APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Troy Sollis, was convicted of two counts of possession of more than .5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, one count of felony evading arrest, and two counts of misdemeanor evading arrest. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 20 years, 11 months, and 29 days to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court’s comments during a pretrial conference established bias and that the sentence is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert Cash, appeals his Bradley County Criminal Court conviction of one charge of aggravated sexual battery of a person under the age of thirteen, alleging that there was insufficient evidence to prove intent. We find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Scotty D. Hatfield, originally charged with three counts of aggravated assault and one count of felony reckless endangerment, was convicted of one count of attempted aggravated assault and misdemeanor reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. The case must be remanded, however, for the entry of a corrected judgment reflecting that the defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated assault rather than aggravated assault on Count 1.

The defendant, Torrie Perkins, appeals from convictions of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder rendered by a Haywood County Circuit Court jury, for which he was sentenced to concurrent terms of life without parole and twenty-five years. In his appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for correction of the judgment for the first degree murder conviction.

The defendant, Shakir Adams, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. The defendant appeals his conviction and argues: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction; (2) that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to allow the defendant to administer a jury questionnaire; (3) that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance; (4) that he was prejudiced by the court’s comments both pre-trial and during trial; (5) that he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence that the defendant was a member of a gang; and (6) that he was prejudiced by the erroneous exclusion of evidence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant pled guilty to simple possession of cocaine. Defendant properly preserved the following certified question of law for review, “Whether the informant’s credibility was sufficiently set forth to establish probable cause in the affidavit which provided support for issuance of the search warrant in this case.” After a thorough review of the record, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the indictment against Defendant is dismissed.

The State of Tennessee appeals the decision of the Obion County Circuit Court suppressing evidence obtained as a result of a police search of the residence of the Appellee, Charlotte Yvonne Turner.  Turner, a parolee, was convicted of drug related offenses in Kentucky, with her parole being subsequently transferred to Tennessee. Turner’s vehicle was stopped by Union City police officers, who were familiar with her status as a parolee. After the stop, Turner and the vehicle were searched for drugs based upon one officer’s suspicion that she was involved in drug activity. After a fruitless search for contraband of both her person and vehicle, the officer demanded that Turner allow a search of her home, pursuant to a condition of her parole. No drugs were found during the search of her residence; however, Turner directed officers to a handgun, which was located in a bedroom.  The weapon was seized, and Turner was subsequently indicted for unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Turner filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court granted.  On appeal, the State argues that the search of the residence was lawful under the recent holding of the United States Supreme Court decision of Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006). After review, we conclude that the police search of Turner’s residence was unreasonable and affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Appellant, Charles W. McCaleb, was indicted by the Hickman County Grand Jury for aggravated assault and assault. After a jury trial, Appellant was acquitted of aggravated assault in Count One and convicted of assault by offensive touching in Count Two. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six months in jail. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve forty-five days in incarceration and the remainder of the sentence was suspended and Appellant was placed on probation. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court because the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for simple assault by offensive touching and the trial court properly sentenced Appellant.

The Petitioner, Raymond David Wright, pled guilty to second degree murder in 1993 in exchange for a fifty year sentence as a Range III offender. He filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming his sentence was illegal because, had he been tried and convicted, he would be considered only a Range I offender. Thus, he claims his fifty-year sentence is illegal. The Petitioner further asserts second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder, and, therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to sentence him. The habeas court dismissed the petition without a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The Petitioner, Troy Lee Weston, appeals the lower court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites for seeking habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.

The petitioner, Julius Jones, was convicted in 2002 of facilitation of felony murder, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal to this court, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that Tennessee’s 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act was unconstitutional and that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. The post-conviction court denied the petition, holding that the petitioner failed to prove his factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Jeremy Crosby, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing. The state contends that the trial court properly dismissed most of the petitioner’s claims but admits that the post-conviction court should have appointed counsel to address the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After reviewing the record, we affirm the majority of the post-conviction court’s order but remand the case to the post-conviction court for the appointment of counsel and additional proceedings regarding the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Danny Alexander, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief based on its untimeliness. Upon a review of the record, we are persuaded that the post-conviction court was correct that the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Adrian K. Nelson, was indicted by a Warren County Grand Jury for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, evading arrest, felony reckless endangerment, leaving the scene of an accident, resisting arrest and driving on a suspended license, second offense. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of all of the offenses and sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-two years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. Appellant seeks review of the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial; (2) whether the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, evading arrest and reckless endangerment; (4) whether the trial court 1 erred by failing to instruct the jury with the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment; (5) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the inference of casual exchange” as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-419; and (6) whether the sentence is excessive. Because we determine that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, we reverse Appellant’s conviction for felony reckless endangerment and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Reneshia Kioto Parker, pled guilty to forgery involving $1000 or more and theft of property valued at $60,000 or more. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced her. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we dismiss this appeal because the Defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal.

