APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Roderick Chapman, pleaded guilty to counts of burglary and aggravated assault and was sentenced as a Range II offender in Shelby County Criminal Court to an effective five-year term to be served in a community corrections program, with the first year to be served in the Synergy drug treatment program. On January 5, 2007, the court revoked the community corrections sentence and resentenced the defendant as a career offender to serve twelve years in the Department of Correction.  From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment below as modified.

The petitioner, Carl Ronald Dykes, appeals from the denial by the Marion County Circuit Court of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that he should be granted a delayed direct appeal of his convictions. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An Obion County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, James Bradley Warner, of facilitation of theft of property valued between $1000 and $10,000, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him to four years to be served consecutively to an earlier sentence stemming from a parole violation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not prove that he knew the items were stolen at the time he helped sell them. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the jury’s guilty verdict.

The petitioner, Martino Wright, pled guilty to two counts of especially aggravated robbery and received a total effective sentence of thirteen and  one-half years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel were ineffective and that as a result of a multitude of errors his guilty plea was not a knowing and voluntary choice. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, William Douglas Zukowski, was convicted of five counts of rape of a child and sentenced to twenty-five years on each count, to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of 125 years. He later pled guilty to three additional counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated rape and accepted a sentence of twenty-five years, to be served concurrently with his prior sentence. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions. In his petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

I concur in the results reached by the majority as I would also remand this case for a new trial. I write separately to note the manner in which I believe that the proposed testimony of nurse Teresa Hudgens—namely, that the defendant contacted Hudgens via telephone and told Hudgens that the victim threatened to kill the defendant—was admissible.

On appeal, Petitioner, Jasper Lee Vick, argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. In his petition, Petitioner alleged that the trial court improperly determined that Petitioner was a Range II, multiple offender, for the purpose of determining the length of his sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping and sexual battery. After review, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to state a ground for which habeas corpus relief is available. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus relief.

Petitioner, Anthony Woods, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief in which he alleged the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial when he was convicted of aggravated assault. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

A Hamblen County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of second degree murder, and the
trial court sentenced her to twenty years. On appeal, she contends that: (1) the evidence is
insufficient to sustain her conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it admonished her counsel in
front of the jury; (3) the trial court denied her constitutional right to present a defense; and (4)
the trial court should have ordered a new trial because a juror made false statements during voir
dire. We conclude that, because the Defendant claimed self-defense at trial, the trial court erred
when it refused to admit testimony about a prior incident in which the victim threatened the
Defendant’s life. Further, we conclude that this error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial on the charge
of second degree murder.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree with the court’s statement that the standard of prejudice for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is whether, absent counsel’s deficiency, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the appeal would have been different. I believe that the proper standard is the same for trial counsel, that is, whether a reasonable possibility that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

The petitioners, Darryl Lee Elkins and Rhonda Grills, were jointly tried and convicted of offenses against the minor child of Rhonda Grills by the Criminal Court for Sullivan County. Petitioner Elkins was convicted of rape of a child (Class A felony) and attempted rape of a child (Class B
felony). He was sentenced to twenty-five years with a fine of $50,000 for the Class A felony and to twelve years for the Class B felony, to be served consecutively. Petitioner Grills was convicted of facilitation of rape of a child (Class B felony) and sentenced to ten years with a fine of $25,000.  Each petitioner appealed, and their sentences were affirmed. See State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Grills, 114 S.W.3d 548 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). Both petitioners subsequently filed petitions for post-conviction relief, which are the subject of this appeal. The postconviction court granted Petitioner Elkins a new trial on his conviction for attempted rape of a child
but denied relief on the conviction for rape of a child. Petitioner Grills was denied any postconviction relief. The State, Petitioner Elkins, and Petitioner Grills have all appealed from the order of the post-conviction court. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court granting relief to Petitioner Elkins, and we affirm the denial of the remaining issues on appeal for both Petitioner Elkins and Petitioner Grills.

A Sevier County jury convicted the defendant, Mark Dewayne Culbertson, of possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, a class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant, a Range II offender, to eight years and six months in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress his statement; (2) denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) denied his motion for a new trial because he was not notified pretrial that the controlled substance was destroyed during testing; (4) denied his motion for new trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct; (5) failed to order a new trial because of newly discovered evidence; and (6) improperly sentenced the defendant. Finding that there exists no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Montez Dickerson, pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance under .5 grams, and the trial court sentenced him as a persistent offender to ten years in prison. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. In the petition, the petitioner alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. The petitioner appeals that dismissal, and we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The petitioner, Mathis T. Vaughn, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, he asserts that the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing his petition prior to the appointment of counsel and that his conviction for first degree felony murder is void because (1) the trial court failed to charge any lesser included offenses of felony murder and (2) the indictment did not charge an underlying felony to support the felony murder charge. The judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The appellant, Oshia Lynn Starnes, a/k/a Oshia Lynn Baffa, a/k/a Oshia Lynn Boffa, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to two counts each of identity theft, forgery, and misdemeanor theft and agreed to an effective sentence of four years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve her effective sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

