APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Bobby Baker, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, by a jury of his peers. The trial court, finding that the appellant was a multiple offender in the aggravated rape case, imposed a Range II sentence consisting of confinement for thirty-five (35) years in the Department of Correction. The trial court further found that the appellant was a persistent offender in the aggravated burglary case and imposed a Range III sentence consisting of confinement for twelve (12) years in the Department of Correction. The sentences are to be served consecutively. The effective sentence imposed was confinement for forty-seven (47) years in the Department of Correction. The appellant presents eleven issues for review. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the authorities which govern the issues raised by the appellant, it is the opinion of this Court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of attempt to commit second-degree murder and aggravated assault. After a hearing, he was sentenced to twelve years on the attempt offense and eight years on the assault offense, to run concurrently. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that his two convictions must be merged; that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial; and that his sentence is excessive.  Finding merit in the first of these issues, we reverse and dismiss the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. We otherwise affirm the judgment below.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 21, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on eight counts of aggravated rape and one count of rape in May 1984, and was convicted of rape in October 1984. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

The defendant, Elton Donald Bowers, also known as Rashid Qawwi, was convicted of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ in the commission of the robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-307. The trial court ordered the weapons conviction merged with the aggravated robbery, classified the defendant as a career offender, and imposed a thirty-year sentence.

The defendant, Perry A. Cribbs, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, first degree murder during the perpetration of an aggravated burglary, first degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and attempted first degree murder. The death penalty verdicts were based upon two of the aggravating circumstances prescribed by statute:

(1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; and

(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing a burglary.

Appellant, Robert Glen Coe, appeals from the dismissal of his third post-conviction relief petition. He has been convicted of first degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnaping. He was sentenced to death for first degree murder and received two sentences of life imprisonment for the other charges. Coe contends the trial court erred in dismissing his petition and presents to this Court the following issues for review:

(1) whether the state withheld exculpatory evidence and presented misleading testimony;

(2) whether the use of the felony-murder aggravating circumstance rendered the death penalty unconstitutional;

(3) whether the jury instruction defining “reasonable doubt” was unconstitutional;

(4) whether the jury instruction on first degree murder omitted an essential element of the offense;

(5) whether he was denied the fundamental right to a unanimous jury verdict;

(6) whether the jury instruction on expert testimony was unconstitutional;

(7) whether the jury was unconstitutionally instructed on the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity;

(8) whether the jury instructions precluded full consideration of the defense of insanity;

(9) whether the failure to instruct the jury about eligibility for parole was unconstitutional;

(10) whether the jury instructions erroneously omitted information about the effect of a non-unanimous verdict;

(11) whether he was denied effective review of the death sentence;

(12) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, including the denial of entitlement to investigative funds;

(13) whether electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment;

(14) whether he was unconstitutionally precluded from consulting with counsel during trial;

(15) whether the death sentence unconstitutionally infringes upon his fundamental right to life; and

(16) whether he was arrested without probable cause.

We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 29, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for robbery with a deadly weapon in January 1989, and the petitioner pled guilty to the same in May 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

The appellant, Stanley Adams, was indicted for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The state sought the death penalty. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, however, the appellant pled guilty to second degree murder and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 45 years for second degree murder and 15 years for aggravated robbery. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on November 13, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on December 3, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on one count each of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping in September 1986, for which the petitioner was subsequently convicted. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508- CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

The appellant, Billy Joe Harris, appeals as of right from a judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing his motion for a new trial. The appellant claimed he was entitled to a new trial due to newly discovered evidence. The trial court found the motion was not timely filed pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellant was tried and convicted on April 27, 1989. His motion for a new trial was denied. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court also affirmed the sentence. He subsequently instituted four suits for post-conviction relief. All four suits were denied at every stage of the proceedings. The present motion was filed June 26, 1995 as a separate action.  After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the law governing the issue presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

A Hamilton County grand jury indicted the defendant, Frank Bennie Jackson, Jr., for possession of cocaine for resale, driving without a license, and failure to stop at a traffic signal. The defendant filed a motion to suppress alleging that the search of his vehicle incident to a custodial arrest was illegal because he should have received a citation in lieu of arrest for driving without a license and running a red light, both class C misdemeanors. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court agreed and suppressed all evidence seized as a result of the search incident to arrest. It is from this order that the state now appeals. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Brandon D. Thomas, was convicted of one count of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and three drug offenses including possession with intent to sell a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), a Class B felony; possession with intent to sell a Schedule III controlled substance (dihydrocodeinone), a Class D felony; and simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the cocaine offense, eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the other drug offenses and six months for the conviction for resisting arrest, with all the sentences to run concurrently for a total effective sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his cocaine conviction and that he was sentenced improperly. After careful review, we find that the defendant was sentenced improperly but not for the issues on which he appeals. The sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class D felony conviction is illegal because the minimum sentence for a Class D felony is two years. We remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the minimum sentence and affirm the trial court as to the other raised issues.

