APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jerral D. Parris, was indicted on two counts of extortion. A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant of two counts of attempted extortion. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the following: (1) attempted extortion is not a crime in Tennessee; (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of attempted extortion; (3) the trial court improperly denied a motion for a change of venue; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to allow the Defendant to test and inspect audio tape evidence; (5) the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial after the Defendant was compared to a notorious murderer; (6) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the affirmative defense to extortion; and (7) the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we determine that attempted extortion is a crime in Tennessee and that there was sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of this crime. His conviction, however, must be reversed because the trial court improperly refused to allow a jury instruction on an applicable affirmative defense. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Appellant, Michael J. Hart, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court. Hart pled guilty to first degree felony murder, aggravated robbery, and felony evading arrest, and received an effective sentence of life without parole. On appeal, Hart contends that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness during the pre-plea proceedings. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Joseph Hough, appeals the trial court's denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's order pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition presents no cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Billy Alfred Mathes, was convicted by a Greene County jury of burglary. On appeal, he alleges there was insufficient evidence for any rational jury to convict him of that crime and that his sentence of six years was excessive. Finding no error exists, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Nathaniel Richardson, pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, and he was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to seven years of supervised probation, with the first year to be served on intensive probation. After two probation violation warrants were issued based upon two arrests and other violations, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. It is from this judgment that the Defendant now appeals, contending that, while the trial court was within its discretion to revoke his probation, his violation does not warrant the imposition of his entire sentence. Concluding there exists no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his convictions of first degree premeditated murder, setting fire to personal property, and abuse of a corpse, the petitioner, Chet Allen Walker, sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the Hamilton County Criminal Court after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to call a particular character witness. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Jeffery McClennon Morris, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, as well as domestic assault and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, Class A misdemeanors. He was sentenced as a violent offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction for the felony and concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence; (2) whether certain of his statements were admitted at trial in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A); and (3) the validity of his indictment for domestic assault. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Phillip Eugene Johnson, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of statutory rape and sexual battery and was sentenced to an effective term of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that prosecutorial misconduct caused the jury to render an adverse verdict. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Michael Bailey, was indicted on four counts of aggravated robbery. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted on all four counts. Because the four counts represented four different theories of prosecution for the same criminal episode, the trial court merged the convictions and sentenced Defendant to thirty years as a career offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s decision to admit evidence during rebuttal of another robbery committed by Defendant, the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of theft and assault and the trial court’s decision to allow the State to impeach Defendant with evidence of his thirteen prior convictions for aggravated robbery. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

The Petitioner, James Mario Starnes, entered an open guilty plea in the Bedford County Circuit Court to attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. He received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. He subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner argues (1) that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) that he entered an involuntary guilty plea, and (3) that an insufficient factual basis exists for his plea. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Clifford Bryant Johnson, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a class B felony, and sentenced to nine years in prison as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals his conviction, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the defendant’s conviction.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Shannon Mayes, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Shannon Mayes, No. M2002-02091-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 49111, at *1-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 15, 2003), perm. app denied (Tenn. May 3, 2004). Petitioner then brought a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court subsequently denied the petition. He now appeals that denial, arguing that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress his statement to police. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Came the defendant, Mark A. Schiefelbein, through counsel, and the State of Tennessee, through the attorney general, upon the defendant’s appeal from the judgments of the Williamson County Circuit Court, where a jury convicted the defendant of seven counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor.  Following extensive briefing, oral argument, and our review of the record and the applicable law, we modify the imposition of consecutive sentences but otherwise affirm the convictions and sentences.