James Paul Hurt, the defendant, was convicted of selling .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance and also of delivering the same substance. Both are Class B felonies. These convictions were merged, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years confinement. On appeal, the defendant avers that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdicts, and (2) the physical restraints placed on the defendant during trial violated his constitutional rights. After review, we have concluded that the evidence was sufficient and that the restraints and safeguards imposed were reasonable under the circumstances and constitutionally permissible. Accordingly, the conviction is affirmed.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Charles Curtis, of second degree  murder and aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of  thirty-six years and sixteen years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the  evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the appellant  and one of his codefendants to be tried jointly; (3) the trial court erred by granting the State’s  motion to sequester the jury; (4) the trial court erred by admitting autopsy photographs of the  victim’s eyes into evidence; (5) his sentences are excessive; and (6) the cumulative effect of these  errors denied him the right to a fair trial and due process. Based upon the record and the parties’  briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dana Keith Woods, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the convictions for first degree premeditated  murder and felony murder and also merged the convictions for attempted first degree murder and  aggravated assault. For these convictions, the Defendant received an effective sentence of life  imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus fifty years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant  raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by  admitting photographs of the victim; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his  convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct on voluntary intoxication; and (4)  whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences.1 Following a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The pro se petitioner, Michael L. McKillip, appeals as of right the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was convicted of aggravated sexual battery pursuant to his guilty plea in the Shelby County Criminal Court and received a sentence of fifteen years as a Range II offender to be served at one hundred percent. He alleges that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court erroneously allowed him to plead outside his range and because the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act violates the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The trial court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to state a cognizable claim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Davis, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of felony murder and aggravated robbery and received consecutive sentences of life without parole and twenty years. This court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. State v. James Robert Davis, No. W2003- 02362-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 452569, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 24, 2005), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Aug. 22, 2005). In 2006, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. After reviewing the record and finding no error, we affirm that order.

Appellant, Hezekiah Cooper, was convicted of four counts of attempt to commit second degree murder, four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of possession of a firearm. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sixty-year sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred “in refusing to allow Appellant to argue alternative theories” at trial; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit exculpatory evidence; (4) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury on lesser included offenses; (5) whether Appellant’s sentences were excessive; and (6) whether the trial court erred by ordering Appellant to serve his sentences consecutively. After reviewing the issues, we determine that: (1) Appellant waived the issue regarding lesser included offenses for failing to request instructions at trial; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to admit exculpatory evidence; (3) Appellant waived several evidentiary issues by raising them for the first time on appeal; and (4) the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. However, we determine that the evidence was only sufficient to support two convictions for attempted second degree murder with respect to the actions against Ms. Thompson and her daughter Tanisha. Therefore, we reverse and dismiss the two remaining convictions for attempted second degree murder. Further, we determine that the evidence supports only one conviction for aggravated robbery because there was only one theft from the victims’ residence of property that was owned by Mr. Norfleet. However, we modify the conviction for aggravated robbery with respect to Jeraldrika Thompson to a conviction for aggravated assault and remand to the trial court for sentencing on that count. However, we are unable to modify the two remaining convictions for aggravated robbery with respect to the   actions taken against Ms. Thompson and Tanisha Thompson to aggravated assault because double jeopardy principles prohibit dual convictions for attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. Accordingly, the convictions for aggravated robbery with respect to Ms. Thompson and Tanisha Thompson are reversed and dismissed. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Timothy Frazier, pled guilty to one count of theft of property more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court denied the defendant’s request for judicial diversion and ordered him to serve a two-year, suspended sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion should be reversed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for reconsideration.

The defendant, Joe Allen Brown, pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of under .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell and/or deliver and was sentenced in the Madison County Circuit Court to an effective four year term to be served in a community corrections program. On March 16, 2007 the court revoked the community corrections sentence and resentenced the defendant to serve six years in the  Department of Correction.  From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment below.

The Appellant, Scott Eric McDonald, presents for review a certified question of law pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A). McDonald pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, and, as a condition of his guilty plea, reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that there was no reasonable suspicion to support the initial stop of his vehicle. On appeal, the State asserts that McDonald failed to properly reserve his certified question, and, as a result, this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Following review, we agree that the certified question of law was not properly reserved. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant, Verico Dewayne Jackson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Jackson, who was convicted of first degree murder, is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to adequately communicate with Jackson and the investigator assigned to the case, resulting in a lack of preparation for trial; (2) failing to seek a severance in the case; and (3) failing to request and argue for certain lesser-included offense instructions. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.