The appellant, James Polk, appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery entered in the Circuit Court of Maury County. The appellant contends that the trial court should have ordered a new trial pursuant to Rule 33(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.  After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Maurice Lashaun Nash, appeals the sentencing decision of the Tipton County Circuit Court. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Nash entered guilty pleas to six felonies and one misdemeanor and received an effective ten-year sentence. The agreement provided that the ten-year sentence would run consecutively to an effective ten-year sentence which Nash was serving at the time of sentencing. The terms of the plea agreement also provided that the manner of service of the ten-year sentence would be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Nash’s request for alternative sentencing, which Nash now asserts was error. After review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Charles Edward Meeks, was indicted for first-degree murder. The jury found him guilty as charged and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.  He has appealed as of right, raising for review the trial court's instructions to the jury and the State's conduct during closing argument. We find the defendant's issues are without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Richard Wayne Otey, appeals as of right from a judgment entered in the Circuit Court of Williamson County, finding him guilty of aggravated assault in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced the appellant to ten years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender, to be served consecutively to a sentence for which the appellant was on parole at the time of the offense at issue in this case.

On February 10, 1994, the appellant was convicted by a jury of his peers of three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication.¹ Following a sentencing hearing, the appellant was sentenced to six years incarceration for each count with each sentence to be served consecutively. Much aggrieved by his convictions and resultant sentences, the appellant appeals from the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 3, Tenn. R. App. P.

The appellant, Thomas H. Aldridge, was convicted of driving while under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, leaving the scene of an accident, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving after having been declared a habitual vehicle offender, a Class E felony, following his pleas of guilty to these offenses. The trial court imposed the following sentences pursuant to the plea bargain agreement:

a.) Driving while intoxicated, a fine of $500 and confinement for thirty (30) days in the Shelby County Correctional Center, twenty-eight days of the sentence was suspended;

b.) Leaving the scene of an accident, a fine of $500; and

c.) Driving after having been declared a habitual vehicle offender, a Range I, standard offender sentence consisting of a $500 fine and confinement for one (1) year in the Shelby County Correctional Center.

The petitioner was convicted by a jury of five counts of armed robbery, four of which were affirmed and one of which was reversed and dismissed by this Court in an opinion filed on March 6, 1985. Application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was denied on June 10, 1985. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 24, 1995, which the court below treated as one for post-conviction relief and dismissed without a hearing on the basis that it was time-barred. He contends that this summary dismissal was improper. After reviewing the record, we affirm the lower court’s judgment.

The appellant, Darren Campbell, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder. This Court reduced his conviction to second degree murder and remanded to the trial court for sentencing.¹ The appellant was sentenced as a Range I offender to 23 years incarceration. His sole issue on appeal is whether his sentence was excessive. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant was charged in the indictment with theft of property valued between ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and sixty thousand dollars ($60,000). On September 21, 1995, she filed an application for pretrial diversion. The district attorney general denied the application on September 28, 1995. The defendant then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the  district attorney general’s decision to deny her application. After a hearing, the trial court found that the State had abused its discretion and ordered the defendant placed on pretrial diversion. In this appeal pursuant to T.R.A.P. 9, the State contends the trial court erred in finding that the State had abused its discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant was indicted on November 7, 1994, for the first-degree murder of Lisa C. Stewart. A jury convicted him of second-degree murder and fined him fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). After a hearing, the defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to justify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. After a review of the entire record, we find that this issue is without merit, and therefore, his conviction is affirmed.

The petitioner, Andre Anthony, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; forgery over $1000, a Class D felony; and two counts of forgery over $500, a Class E felony. He received an effective total sentence of forty-six years. He seeks post-conviction relief and argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief, and we affirm that judgment

The appellant, Jackie H. Martin, appeals the order entered by the Criminal Court of Shelby County denying his petition for discharge from involuntary commitment.1 On appeal, the appellant presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the appellant is not eligible for mandatory outpatient treatment as an alternative to commitment; and (2) whether the trial judge should have recused himself from this case.

I concur with the majority opinion and also with Judge Welles’ concurring
opinion.