APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Linda Batts, was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. She was sentenced to serve eight years in the Department of Correction for the intent to deliver conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail for the paraphernalia conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of eight years. Defendant now appeals the judgments of the trial court arguing (1) the trial judge failed to exercise his duty to act as thirteenth juror and overturn the jury’s verdict, (2) the jury selection process was tainted in violation of her constitutional rights; and (3) the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress evidence. After a thorough review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Ronald Robinson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Maron Donta Brown, pled guilty in the Bradley County Criminal Court to one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of speeding.1 The appellant received a total sentence of fifteen years as a Range II multiple offender. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant properly reserved a certified question of law, challenging the stop and subsequent search of his vehicle during which the cocaine was discovered. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I believe Appellant in this case gave a valid consent for Trooper Hoppe to conduct a general search of Appellant’s car. I am also in agreement that in doing so Appellant consented for Hoppe to “at least touch items, including locked or sealed packages, contained within the vehicle.” However, the majority notes and rightfully so that this consent did not extend to tearing open a sealed package within the car. The majority sanctions Hoppe’s having done so on the basis of his testimony that he was trained in drug interdiction and that upon feeling a closed, heavily-taped cardboard or pasteboard box he was able to immediately recognize the contents as a “brick” of cocaine. With this last crucial bit of information along with the other circumstances of the stop, the majority concludes Hoppe had probable cause to open the package and discover the cocaine within.

The defendant, Jacob Allen Reynolds, pled guilty to one count of vandalism (Class C felony) and, after a sentencing hearing, was ordered to serve four years of confinement in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. Additionally, he was ordered to pay restitution to the victims in the amount of $11,407.75. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to four years of confinement. After careful review, we hold that no error exists and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, and attempted aggravated robbery. He contends that his sentences are illegal and, therefore, that his judgments of conviction are void. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief.

The Defendant, Travis Young, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless aggravated assault, and one count of intentionally evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) classified him as a Range II offender; (2) enhanced the Defendant’s sentences; and (3) imposed consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified, and we remand the case for entry of judgments consistent with this opinion.

In this consolidated appeal, the Appellants, Maurice Leonard and Kenneth Shondale Mason, appeal their convictions by a Bedford County jury. Following a joint trial, Leonard and Mason were convicted of aggravated burglary, attempted robbery, assault, and false imprisonment. As a result of these convictions, Leonard received an effective sentence of four years, as a Range I offender, and Mason received an effective sentence of sixteen years as a Range II offender. On appeal, Leonard and Mason each raise two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the sentences imposed by the trial court are excessive. Following review, we affirm the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences.

Aggrieved of his robbery convictions, the petitioner, William H. Stitts, sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the Circuit Court of Madison County after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner presses his claim that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to ensure that a trial exhibit, a videotape of one of the robberies, was included in the appellate record on direct appeal. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Indicted for rape of a child, the defendant, Eric Maxie, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated sexual battery. He appeals and challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because the record supports the jury’s verdict, we affirm the conviction.

The Petitioner, Michael Henderson, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief and has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The defendant, Christopher W. Norwood, was convicted by a Williamson County jury of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony, and evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of 2.7 years as a mitigated offender to be served on probation after the service of sixty days incarceration for the conspiracy offense and a concurrent sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the evading arrest offense. The defendant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him judicial diversion. Upon a full review of the record, arguments of counsel and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Kascey Marquis Campbell, of first degree premeditated murder, two counts felony murder, robbery, and aggravated burglary. On appeal, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that he acted under duress. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Eric D. Wallace, appeals from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his second pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the parties’ briefs and applicable law, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

In 1985, the Petitioner, Donnie E. Johnson, was convicted of the first degree murder of his wife, Connie Johnson. See State v. Johnson, 734 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tenn. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994, 108 S. Ct. 1303 (1988). The jury imposed and the trial court approved a sentence of death. Id. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by both the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief, which was unsuccessful. See Donnie E. Johnson v. State, No. 02C01-9111-CR-00237, 1997 WL 141887, at * 1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 27, 1997), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Sept. 8, 1997); Donnie Edward Johnson v. State, No. 02C01-9111-CR-00237, 1995 WL 603159 (Tenn., Oct. 9, 1995); Donnie Edward Johnson v. State, No. 02C01-9111-CR-00237, 1994 WL 90483, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 23, 1994); Donnie Edward Johnson v. State, No. 02-S-01-9207-CR- 00041, 1993 WL 61728, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 8, 1993). On June 9, 2006, Petitioner Johnson filed a petition to compel testing of biological evidence as provided by the Post- Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court denied the petition on October 9, 2006. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Johnny Baxter, was convicted by a McMinn County jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, for which he received a sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on child abuse as a lesser included offense, and that the trial court failed to account for mitigating proof in its sentencing determination. We hold that no error exists, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tommy Lee Henry, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and a third offense of possession of cocaine, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years for the tampering conviction and two years for the possession conviction to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He claims that the police illegally detained him when they found him inside a parked car with two other individuals in a high-crime area at approximately 3:00 a.m. and that they illegally seized evidence during the detention. We hold that the trial court properly denied the motion, and we affirm its judgments.

The defendant, Heath Baldwin, pled guilty to misdemeanor assault and received an agreed eleven month, twenty-nine day sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the court ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of an alternative sentence,  specifically the denial of probation. After our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

The defendant, Edgar White, Jr., was convicted of driving under the influence (first offense) (DUI) and simple possession of marijuana, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in jail for each, suspended to thirty days, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence that formed the basis of his convictions and the length of his sentence. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain both convictions, and we affirm the convictions. We also affirm the sentence imposed by the trial  court.

The defendant, Dodrick Losame Houston, pled guilty to burglary and violating the motor vehicle habitual offender law, Class D and E felonies respectively. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years for the former and one year for the latter, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of three years. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying probation. Following our review, we affirm the sentences ordered by the trial court.

Because I conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in giving its instructions to the jury, I am unable to join the majority’s affirmance of the appellant’s sentence and respectfully dissent.

The State charged the appellant, Lee Turner, with misdemeanor assault, and a Marion County Circuit Court jury convicted him of that offense. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served at seventy-five percent. On appeal, the appellant contends (1) that the trial court erred by giving the jury an improper “dynamite” or Allen charge after the jury announced it was deadlocked; (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to admit the victim’s prior juvenile conviction into evidence for impeachment purposes; and (3) that the trial court relied on unsubstantiated facts in determining the appellant’s sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Rickey Hogan, appeals the order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising two issues: (1) whether his concurrent, forty-year sentences, imposed in 1985 for robbery with a deadly weapon and second degree murder, are void; and (2) whether the Department of Correction has miscalculated the expiration date of his sentences. Following our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s order of dismissal.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Edgar Lewis Ries, of attempted first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty years for his convictions. On appeal, he alleges there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error exists, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Jerome Sawyer, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to eighteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. This Court affirmed his conviction. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After appointing counsel and conducting several hearings, the trial court denied his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) the post-conviction court improperly allowed trial counsel to be examined outside of Petitioner’s presence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.