The petitioner, Wendell Daniel Washington, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to nine counts of child rape and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping and, pursuant to the plea agreement, received an effective forty-five-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. In this appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Defendant, Carolyn J. Nobles, pled guilty to three counts of check forgeries, and a jury found her guilty of sixty-eight check forgeries. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a Range I offender, to an effective sentence of seventeen years and six months. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions and that the trial court erred when sentencing her by denying her alternative sentencing and by ordering that some of her sentences run consecutively. Concluding there exists no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the defendant’s convictions. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s arrest was lawful.  Under the evidence at the suppression hearing, I believe that the defendant was not subject to a warrantless arrest because he was no longer at the “scene of a traffic accident” as contemplated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-103(a)(6) and that he was not otherwise subject to arrest for a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence or for a felony. See T.C.A. § 40-7-103(a)(1)-(3). I believe the defendant was at his home, where he was not subject to a warrantless arrest for misdemeanor driving under the influence. In this regard, I note that after the offense in this case, the law was changed to permit the warrantless arrest of an individual involved in an accident who has left the scene, provided the arrest takes place within four hours of the accident and the officer has probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving under the influence. See T.C.A. § 40-7-103(a)(10).  I do not believe this provision can apply in this case.

The defendant, Claude Thomas Davis, was convicted of driving under the influence, seventh offense (Class E felony); driving on a revoked license, third offense (Class A misdemeanor); and violation of the implied consent law (Class A misdemeanor) on October 26, 2004. He was sentenced to serve two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence gathered by law enforcement at his home which is also a place of business located on the parking lot where the driving offense occurred. We affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The Appellant, William Clay Bohanan, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County jury of felony escape and vandalism of property valued under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, Bohanan raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the defenses of duress and necessity; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Following review, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The Appellant, Daniel Eugene Bradford, appeals the sentencing decision of the Hardin County Circuit Court. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Bradford pled guilty to aggravated assault and misdemeanor assault, receiving concurrent sentences of three years for the felony conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor conviction. The manner and service of the sentences were to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, Bradford challenges the trial court’s denial of probation. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Before the court is petitioner Thomas Edward Hogue’s appeal from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his October 2005 “Petition to Set Aside Guilty Plea and to Issue a Writ of Error Coram Nobis.” Based upon an untimely filing of the petition, we affirm the order of dismissal.

This cause came before the court upon the State of Tennessee’s petition for a rehearing, wherein the State posited that the court’s opinion in this cause incorrectly referred to the statutory provision for the writ of error coram nobis in civil cases when a reference to the statute governing criminal cases should have been used. We agree.

The Appellant, Raymond Earl McKay, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Fayette County Circuit Court. McKay pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced, as a career offender, to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he asserts that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we conclude that McKay received erroneous advise from counsel during the plea bargaining process, which resulted in the entry of an involuntary and unknowing guilty plea. Finding both deficient performance and prejudice, the case is remanded to the trial court for withdrawal of the guilty plea.

The State appeals the habeas court’s grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by the Petitioner, Anthony Keshun Goods. The Petitioner alleged in his petition that his sentence was illegal because he was sentenced to concurrent terms when the law required him to be sentenced to consecutive terms. On appeal, the State contends the statutory requirement of consecutive sentences does not apply to the Petitioner, his petition is not yet ripe, and the remedy set out by the habeas court is improper. Finding reversible error in the judgment of the habeas court, we reverse the judgment and dismiss the habeas corpus petition.

The Defendant, Michael D. Gilliam, appeals from the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his probation and ordering that his eight-year sentence be served in the Department of Correction. In December of 2003, the Defendant pled guilty to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine for resale and received an eight-year sentence. The sentence was suspended following service of twenty days in the county workhouse, and the Defendant was placed on probation. On June 23, 2005, a warrant was issued, wherein it was alleged that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Defendant violated the conditions of his probationary sentence and ordered that his original eight-year sentence to the Department of Correction be reinstated. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that his sentence be served in confinement. After a review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Calvin Fleming, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced, as a career offender, to an effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted photographs of the victim’s wounds into evidence because the State failed to authenticate them; (2) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for attempted first degree murder because there was no proof of premeditation; and (3) his convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault violate constitutional principles of double jeopardy. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the attempted murder, but we reverse the judgment as to the aggravated assault because the aggravated assault should have been merged into the attempted murder. Thus, we remand the case for the trial court to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion.