule II controlled substance by fraud (Class D felony) and attempted child neglect (Class E felony). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years on community corrections for one of the Class D felonies and to one year on community corrections for the Class E felony, with the sentences to run concurrently with credit for time served. She was further sentenced to two years on both of the other Class D felony convictions, with those sentences to run consecutively to the other sentence for a total effective sentence of six years, with time served and the balance on community corrections. The defendant violated the terms of her community corrections sentences on several occasions and eventually had her sentences revoked and increased. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in revoking her community corrections release and in increasing her effective sentence from six to nine years. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The petitioner, Jason D. Pillow, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal and that the sentence imposed by the trial court violates the terms of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a July 2006 jury trial, the defendant, Julius Hill, was convicted of one count of possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, one count of possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, and two counts of simple possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the two felony convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years in the Department of Correction on the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days on each misdemeanor conviction, with all sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to convict him of the felony counts and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1997, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Wayford Demonbreun, Jr., of one count of second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-five years in prison. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, his third such petition, alleging that his conviction is void because: (1) the trial court never conducted a hearing on his motion for new trial and, therefore, never performed his duty as a thirteenth juror; and (2) the trial court lacked statutory authority to render a valid judgment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 17-1-305. The habeas court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas court erred. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The petitioner, David Allen Lane, appeals both the post-conviction court's ruling regarding his post-conviction relief and the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The judgment of the trial court denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea is affirmed. Because the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel and because the post-conviction court failed to comply with the requirements of State v. Boyd, 51 S.W.3d 206 (Tenn. 2000), the judgment of the post-conviction court vacating and reinstating the judgment is reversed, the judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The Appellant, Paul David James, Jr., appeals the sentencing decision of the Grundy County Circuit Court. Pursuant to a plea agreement, James pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, with the trial court determining the sentence length and manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced James to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, James challenges the length and manner of the sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly considered his lengthy history of dismissed criminal charges in enhancing the sentence two years above the statutory minimum and in denying alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the briefs of the parties and the record, we affirm.

The Appellant, Brian Roger Neu, appeals the imposition of consecutive sentences by the Madison County Circuit Court. Neu’s sentences stem from his guilty pleas to domestic assault, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia, all class A misdemeanors. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction. The court further ordered that Neu’s sentences for possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to his sentence for domestic assault. Following review, the sentencing decision is affirmed.

The defendant, Sean Thomas Corlew, pled guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, in the Tipton County Circuit Court. Pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress based upon his allegation that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to support the stop leading to his eventual arrest. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Debra Elaine Moore, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide ( Class E felony) and aggravated child abuse (Class A felony). She was sentenced to two years for the Class E felony and twenty-five years for the Class A felony, with the sentences to run concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The defendant raises four issues on appeal including whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of guilt. Because the defendant did not file either a timely motion for new trial or notice of appeal, this court declines to review the subsequently waived issues. However, we do review her issue of sufficiency of the evidence and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts. Therefore, the judgments from the trial court are affirmed.

