APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Clarence Carnell Gaston, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites for seeking habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The petitioner, Jeffrey A. Simmons, was denied the writ of habeas corpus by the Hardeman County Circuit Court based upon his claims that (1) the indictments were void because they listed “Jane Doe” as the victim, (2) the indictments were void because they failed to allege a mens rea, and (3) the trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence him because it did not comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-209(a) by not sentencing him within forty-five days of conviction.  Upon review, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the petition and affirm its order dismissing the petition.

The Appellant, Gregory Derrick Maness, appeals the sentencing decision of the Chester County Circuit Court ordering that his sentences be served in confinement. Following Maness’ guilty pleas to the filing of a false report, a Class D felony, and to the misdemeanor crimes of domestic assault and theft, Maness received an effective four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Maness raises the sole issue of whether the trial court erred “by sentencing [him] to the Tennessee Department of Corrections [sic], rather than an available alternative to incarceration?”  After review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Robert Kimbrel, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Defendant, Richard Lynn Dixon, appeals the revocation of his probation by the trial court. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking defendant's probation. After a thorough review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Alvin Green, was convicted of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of forty-six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State did not adequately rebut his defense of duress. Further, he argues that the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce his statements soliciting the murder of the State’s witnesses; by allowing a lay witness to testify regarding the operation of the weapon used during the offenses; and in applying an enhancement factor and imposing consecutive sentences.  After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 4 to reflect that the defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, rather than attempted robbery.

The defendant, Bobby Dior McMillian, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court sentenced him improperly. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy Earl Waters, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In 1989, Waters was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder and assault with intent to commit first degree murder. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s ruling pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following review, we conclude that the petition fails to allege any ground which would render the challenged judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, dismissal of the petition is affirmed.

The petitioner, William Anthony Hayworth, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. He received a sentence of twenty years for the Class B felony and ten years for the Class C felony as a Range III, persistent offender, with the sentences to be served concurrently. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, John E. Carter, appeals from the Johnson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the State of Tennessee moves this court, pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, to summarily affirm the circuit court’s order. We agree that such motion is well taken, and we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, Tyrone Felton, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Felton seeks habeas corpus relief from his two 1997 Shelby County convictions for aggravated rape, which were entered as a result of his pleas of guilt to these crimes. On appeal, Felton contends that he was sentenced as a multiple rapist on each of the aggravated rape convictions with a release eligibility of thirty percent, and, because “the statute mandates service of such sentence at 100%,” his sentences are illegal and, therefore, void. Review of the face of the judgments of conviction establishes that Felton was sentenced as a “Standard 30% Range 1” offender and as a “Multiple Rapist.” However, review of the record of the proceedings before us clearly demonstrates that a release eligibility of thirty percent was simply a gratuitous and unwarranted entry which, although approved by the trial judge, was not a “bargained-for element” of Felton’s pleas. See Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124, 130 (Tenn. 2006). Consistent with this holding, we remand the case to the original court of conviction for entry of corrected judgments of conviction for aggravated rape to reflect service of the two sentences as a multiple rapist. Dismissal of the petition is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Darron Price, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. Price was convicted in 2003 for attempted first degree murder, attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. State v. Darren Price,¹ No. W2003-01447-CCA-MR3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Feb. 9, 2005). The judgments were affirmed on direct appeal, and our supreme court denied Price’s application for permission to appeal on June 20, 2005. Id. Subsequently, Price filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied Price an evidentiary hearing based upon its determination that the petition was untimely pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations. On appeal, Price argues that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition as untimely. After review, we conclude that the record supports a threshold showing of Price’s compliance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, § 2(G). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order dismissing Price’s petition, and we remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Price can show by a preponderance of the evidence that he complied with Rule 28 § 2(G) in filing his post-conviction petition.

The defendant, Vincent Tracy Morton, entered guilty pleas to three counts of delivery of more than .5 gram of cocaine for resale, Class B felonies, and was sentenced to consecutive eleven year Range I sentences for a total effective sentence of thirty-three years. The defendant did not appeal the sentencing determination. Thereafter, the defendant filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and the court, by agreement of the parties, granted a delayed appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113. In this appeal as of right, the defendant asserts that the trial court imposed sentences that are excessive in both length and manner of service. The state contends that the trial court imposed appropriate sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Marcellus Jeffries, appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition because Petitioner did not demonstrate that his convictions were void. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Antonio Sanders, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and therefore, that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order dismissing the petition.

