APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Demarcus Smith, pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his “petition for writ of habeas corpus to correct illegal sentence.” He contends his sentence is illegal because a Range I, standard offender cannot be required to serve one hundred percent before release eligibility.  After review, we conclude the judgment is facially valid and the summary dismissal is affirmed.

The appellant, Michael Ray Bates, was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of four counts of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine and received an effective ten-year sentence to be served in a community corrections program. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve his ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the revocation of his community corrections sentence and the imposition of confinement. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Brandon Roland, who was convicted of first degree murder and theft over $10,000, sought post-conviction relief from the Rhea County Circuit Court, which denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner presents several issues of the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Following a jury trial in Knox County Criminal Court, the defendant was convicted of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twenty years in prison on the rape of a child conviction and eight years in prison on each aggravated sexual battery conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, resulting in an effective sentence of thirty-six years. On appeal, we affirmed the convictions but remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing because the trial court failed to make appropriate findings concerning consecutive sentencing. State v. James Vanover, No. E 2005-01192-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 521496, at *5-*6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 2, 2006). The second sentencing hearing was held in June 2006, at which the trial court again imposed consecutive sentences. The defendant appeals, alleging that the trial court improperly applied consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James David May, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to one count of jail escape, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years and six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the imposition of incarceration, arguing that it would be more appropriate to sentence the defendant to community corrections. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, John J. Villanueva, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court denied relief, and the Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas court erred because: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose a life sentence without parole; and (2) his sentence is void because the trial court misclassified the offense on the judgment form. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to impose a life sentence without parole and that the trial court’s misclassification of the Petitioner’s offense on the judgment form does not entitle him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly,  we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Fred E. Smith, appeals from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Joe Carpenter Tyree, was convicted of aggravated robbery following a jury trial in Marshall County. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, that the sentence imposed was excessive, and that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated robbery. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In June 2006, the defendant, Johnny James Lloyd, was charged by criminal information with one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant waived issuance of an indictment, pled guilty, and was sentenced to five years in prison as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant filed a timely motion to set aside his guilty plea. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The defendant appeals, claiming his guilty plea was not entered into voluntarily and knowingly. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the aggravated kidnapping conviction should be reversed under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). I concur, though, in the majority opinion’s analysis and conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and consecutive sentencing.

The Defendant, Thomas Coburn, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and attempted rape, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nineteen years for the aggravated kidnapping and nine years for the attempted rape to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts the following: (1) his conviction for aggravated kidnapping violated federal and state due process protections and should be vacated under State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991); (2) the evidence establishing identification is insufficient to support his convictions for attempted rape and aggravated kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve consecutive sentences based upon the classification as a dangerous offender. We reverse the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping. We affirm the conviction for attempted rape.

This case illustrates the growing disparity in the application of diversion, both pre-trial and judicial, in the State of Tennessee. The appellant in this case, who presents an unblemished combined history of thirty-five years of meritorious service to his country in the military and to the citizens of this state as a police officer, is denied diversion, in effect, for operating a boat without proper light.  Meanwhile, on the date this opinion is being written, the Shelby County Criminal Court grants diversion of a conviction for manslaughter stemming from the shooting death of the defendant’s  husband.

The appellant, Russell L. Tipton, was charged with reckless operation of a motor vessel and failure to observe the motor vessel light law. The appellant applied for pretrial diversion and has twice been denied. In the instant appeal, the appellant challenges the prosecutor’s second denial of his application for pretrial diversion. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court upholding the prosecutor’s denial of diversion and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The prescribed due process analysis in cases of multiple prosecutions involving kidnapping is vexing to prosecutors and courts, if not to defenders, because of the infinite possibilities for factual permutations. The present case presents an apt opportunity to illustrate the analytical challenges and shortcomings.

The defendant, David Threat, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, for which he received concurrent sentences of life and twelve years, respectively. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting a store surveillance videotape into evidence; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his felony murder conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Ray Carlton, was convicted of theft over $60,000 (Class B felony) and sentenced to eight years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant now appeals his conviction and sentencing and presents the following issues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding accomplice corroboration; (3) the trial court committed plain error in allowing certain testimony and in allowing improper comments in closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing by its order of incarceration. After review, we affirm the conviction but modify the manner of service of sentence to serve six months in the local jail or workhouse, with eligibility for work release if available, followed by supervised probation for the remainder of his sentence. We remand to the trial court for the determination and setting of restitution payments.

The appellant, Vanda Watkins, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and pursuant to the plea agreement, received a two-year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the appellant serve his entire sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert Charles Skinner, appeals from the judgment of the Dyer County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and imposing service of the remainder of his misdemeanor sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the court erred in revoking his probation.  Following our review of the record, parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we determine no error exists in the court’s revocation of probation, and thus affirm the court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Glenn Bernard Mann, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Following our review of the record, parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Connie Lee Arnold, appeals the Carter County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for child rape and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and resulting effective thirty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney failed to file a motion for change of venue based on pretrial publicity and (2) the post-conviction court judge erred by refusing to recuse himself from this case. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petitioner did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the postconviction court did not err by denying the petitioner’s motion to recuse. Nevertheless, we hold that the judge who presided over this post-conviction proceeding is disqualified from any subsequent proceedings in this case.

The Appellant, Michael Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Davis raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury with regard to criminal responsibility for the conduct of another; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction.

Defendant, Mitchell Ridley, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and the imposing of a sentence of confinement. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wilson County- The Defendant, David Lane Goss, was convicted by a Wilson County jury of driving under the influence. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the trial court erred when it: denied his motion to suppress certain oral statements he gave during the traffic stop; denied his motion to dismiss based on his claim that he was not properly taken before a magistrate; and denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendants, Deddrick Parker, Taurus Driver, and Tremaine Roberson, were indicted for two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and five counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Each defendant was convicted of both counts of aggravated robbery, and Roberson was also convicted of all five counts of aggravated assault, Parker of two counts, and Driver of two counts of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated assault. Roberson, Parker, and Driver were sentenced as Range I, standard offenders to consecutive sentences totaling thirty-five, twentyfour, and twenty years, respectively. In this consolidated appeal, they raise three issues: (1) the evidence is insufficient; (2) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement factors and in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (3) the trial court erred by not timely disclosing its prior relationship with an assault victim. Following our review, we remand for resentencing as to those sentences imposed on each defendant which exceed the minimum, affirm the remaining judgments, and remand to the trial court for a determination as to whether the sentences should be served concurrently or consecutively.