In Tipton County, Petitioner entered an open guilty plea to three counts of vehicular homicide, one count of vehicular assault and two counts of driving while intoxicated, which were later merged into the first vehicular homicide conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to three consecutive ten-year sentences for the vehicular homicides and a consecutive three-year sentence for vehicular assault. This resulted in an effective thirty-three-year sentence. Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal. State v. Barbara Ann Bryant, No. W2004-01245-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 756252 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 1, 2005), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2005). Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied and dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision based upon the fact that Petitioner did not present the issue to the post-conviction court that she now presents to this Court on appeal.

The Appellant, Tyrone Neely, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition to reinstate driving privileges, which were revoked after he was declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO) on October 20, 1994. In December 2006, Neely filed a petition to reinstate his driving privileges, pursuant to an amendment to the reinstatement of license statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-615(c), which permits immediate reinstatement of driving privileges when one of the underlying convictions which qualifies a person for MVHO status is not enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-603(2)(A). In his petition, Neely asserted that his underlying convictions for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, were not qualifying offenses of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-603(2)(A); therefore, he was entitled to reinstatement. At the scheduled hearing, the trial court summarily denied the petition without allowing Neely to present proof regarding the prior convictions. Neely appeals this ruling. On appeal, the State concedes, and we agree, that it is necessary that the case be remanded to the trial court for a full hearing to determine the nature of the qualifying convictions and whether Neely is entitled to immediate restoration of his driving privileges as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-615(c). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and remanded.

The defendant, Louis E. Whitecotton, was convicted of failure to timely register as a violent sexual offender, a Class E felony, and sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, John Willie Partee, appeals as of right the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleges that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the Board of Paroles violated his constitutional rights by  the retroactive use of release eligibility standards. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of  the habeas corpus court.

The Appellant, Don Sanders, appeals his conviction by a Shelby County jury for the first degree murder of Marilyn Hughes. On appeal, Sanders argues that, because he suffers from a mental illness, the evidence is insufficient to establish that he possessed the mental capacity to premeditate the murder of the victim. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support his conviction. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Lonnie Maclin, was convicted of first degree felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, misdemeanor reckless endangerment, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, reckless aggravated assault, and two counts of aggravated assault, and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the trial court’s instructions to the jury were erroneous. Finding that the issue was waived because it was not raised on direct appeal, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in those determinations and in dismissing his petition without affording him an opportunity to amend or supplement it. He also argues that we should not find waiver because he is seeking to vindicate a federal constitutional right. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Michael D. Mann, appeals his misdemeanor conviction by a Dyer County jury for aggravated criminal trespass. Mann challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying this conviction. The State argues that Mann has waived his right to appeal this issue by failing to file a timely motion for new trial or notice of appeal. We agree, but, in the interest of justice, we waive the timeliness requirement for the notice of appeal. After review, we conclude that the evidence at trial was legally sufficient to support Mann’s conviction for aggravated criminal trespass.  Alternatively, the State appeals the trial court’s grant of Mann’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to a separate charge of simple assault. However, there is no authority which permits the State to appeal, as of right, from a trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal when the grant is entered prior to a verdict of guilty. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects.

The pro se petitioner, Anthony D. Clement, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the habeas court erred in summarily dismissing the petition without appointing counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court dismissing the petition.

The defendant, Floyd Taylor, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not offer adequate proof that he intentionally or knowingly robbed the victim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kevin Wilkins, filed in the Shelby County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief, challenging trial counsel’s failure to appeal the petitioner’s conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. The post-conviction court granted the petitioner post-conviction relief, and the State appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.