In 2003 the defendant, Pierre Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, two counts of leaving the scene of an accident, and one count of driving on a revoked license, third offense, receiving an effective sentence of fifty-two years, five months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he argues that the State’s proof as to prior DUI convictions was deficient, the indictments and jury instructions were deficient, and the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand for resentencing as to the convictions for aggravated vehicular homicide upon finding that the trial court’s application of one sentencing enhancement factor violated the Sixth Amendment. We also direct the entry of judgments reflecting the convictions for leaving the scene of an accident.

Appellant, Larry Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted aggravated kidnapping.  As a result, he was sentenced as a Range III persistent offender to a fourteen-year sentence.  Appellant appeals, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for attempted aggravated kidnapping and that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant.

The Defendant, Sentorya L. Young, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. He received an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole as a repeat violent offender. Thereafter, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that a prejudicial and extraneous piece of paper was sent to the jury room as substantive evidence. The trial court denied the petition. In this consolidated appeal, he raises the following four issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) whether the trial court failed to properly perform its role as thirteenth juror; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to express a personal opinion through the admission of a chart; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying his writ of error coram nobis petition. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After conducting a bench trial, the trial court found the Defendant, Richard Anthony Arriola, guilty of one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, and two counts o fattempted second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. This Court remanded the case to the trial court for an order clarifying its findings on the insanity defense. On appeal, the Defendant claims: (1) the trial court erred when it used an improper legal standard for the insanity defense; and (2) the evidence presented at trial proved by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court applied an improper legal standard for the insanity defense. Therefore, we reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial.

The Appellant, Jeffrey Lee Turner, appeals the sentencing decision of the Humboldt Law Court for Gibson County. Turner pled guilty to one count of aggravated statutory rape, fifteen counts of statutory rape, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Turner to an effective term of eleven years, eleven months, and twenty-eight days. On appeal, Turner challenges the length of his sentences, specifically alleging (1) that the trial court misapplied enhancement and mitigating factors and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing partial consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm.

I concur in the majority opinion except I would have not relied upon the presentence report for a Blakely-type admission. See State v. Charles Vantilburg III, No. W2006-02475-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 12, 2008) (holding that statements “made outside the confines of any judicial proceeding . . . do not qualify as admissions for purposes of the Sixth Amendment”).

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony Riggs, was found guilty of the offense of rape, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to twelve years for his conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the length of the sentence was excessive and contrary to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). Upon review, this Court found that the trial court improperly applied two of the five enhancement factors it found applicable.  Nonetheless, relying on State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005) (“Gomez I”), we concluded that the remaining three enhancement factors were sufficient to enhance Defendant’s sentence to twelve years and affirmed his sentence. State v. Anthony Riggs, No. M2005-02105-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 49553 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, January 8, 2007). Defendant filed an application for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted Defendant’s application for the limited purpose of remanding to this Court for reconsideration of the length of Defendant’s sentence in light of State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (“Gomez II”). After a thorough review of the record, we modify Defendant’s sentence for rape from twelve years to eleven years.

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of possession of cocaine over 0.5 grams with intent to deliver and one count of delivery of over 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to eleven years on each count to be served concurrently. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to this Court, and we affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Maurice Shaw, No. W2005-02097-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3085503 *1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 21, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 9, 2007). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court denied the petition, and the instant appeal followed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In November 2005, a Putnam County grand jury indicted the defendant, Shane Delano Hunter, on one count of premeditated first degree murder in connection with an incident that occurred in August 2005. Following a January 2007 jury trial in Putnam County Criminal Court, the jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Willis Ayers, was indicted for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was tried jointly with co-defendant, Charles Curtis, and another co-defendant, David Milken, was tried separately for the charged offenses. Co-defendant Curtis’s case is not part of his appeal. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty-two years for his second degree murder conviction, and as a Range II, multiple offender, to fourteen years for his facilitation of especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively, for an effective sentence of thirty-six years. In his appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that State’s witness Corey Smith was an accomplice to the charged offenses; (3) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for severance; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.