A Lincoln County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Tony E. Cannon, Jr., of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court merged the conviction of aggravated assault with the conviction of attempted second degree murder and imposed an effective sentence of 12 years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the 12-year sentence imposed for attempted second degree murder is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Anthony E. Perry, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Perry was convicted of first-degree felony murder in the perpetration of kidnapping and especially aggravated kidnapping and is currently serving an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to this court. In July, 2002, Perry filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other issues, multiple grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel, and, following the appointment of counsel, an amended petition was filed seeking a delayed appeal of his convictions upon the ground that Perry had been deprived of his right to seek second-tier appellate review. At the post-conviction level, the State conceded Perry’s entitlement to a delayed appeal. Nonetheless, on September 17, 2002, the post-conviction court denied Perry’s post-conviction petition based upon its perceived lack of jurisdiction to grant a delayed appeal, without addressing the merits of Perry’s remaining post-conviction issues or reserving them for a later determination. The Appellant then appealed the dismissal of his petition to this court. While the appeal was pending in this court, the post-conviction court entered a second order, on January 2, 2003, reversing its prior dismissal of the petition and granting Perry a delayed appeal. No action was ever taken by Perry in furtherance of the delayed appeal. Perry later moved to voluntarily dismiss his appeal, which was still pending before this court. Within one year from the voluntary dismissal of the appeal, the post-conviction court appointed substitute counsel to represent Perry for the purpose of pursuing the ineffective assistance claims alleged in the petition. Following the filing of three amended post-conviction petitions, a post-conviction hearing was held on December 21, 2005, at which Perry asserted ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s (1) failure to seek suppression of his warrantless arrest within his home, in violation of Payton v. New York, and (2) failure to request lesser-included instructions at trial. After hearing the evidence presented, the post-conviction court denied the petition upon the merits. Perry now appeals that denial. On appeal, the State initially argues that the post-conviction court was without jurisdiction to review Perry’s alleged claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of this argument, the State asserts that the post-conviction court lost jurisdiction of the case when Perry filed a timely notice of appeal to this court from the post-conviction court’s order entered on September 17, 2002, denying post-conviction relief. We agree. As the September 2002 order specifically denied the post-conviction petition, without reservation of any issues, Perry’s only relief was through the appeal to this court. By voluntarily dismissing that appeal, the Appellant has defaulted those issues which collaterally challenged his conviction. The subsequent order entered by the post-conviction court granting the delayed appeal had no force and effect, and any actions, including the filing of amended post-conviction petitions, were not validly before the post-conviction court. Thus, the post-conviction court’s order of September 5, 2006, denying relief must be reversed and vacated.

The petitioner, Yasin Hawkins, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition is defective because it does not include a copy of the judgment which is the basis for the petitioner’s being restrained, and it fails to present a claim which is cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Defendant, Lovard D. Horton, pled guilty to two counts of conspiracy to sell 300 grams or more of cocaine, possession with intent to sell seventy pounds or more of marijuana, and possession with intent to sell or deliver 300 pounds or more of marijuana within 1000 feet of a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Defendant pursuant to the plea agreement to an effective sentence of twenty-eight years in prison. The Defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Gerry Lynn Hensley, appeals the sentencing decision of the Humboldt Law Court of Gibson County. Hensley pled guilty to two counts of Class B vehicular homicide by reason of intoxication and was subsequently sentenced by the trial court to concurrent eight-year sentences as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, Hensley raises the following challenges to the imposed sentences: (1) whether the trial court erred in considering an enhancement factor when no notice was provided by the State of its intent to rely upon such factor as required by local rules; (2) whether the court erred in considering dismissed charges in applying the enhancement factor of a prior criminal history; (3) whether the court erred in failing to specifically identify the mitigating and enhancing factors found and in failing to apply other certain mitigating factors which Hensley argues are applicable; (4) whether the court erred in not sentencing Hensley as an especially mitigated offender; and (5) whether the court erred in denying an alternative sentence. Following review of the record, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The petitioner, Dallas R. Myers, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record, we are persuaded that the post-conviction court did not err in dismissing the petitioner’s post-conviction petition. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Therefore, we grant the state’s motion, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Michael Dewayne Mann, was found guilty by a Dyer County Jury of driving under the influence and for violation of the implied consent law. In a bifurcated hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty of third offense driving under the influence. As a result, Appellant received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was to be suspended after the service of 150 days of incarceration. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. On appeal, the following issues are raised for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the trial court improperly allowed a police officer and the prosecutor to refer to Appellant’s prior record. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Furthermore, we decline to address the evidentiary issues as plain error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, Heath Brent Clark, was indicted by the Marshall County Grand Jury for multiple offenses including burglaries, thefts, vandalism and evading arrest. He pled guilty to all the charges. At a sentencing hearing, Appellant was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of eighteen years. Appellant asserts on appeal that the trial court improperly denied an alternative sentence and that consecutive sentencing was excessive given the fact that the offenses all occurred during a twenty-four hour period of time. We conclude that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing and that despite Appellant’s waiver of the issue regarding consecutive sentencing, the trial court properly ordered consecutive sentencing. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Anthony Harris, has appealed the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that he was ineffectively represented and that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Larry Carter, was convicted of burglary, a Class D felony, and sentenced to serve twelve years in the Department of Correction as a career offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence presented at his jury trial was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court